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This research report is the first to systematically engage with the growing political 
agenda of the climate-security nexus and to place a particular focus on the 
relationship between the state and the only international organ with a mandate 
to maintain international peace and security: the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). Discussions that have been ongoing since 2007, scattered 
governmental positions and the difficulty of achieving an overview of the various 
understandings, topics, concerns and responses of the UNSC member states 
in relation to the climate-security nexus all indicate a need to address this 
topic. This report therefore assesses and maps if and how the UNSC members 
acknowledge the linkages between climate change and security and how they 
position themselves with respect to these debates in the UNSC.
With a large international network of interdisciplinary and country-specialized 
partner scientists, the analysis relies on an extensive spectrum of official 
primary sources from member state governments, various ministry strategies 
(such as those addressing security and climate change), UNSC documents 
and interdisciplinary academic literature on the climate-security nexus. It is 
located in the context of substantiated planetary climate emergencies and 
existential threats as well as urgent calls for action from the UN and member 
state representatives, scientific networks in Earth System Sciences and youth 
protests.
Based on broad empirical research findings, this report concludes that all 
15 current UNSC member states acknowledge the climate-security nexus in 
complex, changing and partly country-dependent ways. The report formulates 
an outlook and recommendations for decision-makers and scholars with a 
particular focus on strengthening the science-policy interface and dialogue 
and emphasizing the urgent need for institutional, multilateral and scientifically-
informed change. It also illustrates how essential it is for the UNSC to recognize 
and adapt institutional working methods to the interrelations of climate change 
and security and their effects as a cross-cutting issue.
This report contains detailed research results that serve as the basis for the 
IFSH Policy Brief 5/20: “A Climate for Change in the UNSC? Member States’ 
Approaches to the Climate-Security Nexus” (Hardt 2020).
Abstract
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This research report and the related policy brief (Hardt 2020) contain the 
main research results from the project “The role of climate change in security 
conceptions and perceptions of the UNSC member states,” which was carried 
out in cooperation with the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at 
the University of Hamburg (IFSH) and the Research Group Climate Change and 
Security (CLISEC) at University of Hamburg. The project was funded by the 
German Federal Foreign Office.
Funding
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The world is facing the dramatic implications associated with climate change 
– ranging from vulnerability, instability and poverty, to statehood loss, violent 
conflict, global health effects, forced displacements and the increased intensity 
and frequency of hydrological disasters, to threats to the future of humanity 
itself (e.g. UNGA 2009c, b; UNSC 2011). In response the UN Secretary-General 
António Guterres (2019) has warned, “Let us not mince words: the climate 
crisis is a race against time for the survival of our civilization, a race that we 
are losing” and urged decisive action. The need for coordinated state and UN 
actions to successfully address the multiple security threats emanating from 
climate change – referred to here as the climate-security nexus – has also been 
expressed by several UN institutions (UNEP 2011; UNDP 2019), and the 2018 
creation of the UN Group of Friends on Climate Security and the Climate Security 
Mechanism illustrates both the mounting concern among the wider UN family 
and the growing political agenda of the climate-security nexus. 
Despite these multiple calls for action, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
– the international institution most relevant to the issue and with the mandate to 
maintain international peace and security according to the UN Charter – has 
thus far refrained from officially recognizing the multiple implications that climate 
change has on security. Debate on this issue dates back to the year 2007, when 
the question was first posed.
One of the reasons a consensus has never been reached on this issue is the 
fact that member states view the UNSC through the lens of diverging individual 
positions, political concerns, and different understandings of and approaches 
to security. Moreover, various discussions are repeatedly hampered by the 
complexity of different concerns, ranging from conflicts, injustice and threats 
to future generations to questions of adequate responses within contemporary 
institutional settings and the relationship between the UNSC and national 
sovereignty. 
This research report addresses the growing political agenda of the climate-
security nexus by engaging with the member states’ seemingly disparate, 
scattered positions and approaches in order to make them more accessible. 
The central questions are whether and how the current 15 members (see Figure) 
perceive and address climate change in relation to security and approach 
the so-called climate-security nexus within a broad spectrum of policies and 
1. Introduction
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practices. To this end, the report draws on the research results of the project 
“The role of climate change in security conceptions and perceptions of the 
UNSC member states”, which was carried out by the authors in cooperation 
with a large international network of interdisciplinary and country-specialized 
partner scientists. 
To date, this report is the only systematic and standardized analysis that detects 
and compares the 15 UNSC member states’ positions on this question (see 
Zhou 2017; Scott and Ku 2018). It relies on a broad range of official primary 
sources: member state government policies, various ministry documents (such 
as security strategies, military doctrines, policy frameworks and presidential 
orders), UNSC documents and interdisciplinary academic literature on the 
climate-security nexus. It roughly covers the period from 2007 through April 
2020 with a particular emphasis on recent events, and it includes member 
state activities at the domestic, regional and international levels as well as their 
corresponding positions in the UNSC. 
The analysis is informed by a broad approach to Security, Peace and Conflict 
Studies and the literature on the climate-security nexus. This research aims 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the UN (n.d.).
Figure 1: 2020 UNSC Member States
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to contribute to the question of whether and how climate and security politics 
converge at the national and international level and therefore places the analysis 
in the context of existential threats and the ongoing planetary climate emergency 
as well as urgent calls for action from the Earth System Sciences (Rockström et 
al. 2009; IPCC 2018, 2019; Lenton et al 2019; Steffen et al. 2020), scientific 
networks (Club of Rome 2020; Ripple et al. 2019; Hagedorn et al. 2019), and 
youth (Friday For Future, e.g. Thunberg 2018) and broader civil society (e.g. 
Extinction Rebellion) protests. 
The research was carried out through the lens of four main research foci that 
structure the analysis and provide an overview of how the member states 
acknowledge, describe and approach the linkages between climate change and 
security. 
The first research focus detects a) whether and how the ministries of defense 
and the military – the so-called traditional security sector – acknowledge and 
approach climate change. The second research focus detects b) how other state 
actors (e.g. heads of state and various ministries) include and/or address the 
connections between climate change and security. This perspective is called 
the extended security sector because it refers to a broad and encompassing 
understanding of security and security measures. The third analytical category 
has a topical focus and detects c) descriptions of climate change that indicate 
a conception of existential security focused mainly on the articulations of 
existential threats and of humanity’s existence as a core value to be secured. 
This idea is referred to throughout as an existential security perspective. In 
contrast to the classical security categories (e.g. peace and conflict), it detects 
whether a new understanding of security – one that considers the irreversible 
and existence-threatening effects often associated with the characteristics of 
the Anthropocene geological epoch (e.g. Crutzen 2002; Steffen et al. 2020) and 
Earth System Sciences research results (e.g. IPCC 2018, 2019; Steffen et al. 
2020) – is approached and acknowledged. The fourth research focus detects 
d) the member states’ respective positions on the issue of addressing climate 
change in the UNSC. 
These four research foci also provide the basis for the comparative analysis and 
main conclusions, which, in turn, form the basis of recently published policy 
recommendations (Hardt 2020). Future publications and elaborations of the 
extensive research findings are envisaged. The elaboration of the country case 
studies was carried out mostly before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Since its creation, the UNSC has focused predominantly on issues of violent 
conflict, war and military activity. However, the UNSC has evolved significantly 
in recent years and has dealt with broader security topics including a more 
encompassing concept of human security, the Responsibility to Protect, and 
the plight of women (e.g. Resolution 2493 (UNSC 2019b)) and children (e.g. 
Resolution 2427 (UNSC 2018a)) in conflicts. The highest institution with the 
mandate to maintain international peace and security is thus a dynamic and 
evolving institution (Scott and Ku 2018; Conca 2019:14). Debates on addressing 
climate change in the UNSC can be traced back to the year 2007. The very first 
debate, initiated by the United Kingdom (UK), was focused on climate change, 
energy and security. The next open debate, initiated by Germany in 2011, led 
to a presidential statement which “expresses [the Security Council’s] concern 
that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate 
certain existing threats to international peace and security” and also addressed 
potential territory loss in low-lying island states (UNSC 2011). 
Several Arria-Formula meetings – an informal UNSC working format that 
provides an opportunity to exchange views with external experts and civil 
society representatives (Security Council Report 2020) – followed (see What’s 
in Blue 2013, 2015). The topics discussed in these meetings revolved around 
the “security implications of climate change: sea level rise” (Permanent Mission 
Ukraine 2017), “preparing for [the] security implication of rising temperatures” 
2. Climate change and  
 security at the United Nations  
 Security Council
The research report has been structured into five sections. Following this 
introduction, section two provides a description of the empirics on the debates in 
the UNSC. The third section presents the analytical background and approach of 
this research report. Section four contains the research findings on the climate-
security nexus in all 15 current UNSC member states (listed in an alphabetical 
order). The comparative analysis of the case studies, the main conclusions, key 
recommendations and outlook concerning policies and theory development are 
presented in section five.
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(What’s in Blue 2017) and the potential to “transform these new threats into 
opportunities for cooperation” (Eliasson 2015).
The first open debate in the UNSC since 2011 was held in 2018. Initiated by 
Sweden, it focused on climate-related security risks (UNSC 2018b) and was 
followed by an open debate in 2019, initiated by the Dominican Republic, that 
emphasized the effects of climate-related disasters on international peace and 
security (UNSC 2019c). 
More recently, an Arria-Formula meeting on climate and security risk in April 
2020 (Permanent Mission of France 2020) resulted in a joint statement of 
10 UNSC member states on a joint initiative to address climate-related security 
risks within the UNSC context (Permanent Mission of Germany 2020). A 
subsequent debate hosted by Germany took place in July 2020.
Despite various actors’ serious concerns and multiple efforts, the UNSC 
remains reluctant on this topic due to the member states’ lack of consensus. 
The arguments and concerns of the member states for or against including 
climate change on the UNSC agenda can be summarized as follows (see 
Maertens 2019; Conca 2019; Scott and Ku 2019 for more detailed descriptions): 
The critics refer mainly to the risks of further militarization, de-politicization, 
the co-optation of climate politics to further power politics, the duplication of 
tasks within the UN, the potential to overrule sovereign decision-making, and 
inadequate and simplified responses to the interlinked climate-security threats. 
The proponents underline the need to include the existing and growing threats 
of climate change in a broader consideration of security. They reject the critics‘ 
assertion that viewing a problem as a security problem necessarily leads to 
militarization, arguing instead that successful security policy has a wide range 
of instruments at its disposal, including soft security measures. The debates are 
therefore shaped by the possible directions, tools, and forms of security policy 
and by how or to what extent the UNSC could or should (not) address and include 
climate change (thereby officially recognizing socioecological phenomena for 
the first time) as part of its agenda. The debates are thus not only focused on the 
different effects of climate change on national and international security but are 
also influenced by discussions of the responsibilities, capacities, and authority – 
the very legitimacy – of the council and the lack of reform of the Security Council 
in a changing world (Conca 2019).
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Furthermore, the debates call attention to the fact that, despite refraining from 
officially addressing climate change, several UNSC resolutions and field missions 
since 2017 have included references to and operated on the premise of the 
adverse effects and implications of climate change, natural disasters and other 
ecological changes on stability and security, though only in relation to specific 
geographical regions and states, as the Lake Chad Basin Region (Resolution 
2349 (UNSC 2017), Darfur (Sudan) (UNAMID, Resolution 2429 (UNSC 2018c)), 
Somalia (UNSOM, Resolution 2461 (UNSC 2019d)), Central Africa (MINUSCA, 
Resolution 2499 (UNSC 2019e)), Mali (MINUSMA, Resolution 2480 (UNSC 
2019f)) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, Resolution 
2502 (UNSC 2019g)). 
It must also be highlighted that a growing acceptance of and activities on the 
topic have been noted within the broader UN System, as several UN agencies 
(UNEP 2011; UNDP 2019) and secretaries-general (e.g. Ki-moon 2011; Guterres 
2019) have pushed the agenda on the climate-security nexus. The establishment 
in 2018 of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) at UN Headquarters in New 
York as a joint initiative of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs 
(DPPA), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), promotes dialogue and exchange 
on the linkage between climate change and security among UN institutions (UN 
2020; UNEP n.d.) and works with UN entities and (sub-) regional organizations to 
integrate climate-related security risks into analysis, planning and programming. 
In addition, the Community of Practice on Climate Security, convened by the 
CSM, is an informal group of over 20 UN entities from across the UN system 
that meets bimonthly to facilitate the exchange of knowledge, experiences and 
lessons learned and identify opportunities for cooperation on climate security. 
It is open to all UN entities with a shared interest in addressing climate-related 
security risks. 
The establishment of the Group of Friends (GoF) on Climate and Security (co-
chaired by Germany and Nauru) to enhance actions on climate-related security 
risks within the UN system (German Federal Foreign Office 2018) also illustrates 
an increasing embrace of the topic and the necessity of engaging with it.
IFSH Research Report #005
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Security resides at the core of our conception of the world and is critical to 
central existential values of utmost importance, priority and protection (Hardt 
2018). Guided by the ultimate goal of securing survival against existential 
threats, security policy is often articulated as being above the cut and thrust of 
domestic political contestations. This means that security policy often operates 
independent of formal constraints, sometimes necessitating urgent responses to 
secure what are seen as fundamental or hard state interests (Hardt forthcoming 
2020a). The particular question of how security policy has included/will include 
climate change in the face of the increasingly threatening dimensions of climate 
change and the broader socioecological dynamics described by Earth System 
Sciences is one that has been the subject of urgent debates in theory and politics 
– debates to which this research report aims to contribute. The theoretical 
background and analytical approach are described in the following sections. 
3.1. SECURITY STUDIES: SECURITY CONCEPTS, PERCEPTIONS  
AND ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES
This research is broadly informed by Security, Peace and Conflict Studies, which 
deal with the multifaceted causes, processes, actors and contexts of security, 
peace and conflict (see Buzan and Hansen 2009). The analytical framework 
applied here acknowledges the existence of different approaches and schools of 
thought, and it attempts to utilize this broad field of existing approaches. These 
include the traditional approach to security, in which the state security concept 
adheres closely to national territories and military security responses to ensure 
the survival of the sovereign state (Mearsheimer 2001), and a concept of human 
security focused on the individual, in which several dimensions (food, energy 
and environmental security, among others) are based on the positive aspiration 
to secure basic human heeds (UNDP 1994; CHS 2003; Barnett 2007) and rely on 
a range of soft, preventive and hard security measures. Both security concepts 
(state and human security) constitute a fixed, generalized and condensed set of 
interlinked processes and relations that guide and describe security policies in 
an international state system both in theory and in practice. 
3. Mapping the climate- 
 security nexus: Analytical  
 background and approach
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DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITY CATEGORIES SECURITY PRISM
Value and asset  
to secure
• Defining value of utmost importance and 
priority
• Existential value or object connected to 
survival
• Constitution of the actor/system
What is the basic  
security value?
Security threat • Existential fear and threat
• Threat to survival and constitution of the  
basic value and/or asset to secure
What is the security 
threat?
Response • The form and process originate from an 
integral, groundwork-laying entity or an agency 
that is conceived for this purpose and is a 
component of the overall structure
• The measures are characterized by 
 - priority
 - urgency
 - extraordinary measures
 - routinized processes of immediate response
 - measures that can be reactive, defensive or 
precautionary
 - all-encompassing framework of routinized 
practices that feed into all other sectors
• interests that are pursued regardless of the  
costs incurred
• sacrifice of other values (e.g. violence in the  
name of security) 
What is the security 
response?
Table 1: Security categories, definitions and characteristics
The analysis presented here engages primarily with security perceptions, which 
locate the actor in historical and sociopolitical contexts and depart from the 
idea that security lacks an objective meaning, focusing instead on how meaning 
varies according to the protagonist and his ideology as well as to historical 
context, culture, theory, worldview, etc. (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 4). 
In reference to the different schools of critical security studies, such as the 
Copenhagen school (Buzan et al. 1998), the Welsh school (Booth 2005, 2007) 
and the Paris school (Bigo 2010), security is used here as a research category 
and a so-called security prism. This consists of a set of questions that assesses 
security perceptions and approaches by identifying the referent object and core 
value to protect, the threat, the response and the goals of security that lie at the 
very core of the security understanding of the actor analyzed (see table below), 
with a particular focus on how climate change is articulated and approached 
within the case study analysis.
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3.2. CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS:  
EVOLUTION AND APPROACHES IN RESEARCH
This research is also informed in particular by the evolution and tools of the 
literature on climate change and security. Literature on the linkages between 
environment and security dates back to the 1960s; since the 1990s, this literature 
has been recognized as its own research strand. The table below provides 
a simplified overview of the topics typically associated with the field of the 
climate-security nexus organized into various major research phases. It shows 
that the main focus arose in 2007 in reference to the publication of the fourth 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climat Change (IPCC) assessment as well as in 
relation to the first debate on the topic in the context of the UNSC (Brauch 2009: 
83). As can be seen in the table, the main research focuses on the interrelations 
of environmental issues and climate change with violent conflict (e.g. Homer-
Dixon 1994, 2004; Baechler 1998; Welzer 2008; Gleditsch 2015; Mach et al. 
2019; Brzoska 2018; Ide 2019; Scheffran 2020), cooperation (e.g. Conca, Carius 
and Dabelko 2005; Wappner 2013), peacebuilding (e.g. Matthew 2014; Ide 
2020; Krampe 2019; Hardt and Scheffran 2019), transformation (e.g. Brauch et 
al. 2016), and development and humanitarian studies (e.g. Barnett 2001, 2007; 
Barnett and Adger 2007; Dalby 2002, 2009; Floyd 2007; Floyd and Matthew 
2013), or in terms of including ethical considerations on human-nature relations 
in security thinking (e.g. Dalby 2013; Nyman and Burke 2016; McDonald 2018). 
More recently, several scholars have integrated Earth System Sciences research 
findings with a special focus on the Anthropocene (e.g. Dalby 2009, 2020; 
Harrington 2016; Hardt 2018, 2019, forthcoming in 2020a) into their work, 
but further development and integration of a new conception of existential 
security associated with the irreversible effects and life-threating implications 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Bigo (2020), Buzan et al (1998), Wolfers 
(1952), Hardt (2018:15-27).
• Consequence: either overrules everything else  
and thus renders all other questions and issues 
moot, and/or the establishment of routinized,  
all-encompassing/underlying practices on a  
continuum that feeds into all other sectors
• Effect: eradication of the threat through  
adequate measures and means
How is the security 
response brought about
Goal of security • Secure the basic value/asset
• Maintain or establish stability through secured 
survival 
What is the goal of 
security?
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MAJOR RESEARCH PHASES DOMINANT FOCI AND CONTENT
1st 1989 – ongoing First wave of research on the interrelation between environment and conflict: 
empirical case studies, mostly focused on national security 
2nd 1994 – ongoing Second wave of research on the links between environment and conflict: 
focused on different methods and empirical case studies
3rd 2003 – ongoing Research on the links between environment and peace
4th 2007 – ongoing Link between climate change and security: concept of climate security
Link to or inclusion of environmental security in human security
Environment and energy security/independence
Climate change, security and migration
Gender, marginalization, environment and security
Introduction of complexity theory and a critical focus on the de-politization 
of climate change through discourses of resilience, risks, adaptation and 
mitigation
5th 2009 – ongoing Foci of the Anthropocene as a new geological era and context for the 
environment/climate security link and human security; strong influence 
of Earth System Sciences (planetary boundaries) and Climate Sciences; 
emergence of Ethical Security Studies
6th 2017 – ongoing Focus on various institutions and on how the link between climate change 
and security is included/addressed or institutionalized. Discussion on how 
actors address the link and in what terms, and what future activities, risks 
and potentials might be
Outlook 2020 – ongoing Emergence of a next research phase on topics such as complex crises, 
tipping points, compound risks, how different actors (ranging from global 
governance and states to civil society) address the climate-security nexus, 
the merging of research communities and a focus on the science-policy 
interface
Table 2: Major research phases in the literature
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Hardt (2018:45).
The question of whether and how the UNSC could or should take action in 
relation to the link between climate change and security has also become a 
focus of debate among institutions (e.g. Detraz and Betsill 2009; Cousins 2013; 
Scott 2015). In recent years, theoretical work on this issue has been driven by 
the fundamental assertion that climate change has become an inescapable 
topic for global governance actors and regional institutions and can therefore 
no longer be ignored by the UNSC (e.g. Krampe 2020; Rüttinger et al. 2015; 
of exceeding the planetary boundaries and the hothouse Earth trajectory (e.g. 
Steffen et al. 2018; Steffen et al. 2015; Rockström et al. 2009; IPCC 2018, 2019; 
Ripple et al. 2019) is still to come. 
IFSH Research Report #005
16
Mobjörk et al. 2016; Werell and Femia 2017; Brock et al. 2020). Based on this, 
several proposals to address climate change in the context of the UNSC have 
been elaborated (Conca 2019; Dröge 2020; Parker and Burke 2017; Born, Eklöw 
and Mobjörk 2019; Zhou 2017; Scott and Ku 2018; Vivekananda et al. 2020).
The field, having significantly evolved, thus stands at a juncture that focuses on 
some of the central concerns of humankind through varying ways of relating 
environmental phenomena to conflict, cooperation, health, development, well-
being and existential threats (Hardt 2019). The climate-security nexus – the 
central research category – represents a conglomeration of the multiple topics, 
relations and implications associated with climate change and security in both 
theory and practice. It is important to highlight here that this report engages 
neither in an assessment of the scientific basis or validity of the descriptions 
articulated, nor in an evaluation of the activities with respect to the climate-
security nexus described. This is important to emphasize because the numerous 
linkages between climate change and security have been, in some cases, 
strongly contested and subject to scrutiny (e.g. Benner et al. 2020), especially 
due to their normative and political character as well (e.g. Chaturvedi  and Doyle; 
Klepp and Fröhlich 2020).
In addition to the approaches outlined above, the research furthermore draws 
on securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998) and the concepts of security as 
routinized practice and security as a continuum (Bigo 2010), and on the process 
of climatization of related policies (Aykut et al. 2017; Oels 2012; Maertens 2019).
3.3. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
In the form of a mapping exercise, this research report provides an overview of 
how the current 15 UNSC member states acknowledge and approach climate 
change in relation to security. The research design does not distinguish between 
the categories of permanent members (China, the USA, Russia, France and the 
UK) and elected members of the UNSC.
The systematic assessment of the UNSC member states’ basic policy approaches 
was developed in two main work phases. In the first step, 15 country-specialized 
partner scientists elaborated the respective country assessments (from 
December 2019 until April 2020) based on a provided methodological guideline. 
This is why the country case analyses, despite this shared approach, are notably 
influenced by the country-specific context, the integration of local perspectives 
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and the respective multidisciplinary expertise of the partner scientists. In order to 
have access to the perceptions as described by the actors themselves and avoid 
external descriptions, primary sources provided the main basis for the analysis. 
The emphasis is on relevant governmental documents, public statements and 
debates with a focus on the latest developments, including UNSC and UNSC 
member state documents from 2007 to April 2020. Due to time and space 
constraints on the project, the focus was limited to accessible information and 
issues explicitly expressed by the actors themselves.
In the second step, the research findings of the country assessments were 
included in an overall framework that structures the mapping exercise and 
aims to provide an overview of and better access to the states’ positions and 
approaches. This framework consists of four research foci in relation to different 
topics and actors and their positions in the UNSC context on the issue in 
question. In order to tackle the main question of whether and how the so-called 
traditional security sector includes or addresses the issue of climate change 
in relation to hard security approaches, the first line of inquiry focuses on the 
Ministries of Defense and the military.
The second focus assesses heads of government, governmental policies and 
various ministries such as those tasked with disaster risk management, health, 
the environment, economics, foreign affairs and domestic affairs. It asks whether 
and how these non-traditional security actors acknowledge and/or address the 
climate-security nexus in their respective policy fields. It is called the extended 
security sector because it enables the inclusion of actors and measures of the 
so-called soft security approach in the analysis. As such, it is influenced by 
several notions of the concept of human security, including multiple political 
dimensions as well as positive and preventive/reactive policy responses. In 
addition, this research focus contains responses to climate change in terms 
of the securitization and climatization of politics. It furthermore detects the 
described security effects of environmental phenomenon (e.g. sea level rise, 
extreme weather events or climate tipping points). 
The third focus traces a new dimension of security in relation to descriptions of 
climate change as an existential threat and/or in relation to the protection of a core 
value to secure. This idea can be described as an existential security awareness 
or as viewing security from an existential perspective. These descriptions make 
references to the Earth System Sciences and the Anthropocene, as these 
subject areas articulate a completely different threat quality and dimension of 
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security than descriptions of the effects that climate change has on the relatively 
classical concerns of international relations (e.g. peace, stability, development 
versus violent conflict, instability and poverty). 
The fourth research focus outlines the member states’ positions on the question 
of whether and how to include climate change in the UNSC agenda. 
To ensure the quality and reliability of the information and comply with scientific 
standards, all 15 country assessments were reviewed via an anonymous process 
by a local researcher after the first work phase. An overall review of the research 
was carried out by the Supervisory Group and with the support of the broader 
scientific network.
This section presents the research findings of the country case studies in 
alphabetical order. Each country case is structured around the four main 
research foci of acknowledgements and descriptions of the climate-security 
nexus, illustrated mostly in tables. The description of the member state’s position 
on the climate-security nexus in the context of the UNSC is highlighted in a box 
at the end of the case study. Each case study presents different approaches, 
thereby exemplifying and showcasing the variety and changeability of security 
approaches in the various countries.
The case studies elaborated in this report can be regarded as entry points for 
further inquiry. Future publication of a more detailed, in-depth assessment in 
a format to be determined is envisaged. Finally, it is important to stress that 
the elaboration of the country case studies was carried out mostly before the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
4. Climate-security nexus in  
 UNSC member states:  
 Case studies
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It is important to note that, since the 2016 Brussels attacks, Belgian security policy 
has been heavily focused on the fight against terrorism. In addition, Belgium has 
had no federal government since December 2018, and the institutional system 
is characterized by fragmentation. Climate change and environmental issues 
fall under the competencies of three different regional authorities. The National 
Climate Commission (NCC) functions as a coordinating institution between the 
different regions. 
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Security Review by the 
Ministry of Defense
Issued by the Ministry of Defense, it notes that climate change presents a threat 
to both national and individual security in developing countries as a “large 
number of people live in poverty, and climate change makes living conditions 
more difficult” (MoD 2019:23). The implications of climate change on food 
security are highlighted in relation to migration and instability, which could 
result in conflicts, terrorism (especially in the Sahel region) and competition 
for resources (MoD 2019:27). The MoD focuses on practical solutions based 
on technology transfer (for sustainable farming, to mitigate climate change or 
alleviate water scarcity, for example) to help developing countries address the 
instabilities created by climate change (MoD 2019) and/or intervene in disasters 
via the emergency support team.
Belgian First Aid and 
Support Team
As an emergency aid team under the umbrella of the MoD, B-Fast (B-Fast 
n.d.), created in 2003, immediately provides assistance to countries affected 
by natural or man-made disasters. As a cross-departmental unit, it includes 
the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others. B-Fast 
interventions are mobilized within 12 hours and last no longer than 10 days. 
Intervention requirements include receiving countries not being able to 
manage the crisis alone, agreeing with support and not being affected by 
armed conflict (MFTD n.d.).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Amandine Orsini’s research results.
Table 3: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Belgium’s traditional security 
sector
4.1. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN BELGIUM
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Amandine Orsini
As illustrated in the table below, the climate-security nexus is acknowledged 
within the traditional security sector, with major concerns placed on foreign 
affairs and, especially, on how climate change affects living conditions, food 
security and the interrelation of conflict and instability. In response to these 
issues, Belgium promotes development aid for capacity building and thereby 
supports other countries, especially those in unstable regions, in tackling the 
climate change problem. 
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Several reports, plans and surveys from various actors (see table below) show 
the Belgian extended security sector’s acknowledgement of climate change. 
The climate-security nexus is depicted in relation to development aid, but also 
in reference to the domestic vulnerability to sea level rise and slowing economic 




to the United Nations 
Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 2009, 2013, 
2014 and 2015
Created in 2002, the NCC is composed of representatives from the federal state 
and the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capital regions. It also includes the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs and Security, and it is responsible 
for the development of Belgium’s climate adaptation plans and reporting to the 
UNFCCC (NCC n.d.). In several reports, climate change is described as “an 
important source of instability in terms of food security, biodiversity loss, land 
degradation and desertification, (environmental) migration, public health and 
tensions that could lead to conflicts,” and it presents the reason for the “fight 
against climate change” in Belgian development cooperation (NCC 2009:125). 
Adaptation to climate change is seen as crucial for foreign and development 
policy. The need for climate change adaptation projects, e.g. projects on food 
and water security in developing countries (mostly in Africa), is emphasized 
(NCC 2009, 2013, 2014, 2015).
2016 National  
Adaptation Plan
The NCC issued the National Adaptation Plan with reference to climate change 
for the years 2017-2020. Focusing on domestic vulnerabilities, it describes 
Belgium as a country vulnerable due to sea level rise affecting flat coastal 
areas. It also highlights the need for invasive alien species risk analysis, energy 
security measures and crisis management (NCC 2016:35), concluding that 
“future climate change is projected to slow down economic growth, erode food 
security, and increase global inequalities” (NCC 2016:14).
Surveys to test Belgian 
citizens’ knowledge 
about climate change
Since 2005, DG Environment regularly organizes surveys to test Belgian 
citizens’ knowledge about climate change and their perception of governmental 
climate actions. In a comparison of three surveys, the number of problematic 
consequences of climate change worldwide mentioned by Belgian citizens 
increased over time, with melting ice, sea level rise and hurricanes mentioned 
in 2009, while food security, biodiversity impacts, heat waves and rain 
modifications were added in 2013 and 2017. In 2017, climate change was 
seen as an increasingly important issue; Belgian citizens perceived its 
consequences as mostly taking place outside Belgium but still as a threat to 
their everyday lives (DG Environment 2017b).
2017 Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs
This Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ international seminar on security implications 
of climate change addressed scientific trends toward “mitigation alternatives 
through deliberate and large-scale intervention in the Earth‘s climate system 
or ‘geoengineering,’ for example through solar radiation modification” and 
possible security implications resulting from these emerging climate-altering 
technologies (MFTD 2019).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Amandine Orsini’s research results.
Table 4: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Belgium’s extended security sector
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Regular surveys of Belgian citizens’ knowledge about climate change by the 
Ministry of Health, Food Safety and Environment (DG Environment) shows the 
rising concern for and awareness of adaptation measures within civil society. 
According to a DG Environment report on environmental impacts of climate 
change (2017a:23), “climate change has in particular links with food and water 
supplies, with biodiversity and ecosystem services, with raw material availability, 
with energy supply, economic development, migration, international relations 
and security.”
Acknowledgements of the climate-security nexus from an existential security 
perspective (see table below) have been detected in the Belgian constitution 
and in a reference to the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). 
The diversity of frames and geographical contexts here is striking. Direct global 
impacts of climate and environmental changes like droughts, floods, weather 
extremes and sea level rise, or new diseases, economic growth and energy 
security are identified on a national policy-making level. The dominant concern 
related to the climate-security nexus is, however, mainly located in developing 
countries and regions in Africa (e.g. the Sahel) as well as the SIDS. References 
and linkages to conflict, development, health, global inequalities and loss of 
economic growth are thereby highlighted. Furthermore, the assessment shows 
that Belgium mainstreams security issues into its national climate policies 
because of its own climate vulnerability. It can be observed that, knowing the 
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2017 Belgian  
Constitution 
Includes the right of Belgian citizens “to the protection of a healthy environment” 
in Article 23, and sustainable development is recognized as a general policy 
objective in Article 7bis: “In the exercise of their respective competences, the 
Federal State, the Communities and the Regions pursue the objectives of 
sustainable development in its social, economic and environmental aspects, 
taking into account the solidarity between the generations”(Belgian House of 
Representatives 2018).
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2018 Belgian 
Intervention 
This intervention during a ministerial meeting of the Group of Friends on 
Climate and Security included the statement that “climate change is a threat 
multiplier. This is for many the point of departure. It interacts with other risks 
and threats with direct and indirect implications for international security and 
stability; rising sea-levels pose a direct threat to existence of the SIDS” (MFTD 
2018).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Amandine Orsini’s research results.
Table 5: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Belgium from an existential 
security perspective
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extent of domestic climate risks, Belgium has progressively mainstreamed 
climate change into its international policies by first promoting bilateral aid for 
climate change adaptation in developing countries, especially to traditional aid 
partners or unstable regions. Thus, Belgium made the climate-security nexus a 
key element of its mandate at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with 
regard to conflict prevention in particular.
BELGIUM: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
In 2018, Belgium became part of the Group of Friends on Climate and 
Security, which aims to enhance actions on climate-related security risks 
within the United Nations (German Federal Foreign Office 2018). During its 
previous UNSC membership (2007-2008), Belgium was already among the 
supporters in the first-ever debate on the security implications of climate 
change (UNSC 2007). The nexus is again a priority of Belgium’s during its 
current membership in the UNSC (2019-2020). It aspires to cooperate closely 
with Germany in this regard to show that “security is not just armed conflicts” 
and that the consequences of climate change must be considered (Reynders 
2019). Belgium has emphasized the importance of climate change in conflict 
prevention, especially in countries with high vulnerability, i.e., Least Developed 
Countries and SIDS. For these, and in unstable regions in particular, climate 
change is said to function as a threat multiplier and therefore presents direct 
and indirect implications for international security that need to be addressed. 
Belgium also highlights the need for knowledge transfer on the nexus from 
different institutions within the UN system (e.g. the IPCC and UNEP) to the 
UNSC in order to bring them together to address security threats (MFTD 2018). 
The African continent and the Sahel region in particular is a security priority of 
Belgium’s, for whom the interlinkage between climate change, development 
aid, diplomacy and even military presence is regarded as an important aspect of 
conflict prevention (Reynders 2019). Belgium supports the United Nations Office 
for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and highlights the mission’s important 
role “in studying the impact of climate change on security, as part of ‘conflict 
prevention’ approach” (Pecsteen de Buytswerve 2019). The Middle East, Central 
Asia, and Pacific and Caribbean islands are also described as increasingly 
unstable and insecure due to climate change (UNSC 2019). Since 2019, Belgium 
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has been promoting the idea of greening the UN peacekeeping operations and 
operational consideration of climate risks (UNSC 2019; Van Vlierberge 2019).
During the recent 2020 Arria-Formula meeting, which Belgium co-organized, 
the Belgian representative recommended further mainstreaming of climate-
related security risks into the mandates of the UN and UNSC, including 
their in-country actions, and better equipping missions with personnel and 
training (Van Vlierberge 2020). Furthermore, the need for improved data 
and information management in risk assessments was highlighted. Belgium 
suggested establishing a “clearing house” within the UN to provide the 
UNSC with relevant expertise and expressed support for the Climate Security 
Mechanism. Accordingly, based on this strengthened supply of information, the 
secretary-general could make reports to the UNSC on climate-related risk and 
the regions most affected through, for example, horizon-scanning, and include 
recommendations for preventive measures. Finally, Belgium emphasized the 
importance of including civil society and, especially, the role of women when 
looking at these issues (Van Vlierberge 2020).
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4.2. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN CHINA
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Juha Vuori
As illustrated in the table below, the climate-security nexus is acknowledged in 
China’s traditional security sector, and the military has a broader mandate to 
address disaster relief and reforestation as well (Information Office 2011:33). 
Beginning in 1996, China introduced a new concept of security, which includes 
environmental issues alongside matters of defense, the economy, religion and 
geopolitics, among other aspects (Information Office 2004, 2006). Due to this 
broad approach to security, the presented findings that are categorized into 
three security approaches may appear, at times, to overlap and be in close 
dialogue with one another. 
The analysis of the China case study shows many empirical findings in reference 
to the extended security sector. As illustrated in the table below, climate change 
has increasingly become a part of fundamental policies at the domestic level in 
the last several years. While the focus lies mainly on domestic policies, there are 
some cases in which climate change is included in diplomatic efforts. In joint 
declarations on climate change by the US and China over the years, both “recognize 
that the increasing dangers presented by climate change measured against the 
inadequacy of the global response requires a more focused and urgent initiative” 
(NSCS 2013). Both countries “have a critical role to play in combating global 
climate change, one of the greatest threats facing humanity” (US Press Secretary 
2014) and announced their united support of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement “to win the fight against the climate threat“ (US Press Secretary 
2016). Indeed, “tackling climate change” was seen, rather than an urgent issue 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
White Papers on  
National Defense 
Considers environmental pollution (Information Office 1998); environment 
(Information Office 2004); environmental disasters (Information Office 2008); 
climate change as a security threat and global challenge alongside terrorism, 
transnational crime, economic insecurity, natural disasters and health concerns 
(Information Office 2011).
2008 Expert committee 
on climate change  
within the People’s 
Liberation Army 
The committee was established with its main focus on disaster relief issues. It 
consists of experts from the National Development and Reform Commission, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, China 
Meteorological Administration, State Bureau of Oceanography and National 
Natural Sciences Foundation Commission (Bo 2016; Freeman 2010).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Juha Vuori’s research results.
Table 6: Findings on the climate-security nexus in China’s traditional security sector
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of security, as a chance to “strengthen national and international security” (US 
Press Secretary 2014). This international policy approach can also be found in 
China’s South-South cooperation on climate change mitigation, in which China 
operates under the consideration of “mutual benefits” (NDRC 2013:60).
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Change in domestic 
climate policy of 
National Development 
and Reform Commission 
Identifies the dire effects of climate change on the domestic situation and 
presents China as among the states most vulnerable to them: “weather and 
climate disasters have impacted China’s economic and social development as 
well as people’s lives and property in a large degree” (NDRC 2012:2).
Mainstreaming of 
climate change in 
Chinese society, 
economy and policy line 
Incorporation of climate change into the main Chinese policy line and 
the mainstay of Xi’s ideological formulation of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” that entails the prioritization of ecological development and its 
incorporation into socialist ideas, e.g. through promoting green, cyclical and 
low-carbon development (NDRC 2013:2).
National Climate 
Change Plan (2014-
2020) considers security 
impacts
Climate change has an impact on “China’s economic and social development 
and is essential to maintain economic, energy, ecological, food security and 
the safety of people’s lives and property” (NDRC 2014: foreword).
President’s holistic 
overall security outlook 
on ecological security 
Contains “ecological security,” among other things (生态安全, shengtai 
anquan). This “holistic” understanding of national security is characterized by 
the combination of traditional and new approaches to security. Other issues 
areas covered are “the spheres of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, 
society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural 
resources” (Xinhua 2014).
War on pollution 
by President Xi’s 
administration
Declaration of war on pollution through reduction of air pollution (Reuters 
2014).
Five-Year Plan (2016-
2020) includes climate 
change
Contains the aim of keeping China ecologically secure and includes national 
climate policies. The plan states that China is working “hard to both adapt 
to and slow down climate change” and “take active steps to control carbon 
emissions, fulfill our commitments for emissions reduction, increase our 
capability to adapt to climate change, and fully participate in global climate 
governance, thus making a contribution to the response to global climate 
change” (NPC 2016:136).
Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection (MEP) 
and Ministry of Ecology 
and Environment (MEE) 
reports on the state of 
the environment
Direct impacts of climate change for China include: desertification, water 
shortage, sea level rise, air pollution, mudslides, ocean acidification, loss of 
biodiversity, and zoonotic diseases (can spread to humans due to changing 
environments) (MEP 2012, 2014, 2016; MEE 2017).
Holistic security as part 
of Socialist Chinese 
Policy
The policy includes, among other aspects, “ensuring harmony between 
human and nature” and is a part of “socialism with Chinese characteristics in 
the new era.” Policy is influenced by a “holistic approach to national security” 
that includes elements such as “traditional and non-traditional security, and 
China’s own and common security” with the intent to “foster new thinking on 
common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security” (Xi 2017b).
Table 7: Findings on the climate-security nexus in China’s extended security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Juha Vuori’s research results.
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In terms of an existential security perspective, the Chinese case study contains 
a special feature within this larger research project. The following table shows 
some examples of the acknowledgment of the climate-security nexus from an 
existential security perspective in the party constitution, the US-Chinese joint 
statement and in the context of the UNFCCC. In addition to these examples, it 
is a common and longstanding rationale in Chinese policy that climate change 
poses an urgent threat to all humankind. Climate change is presented within 
this policy line as a threat to shared human survival but not as much of a threat 
to China’s national security directly, because these are seen as two different 
issues, the latter being focused on the state and the ruling state party. Since 
2008, developing countries in particular have been regarded as being confronted 
with an existential threat and constraints to the “development of human society,” 
which could be causing social instability (Information Office 2008).
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US-China joint 
statement on climate 
change in 2014, 2016
A prominent instance of climate diplomacy and an example of the existential 
security approach is the US-China joint presidential statement on climate 
change, in which both states “have a critical role to play in combating global 
climate change, one of the greatest threats facing humanity” (Office of the Press 
Secretary 2014) and the united support of the UNFCC and the implementation 
of the Paris Agreement was announced “to win the fight against the climate 
threat” (Office of the Press Secretary 2016).
The Chinese 
Constitution (2017) of 
the Communist Party 
contains the aim of 
building a socialist 
ecological civilization
“The Communist Party of China shall lead the people in building a socialist 
ecological civilization. It shall strengthen the philosophy underlying ecological 
civilization that nature should be respected, adapted to, and protected… and 
take a positive path to development that ensures increased production, higher 
living standards, and healthy ecosystems” (Constitution 2017).
The connection between 
the effects of climate 
change and China’s 
domestic security 
concerns is expressed 
in China’s action report 
to the UNFCCC 
“To act on climate change in terms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and 
enhancing climate resilience, is not only driven by China’s domestic needs for 
sustainable development in ensuring its economic security, energy security, 
ecological security, food security as well as the safety of people’s life and 
property and to achieve sustainable development, but also driven by its sense 
of responsibility to fully engage in global governance, to forge a community of 
shared destiny for humankind and to promote common development for all 
human beings” (NDRC 2015:2).
Holistic security as part 
of Socialist Chinese 
Policy
The “Beautiful China Initiative” outlines the plan to implement the UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the development of a “harmonious” 
coexistence between humans and nature. In this vision, nature is to be 
“guarded rather than fought” and a “community of a shared future of mankind” 
(人类命运共同体, ren lei ming yun gong tong ti) is emphasized (Xi 2017a).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Juha Vuori’s research results.
Table 8: Findings on the climate-security nexus in China from an existential 
security perspective
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Indeed, President Xi Jinping has made environmental issues and an emphasis 
on “global ecological security” a major part of his policy. He has noted that 
China has taken a leading role in international climate change cooperation and 
become “an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global 
endeavor for ecological civilization” (Xi 2017b:4). Xi has listed climate change 
among common uncertainties and destabilizing factors such as terrorism 
and infectious diseases that all of humanity must face (Xi 2017b). Therefore, 
the “common aspirations” of all nations with regard to the climate issue is 
emphasized, as the impacts of climate change are global (NDRC 2013:3). Xi has 
expanded the narrative with the concept of “a community with a shared future 
for mankind,” for whom tackling climate change and protecting the planet is an 
existential question (Xi 2017b:53). 
In current Chinese policy documents, climate change is listed among a number 
of issues that challenge human survival on a global scale, and environmental 
and climate security are also part and parcel of a current overall security 
outlook that also emphasizes collective and universal security. The government 
focuses on the effects of climate change on human security in terms of social 
development, lives, and property. Yet “harmony between human and nature” 
(Xi 2017b:20) goes beyond security in that it is a vital aspect of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics in the new era” (Xi 2017b:22) – an essential part of Xi’s 
thinking. This indicates that climate change is recognized as a security issue, 
but the referent object is humanity in general rather than the Chinese nation; 
therefore, tackling climate change falls to international efforts in which China 
is expanding its leadership role. Nevertheless, China’s national security focus 
is still mainly on political security, separatism and terrorism. At the same time, 
concepts like “ecological civilization” (Xi 2017b:20) have become an integral 
part of the overall ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. While this 
may be the result of security-oriented thinking, it is not legitimated in national 
security speech. Climate change is widely mainstreamed in domestic policies; 
however, it is not a primary security concern.
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CHINA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
Since the first discussion of the topic in 2007, China has positioned itself 
against the inclusion of climate change as a security issue in the UNSC. The 
main argument has been that climate change is an issue of “sustainable 
development” rather than security. Accordingly, the UNSC, as the key 
instrument in the Council, is not responsible for tackling the issue and lacks the 
expertise necessary to deal with it (UNSC 2007). Despite this, China approved 
the 2011 UNSC presidential statement that described climate change as a 
“threat multiplier” (UNSC 2011). China nevertheless maintained its stance 
on the fundamental role of development and the view that the Council does 
not have the “means and resources” to address climate change. There has 
been a major change in this position. During the 2019 UNSC open debate, 
the Chinese representative stated that “climate change is a major challenge 
that affects the future and destiny of humankind” because of the havoc it 
wreaks and its impacts on water and food security and human life. Crucially, 
though, these issues are “disruptive factors in certain regions, undermining 
peace and stability.” China’s representative emphasized the need to “uphold 
multilateralism and foster a sense of community and shared future for 
humankind” over individual solutions. Development is still regarded as the 
main response to climate change-related issues such as “food insecurity, 
humanitarian crises and mass migration.” Accordingly, efforts need to work 
toward what the Chinese representative framed as “a world of lasting peace, 
universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness – a world 
that is clean and beautiful” (UNSC 2019).
During the recent Arria-Formula meeting in April 2020, the Chinese 
representative confirmed this standpoint and underscored that climate change 
represents a global challenge and poses a threat to food and water security 
and stability, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. To address these 
threats, he emphasized stronger international cooperation and coordination 
and the inclusion of all UN entities in their respective mandates. Due to the 
various understandings of the linkages between security and climate change, 
the representative expressed the need for further, country-specific analysis 
(Zhang 2020).
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4.3. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS  
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Ana Sofia Ovalle
The Dominican Republic (DR) is highly vulnerable to natural disasters such as 
hurricanes and floods, which are especially relevant in relation to the security 
implications of climate change. In 2007, extreme tropical storms Olga and Noel, 
which caused multiple deaths and internal displacement and heavily impacted 
the country‘s economy, helped encourage a shift in Dominican environmental 
legislation and contributed to climate change becoming a political concern 
(ECLAC 2008). In response to the country’s vulnerability, the state has put in 
place several legal instruments and entities related to national emergency. This 
is how disaster risk management and climate politics have been mainstreamed 
and, importantly, have come to underpin various policies in a very broad and 
integrated way. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR) 
is the principal body responsible for environmental issues, and it cooperates 
with regional and international actors to fund and implement related projects. 
The National Council for Climate Change and Clean Development Mechanism 
(NCCCCDM), chaired by the President, is responsible for formulating, 
implementing, and enforcing climate change policies and projects. The council 
also coordinates climate change efforts across different ministries. 
While the analysis did not detect acknowledgements of the climate-security 
nexus in the traditional security sector in the time period available for research, 
some of the institutionalized approaches (see table below) are related to the 
Ministry of Defense, which demonstrates a concern on environmental issues 
and disaster risk management. This underpinning concern of vulnerability to 
climate change has been especially detected in the long list of findings on the 
climate-security nexus in the extended security sector (see below).
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The institutional body SENPA, created in 2000, aims to monitor, detect, prevent 
and control environmental criminal activity throughout the national territory 
and also reports directly to the Ministry of Environment. SENPA is directed 
by military personal, works alongside the Ministry of Environment and plans 
national reforestation actions. In 2012, environmental border security capacity 
was reinforced with soldiers (SENPA n.d.). Recently, 881 individuals were 




In 2002, Congress promulgated the Risk Management Law (147-02), which 
resulted in the creation of the EOC. This objective of this oper-ational body is 
to integrate all key institutions in the preparation for and response to national 
emergencies from a cross-cutting perspective. The military is included in part, 
and the office operates under executive power in the case of an extreme event 
(EOC n.d.).
National Council for 





Compatible with Climate 
Change
2011 Strategic Plan for 
Climate Change
The council, established in 2008, is an inter-institutional body under executive 
power which formulates and coordinates national climate change policies 
with a cross-cutting view. It is chaired by the president and includes various 
ministries (e.g. MENR and MEPD) and civil society institutions as well as the 
private sector (NCCCCDM n.d.).
The 2010 plan was developed with funds from the German government and 
technical guidance from the Coalition for Nations with Tropical Forests. The 
plan is a fundamental strategic tool that established the GHG reduction goals 
and serves as the basis for mitigation actions. Since the DR’s GDP is very 
vulnerable to extreme event incidences, the plan aims to double the GDP while 
reducing GHG emissions by 65% by 2030 (NCCCCDM 2010). 
The 2011 plan outlines the addressing of climate change over the course 
of twenty years (2011–2030). Its objective, among others, is to achieve high 
capacities for climate change adaptation based on community knowledge. 
In particular, the adaptation of sectors vulnerable to disaster risks–e.g. food 
security, water and marine resources (especially in tourist areas), infrastructure, 
health, biodiversity, and energy–is envisaged (NCCCCDM 2011).
National Emergency 
Commission, 
2011 Integrated National 
Risk Management Plan
The commission is responsible for natural disaster policies and is composed 
of several entities, e.g. the Ministries of Defense, Environment and Health. 
It defines principles for the political sector but also the public and private 
sectors to reduce the risk of disasters and guarantee better security conditions 
for the population and the economy as well as social, environmental and 
cultural heritage. Climate change is mainstreamed in relation to disaster risk 
management as the DR is increasingly exposed to extreme events. In this 
context, the severe impacts of climate change and the need for resiliency are 
highlighted. Key aspects of the policy are prevention, mitigation, early warning 
systems and post-disaster management. The plan describes the security 
implications of climate change in relation to the population’s vulnerability 
to these aforementioned aspects. In response, sustainable production and 
consumption as well as societal adaptation are highlighted (NEC 2011).
2012 National 
Development Strategy
The Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development (MEPD) strategy is a long-
term vision for national development until 2030. One key element in relation 
to climate change is the development of a sustainable economy through the 
establishment of efficient and renewable energy systems (MEPD 2012). The 
strategy also mainstreams integrated risk management and environmental 
sustainability, which exemplifies the nation’s vision for tackling the country’s 
vulnerability to the risk of climate change-related disasters.
Table 9: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the Dominican Republic’s 
extended security sector
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Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ana Sofia Ovalle’s research results.
Climate change threatens the very existence of island states such as the 
Dominican Republic. This existential threat and the fact that climate change 
is mentioned in the constitution are categorized as examples of an existential 
security perspective (see table below).
2016 National Climate 
Change Policy
The MEPD and NCCCCDM (2016) elaborated the National Climate Change 
Policy to establish future actions within the political system. Among its 
objectives is the incorporation of climate change as a transversal political 
issue and linking climate change to other cross-cutting policies. It promotes 
a political and institutional framework that supports low-carbon development 




The NDC notes that the DR “is a middle-income country, however, it faces 
a number of development challenges, such as: poverty, education, health, 
security, etc. that exacerbate the challenge of adaptation and decoupling 
emissions from the economy” (NDC 2015: 2), and it includes a focus on 
climate adaptation in key elements such as food security, extreme events, risk 
management and early warning systems. It also contains a chapter on loss and 
damage highlighting DR’s vulnerability to extreme events.
2016 National 
Adaptation Plan for 
Climate Change
The plan was established by the NCCCCDM, the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources, and the United Nations Development Programme with the 
support of the Plenitud Foundation for the time period 2015–2020. The plan’s 
vision is “a country resilient to climate change” through increased adaptation 
capacity to extreme weather events. It outlines the reorganization of the current 
system and includes local communities as well as broader stakeholders in risk 
management. The incorporation of adaptation measures in infrastructure and 
(social and economic) capital investment as well maintenance operations is 
envisaged. The establishment of smart cities with disaster risk reduction and 
early warning systems is also encouraged. The key sectors considered are 
water and coastal-marine resources, biodiversity and forests, agriculture and 
food security, health, human settlements, infrastructure, energy, and tourism. 
Water and food security especially are defined as being vulnerable to extreme 
weather events such as droughts and rainfall phenomena (Plenitud et al. 2016).
2018 Gender and 
Climate Change Action 
Plan
The plan was elaborated by a collective of representatives from government, 
civil society, research institutions and international organizations. It attempts 
to integrate gender equality into climate change mitigation and adaptation 
policies. The DR “is among [...] most affected by climate events worldwide, 
and, in terms of gender equality, it is the fourth most unequal country in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, after Haiti, Panama and Guatemala. While women 
have important capacities as agents of transformation, they also have specific 
vulnerabilities that tend to be exacerbated in the presence of extreme climate 
events because they normally have fewer opportunities to access and control 
resources” (MENR et al. 2018: 11). To reduce inequality and vulnerabilities at 
the same time, a gender-sensitive approach to disaster management is among 
those envisaged; the approach considers “women’s economic security as 
well as physical and sexual security as they are more threatened in disaster 
situations” (MENR et al. 2018:11).
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The DR’s vulnerability to climate change is acknowledged by external actors 
as well. The USAID assessment report (2013) on climate change vulnerability 
describes aiming for a further “understanding of climate change impacts, both 
current and future, on resources that are critical to human safety, security, and 
prosperity – namely watersheds and coastal resources–in four climate-sensitive 
hotspots” (USAID 2013:9). Subsequent USAID reports have also described the 
DR’s extreme vulnerability to the impacts of climate change (USAID 2017; 2018). 
Generally, it was observed that, although the country’s strategic actions do not 
reflect a strong connection between climate change and hard security such 
as the military, climate change is a relevant issue regarding human security in 
both national and international affairs. The creation of the NCCCCDM and the 
constitutional amendment in particular illustrate the political consideration of 
climate change as a national concern and the concern with the security threat 
posed by weather events linked to climate change. Based on the literature 
reviewed and connections elaborated above, the research demonstrates the 
importance of climate change in the DR’s national agenda due to its climate 
vulnerability, which directly affects the livelihoods of its population through 
human security aspects such as food and water security and particularly with 
respect to weather extremes. 





In 2010, the DR embarked on a constitutional amendment process in which the 
NCCCCDM as well as local environmental groups brought climate change issues 
to Congress members’ attention through public consultations and several open 
discussions. Consequently, climate change mitigation and adaptation practices 
were incorporated in a constitutional amendment. Article 194, Plan of territorial 
ordering, states: “The formulation and execution, through law, of a plan of 
territorial ordering that ensures the efficient and sustainable use of the natural 
resources of the Nation, in accordance with the necessity of adaptation to 
climate change, is a priority of the State.” In addition, Article 67, Protection of the 
environment, holds that “Preventing contamination, protecting and maintaining 
the environment for the enjoyment of present and future generations constitute 
duties of the State” (Constitution 2015).
2019 UNSC concept 
note to open debate
“Disasters are not the only climate change-induced developments that 
affect security. Slow-onset hazards such as sea-level rise endanger the very 
existence of some small island developing States, especially the atoll nations 
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans” (UNSC 2019a:4).
Table 10: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the Dominican Republic from 
an existential security perspective
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
In context of the UNSC, climate security is one of the Dominican Republic’s 
main priorities during its membership (2019–2020). During its term as UNSC 
president in January 2019, the country initiated an open debate on Addressing 
the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security. 
In the concept note to the debate, the country highlighted the need to include 
climate change in the Council’s agenda as it affects as “one of the most 
urgent challenges the maintenance of international peace and security,” and it 
argued that, because addressing these risks goes beyond the mandate of the 
UNFCCC, climate change’s risks “fall under the responsibility of the Security 
Council” (UNSC 2019a). During the debate, the Dominican Republic therefore 
highlighted its own vulnerability to extreme weather events as well as the need 
to address the challenges collectively and throughout the entire UN system 
(UNSC 2019b).
In the recent Arria-Formula meeting in 2020, the Dominican Republic’s 
representative underlined the need for the full attention of the UNSC to be on 
this non-conventional threat because of its impacts on vulnerability, poverty, 
economy, displacement and insecurities, especially in developing countries. 
He further stated, “For many of us, it is a matter of existence. In the Caribbean 
the effects of climate change are not one of the major factors for social and 
economic challenges, it is the factor that creates multiple threats for [our] 
economies and our livelihoods.” Solidarity, moral share and responsibility 
are thus necessary to prevent climate change from becoming a direct cause 
of conflict, as it constitutes the “greatest global challenge facing humanity.” 
The Dominican Republic highlighted the need to consider climate change in 
the Council’s agenda, including in operations on the ground. Therefore, the 
strengthening of the Council’s expertise on the matter through, e.g. “tools to 
systematically assess the relationship between the effects of climate change 
and conventional risks, particularly in vulnerable areas” (Singer 2020) is seen 
as a necessity.
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4.4. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN ESTONIA
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Evelin Jürgenson
Based on the analytical focal points of this research, the table below illustrates that 
the climate-security nexus is acknowledged within Estonia’s traditional security 
sector and includes concerns about domestic and foreign affairs. Generally 
speaking, Estonia’s national security is seen as part of a wider international 
security effort and is therefore influenced by interconnections and global trends 
such as climate change (Estonian Parliament 2017a). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Evelin Jürgenson’s research results.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2010, 2017 National 
Security Concept 
The 2010 security concept states: “Conflicts, tensions and instability may also 
be caused by the reduction or unequal division of arable land, fresh water and 
other natural resources. Deterioration of the environment, especially climate 
change, may add to instability, as it is the poorest and most vulnerable areas 
that are often affected, and the probability of natural disasters is increasing” 
(Estonian Parliament 2010:5). It also includes a section titled Environmental 
Security, which opens with: “Estonia’s goal is to apply, through international 
cooperation, the measures required for tackling climate change and mitigating 
the risks stemming from it” and contains a focus on, among other things, 
pollution and the aim to enhance radiation protection and safety (Estonian 
Parliament 2010:19). 
In the 2017 concept, climate and environmental changes are said to potentially 
exacerbate tensions and cause conflict and global instability through their impact 
on livelihood and development (e.g. through the limitation of vital resources) in 
affected populations. Humanitarian emergencies and the state of the economic 
system are challenges for the international community. Accordingly, globalization 
creates risks for Europe through, for instance, violent conflicts, migration and 
extremism. To mitigate or even neutralize the risks caused by climate change and 
reduce vulnerability, the need for international cooperation and development 
assistance as well as conservancy and environmental protection is expressed. 
In addition, adaptation measures should be considered in all social dimensions 
(Estonian Parliament 2017a). 
2020 Ministry of 
Defense, public surveys 
on security 
The Ministry of Defense conducted a public survey which found that, while 
climate change presents possible threats, other threats are perceived as more 
urgent. Generally, a large part of the public perceives the world as unstable. 
Global climate change and worldwide economic crisis took fifth and sixth 
place in the threat ranking, after cyber-attacks, terrorism, migration and fake 
news. Nevertheless, the awareness of the connection between climate change 
and possible threats, as well as the consideration of climate change as a 
security threat, is growing (Turuuringute AS 2019). The same trend is visible 
among Estonian CEOs: 70% of the chief officers say that climate change is a 
considerable risk when planning their undertakings (PwC Estonia 2020).
Table 11: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Estonia’s traditional  
security sector
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Various ministries depict vulnerability and possible security implications at the 
domestic level in relation to rising sea levels and temperatures through the lens 
of the extended security sector. At the international level, the impact of climate 
change on increasing migration is highlighted in particular. Responses can 
be found in improved climate politics and strengthening resilience in foreign 
relations.
Another important characteristic that needs to be emphasized is the fact 
that security understanding in Estonia is strongly influenced by the country’s 
relationship to Russia (see Estonian Parliament 2017a). Therefore, Russia’s 
behavior constitutes Estonia’s main security priority (Estonian Foreign Intelligence 
Service 2019). This relationship is also is reflected in the consideration of 
climate change. An example of the climate-security nexus can be found in the 
link between energy security and climate change. Estonia’s energy sector is 
relatively import-independent because the country produces nearly 90% of its 
domestic electricity need from large reserves of oil shale, which accounts for 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Evelin Jürgenson’s research results.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2018 General Principles 
of Climate Policy 
The General Principles of Climate Policy, established by the Estonian Parliament 
and Ministry of Environment, function as a political guideline for the economy 
and as sectoral policy guidelines for the mitigation of climate change. The 
principles emphasize a long-term, 80% reduction from 1990 greenhouse gas 
emission levels by 2050 (Estonian Parliament 2017b). The main goal is to ensure 
“the preparedness and resilience to react to the impact of climate change” 
(Ministry of Environment 2018).
2017 Climate Change 
Adaptation Development 
Plan 
The plan, which the Ministry of Environment issued for the period until 2030, 
highlights how the state as such is becoming vulnerable due to climate change 
through rising temperatures and sea levels as well as more severe weather-
related natural disasters and costal erosion. Significant economic and social 
consequences for Estonian society (e.g. impacts on agriculture and food supply, 
health and infrastructure) are also expected. Reducing state vulnerability is 
envisaged through the mitigation of these risks by minimizing GHG emissions 
and through adaptation measures. However, the main risk is located outside 
of Estonia, especially in African countries with high vulnerability. Therefore, 
there is emphasis on development policy in relation to climate change. Estonia 
supports countries in climate adaptation measures mainly because of the 
possibility of increased migration to Europe and Estonia caused by climate 
change (Ministry of Environment 2017).
2016 Strategy for 
Estonian Development 
Cooperation
In the strategy issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Estonian 
development assistance, Sustainable Development goals (SDGs) are 
presented as guidelines for Estonian development cooperation with the goal 
of “strengthening resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards 
and natural disasters” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).
Table 12: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Estonia’s extended security sector
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approximately 80% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (World Energy 
Council Estonia 2016). While the Estonian government supports the low-carbon 
reform of its energy sector, it also points out that a stricter climate policy affects 
the country’s energy security (World Energy Council Estonia 2016). To improve 
the reliability of electric power and the gas supply, the Estonian National Energy 
and Climate Plan 2030 (NECP 2030) envisions joint projects between the Baltic 
states and synchronization with European continental networks to achieve 
independence from the Russian energy supply (Ministry of Economic Affairs 
2019). Therefore, energy transition in response to climate change is considered 
a security implication in and of itself.
An existential security perspective can be detected in the Estonian constitution 
in references to the environment and future generations, and in the quotes 
from the Estonian President comparing climate change to a weapon of mass 
destruction at the 74th United Nations General Assembly in 2019.




The preamble pledges “to protect the peace and defend the people against 
aggression from the outside… which forms a pledge to present and future 
generations for their social progress and welfare.” In Article 53: “Everyone has 
a duty to preserve the human and natural environment and to compensate 
for the harm that he or she has caused to the environment. The procedure for 
compensation is provided by law” (Estonian Constitution 1992).
2019 Statement by the 
Estonian President
“We took this responsibility [of the elected seat in the UNSC] because we care. 
We care about the weaker and the weakest among states and within societies. 
We care about those whose voice needs amplification by the multilateral world 
in order to be heard. [….] We care about nations facing extinction through 
the slow weapon of mass destruction– the climate catastrophe. We care 
about nations facing famine, and famine-induced disturbances due to climate 
change. We care about nations depending on this multilateral co-operation, 
based on the rule of law, which is the United Nations. We care because we 
know that true harmony for humankind– never yet achieved– depends on our 
capability to show compassion for the fate of others. Multilateralism is nothing 
but showing compassion for the fate of others” (Kaljulaid 2019).
2020 Statement at the 
Climate Security Berlin 
Conference 
Climate change “poses an existential threat to small island developing states” 
(MFA 2020). 
Table 13: Findings of the climate-security nexus in Estonia from an existential 
security perspective
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ESTONIA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
In 2018, Estonia joined the Group of Friends on Climate and Security with the 
aim of enhancing actions taken on climate-related security risks within the 
United Nations system (German Federal Foreign Office 2018). Climate change 
is a priority of Estonia’s membership in the UNSC (2020-2021). The connection 
between climate change and security is clearly made and communicated. 
Estonia emphasizes that security considerations need to include aspects like 
climate change that go beyond national borders, and it highlights the fact that 
consequences of climate change in conflict regions (e.g. the African Great Lake 
region) are likely. Climate change and related natural disasters and extreme 
events can cause migration, impoverishment (through water and food scarcity) 
and, consequently, increase pressure on conflict situations. Therefore, Estonia 
sees the need to consider climate change in the UNSC and extend the Council’s 
mandate accordingly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). 
During the recent UNSC Arria-Formula meeting in April 2020, the Estonian 
representative underlined the implications of climate change as a “driver to 
insecurity” and the “existential” threat that the SIDS in particular are confronted 
with. The Estonian representative suggested implementing comprehensive 
and strategic planning in order to achieve the preparedness necessary to 
respond to climate-related security risk. Estonia therefore demanded better 
coordination within the UN (e.g. reporting by the secretary-general and the 
consideration of impacts on peacekeeping missions) and on the national, 
regional and international level as well. To expand expertise on the topic, 
according to Estonia, a framework for knowledge sharing that shows best 
practices of analysis and forecasting tools is needed. Modern technology 
should be considered to create the digital infrastructure necessary to guarantee 
accessibility and meet challenges (Jürgenson 2020).
The findings show that all three security perspectives have been detected, 
and that the different threat descriptions range from the national level to the 
international and global levels. The responses refer mostly to the improvement 
of climate politics and the fostering of multilateralism.
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4.5 FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN FRANCE
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Adrien Estève
Acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus within France’s traditional 
security sector have been detected in several strategies and a white paper 
from the Ministry of Armed Forces (see table below). The focus here is mostly 
on how climate change erodes resilience in fragile countries through conflicts 
and migration, but the paper also highlights effects on the defense sector in 
terms of infrastructure, management of natural disasters and the opportunities 
for strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the topic. While foreign affairs 
constitutes the dominant focus, the effects on French overseas territories are 
also considered.
The 2015 COP21 forum and the resulting Paris Agreement have had a 
substantial influence on France’s policies. Since the beginning of the Macron 
presidency in 2017, climate change has become a key part of France’s foreign 
policy through the creation of new international initiatives, and it has become a 
dominant framework in domestic policy as well. The COP21 forum also affected 
the traditional security sector. In preparation for COP21, a study on the security 
implications of climate change was presented at the 2015 conference Defence 
and Climate (MAF 2018b). This study subsequently became a part of the current 
military doctrine called the Strategic Review of Defense and National Security 
in 2017 (MAF 2017). A notable feature of this doctrine is a special research 
unit, the Observatory of Climate Change Impacts on Defence and Security 
(OCCIDS). More recently, other important agencies (see table below) have been 
conducting analysis on the topic, and France’s involvement in the multilateral 
coalition International Military Council on Climate Security illustrates growing 
concern about the climate-security nexus.
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Furthermore, it should be highlighted that current French military involvement in 
initiatives in the Sahel Region can be connected to the climate-security nexus. 
These initiatives are part of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which addresses the 
adverse impacts on climate change on security, and that of the Sahel’s 2018 
G5 doctrine (G5S 2018). France has also played an important diplomatic role 
in the international legitimization of the debate on climate security in the Sahel 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Adrien Estève’s research results.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
Ministry of Armed 
Forces’ (MAF) 2008 
white paper on defense 
and national security
2017 Strategic Review 
of Defense and National 
Security
2018 Defense and 
Climate Report
The 2008 white paper contains several references to climate change in 
relation to the military outlook (MAF 2008), and the 2017 strategy establishes 
connections between climate-induced crises (floods, droughts) and security 
issues (migrations, armed conflicts). It describes climate change as a “risk” or 
“hazard” multiplier, particularly in terms of climate migration (MAF 2017). 
“Unpredictability and the combination of new forms of risks and threats are now 
the predominant norm in the strategic environment. The National Security and 
Defence Strategic Review published in October 2017 highlights ‘an era of great 
turbulence’, characterised in particular by an amplification of the effects of the 
risks and threats already identified in the 2013 Defence and National Security 
White Paper. Climate change is at the forefront of these risks” (MAF 2018b).
In the 2018 report, climate change is said to erode resilience in fragile countries 
and potentially exacerbate conflicts. Adaptation of military operations is 
envisaged, as is the commitment to sustainable develop-ment. France and its 
overseas territories in particular are affected by climate change: “The goal is to 
provide a collective response, based on the mobilization of French, European 
and international public and private actors. Although a potential source of 
tension, these common environmental and climate challenges can also be a 
source of renewed and extensive dialogue, as well as a ground for effective 
cooperation between States” (MAF 2018a:3).
Observatory of Climate 
Change Impacts on 
Defense and Security 
(OCCIDS) 
The research entity, created in 2016, provides the MAF with a tool to anticipate 
future climate-induced security risks. OCCIDS works on climate risks within 
the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategies (DGRIS) 
and was also involved in the 2019 International Military Council on Climate 
Security, which is a forum that aims to explore the “high-order security risks” 
and “geopolitical impacts” of climate change as well as its impact on “military 
and defense” (IMCCS 2020). 
The geographic foci are the South Pacific, South Asia, the Indian Ocean, East 
and North Africa and the Sahel Region (DGRIS 2020). OCCIDS analyzes 
the resilience of critical infrastructures in relation to climate change, the 
management of rescue operations during natural disasters, the surveillance of 
maritime spaces and how climate change can fuel existing tensions (OCCIDS 
2018, 2019).
Institute of Advanced 
Studies in National 
Defense (IHEDN)
The institute, which falls under the purview of the Office of the Prime Minister, 
develops strategic thinking and defense studies at the highest level of 
responsibility. Every year, it offers advanced training on contemporary security 
and military issues (known as “Defense Policy”) to select public and private 
executives as well as high-ranking military personnel. Forthcoming reports for 
the academic year 2019-2020 address the Consequences of Climate Change 
for Security and Defense (FMES 2019).
Table 14: Findings on the climate-security nexus in France’s traditional security sector
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through other important statements on the issue at the UNSC in 2018 and 2019 
(Permanent Mission France 2018, 2019). 
As seen through the lens of the extended security sector, acknowledgement 
of the climate-security nexus spans a broad array of institutional approaches 
and agencies such as the Ecological Defense Council (see table below). Other 
international initiatives such as the One Planet Summit (MEFA 2017) or Make 
Our Planet Great Again (President of France 2017) reveal a particular concern 
with the issue. Also worthy of attention in this context is the constitution of a 
citizens’ panel that was established in response to the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) 
protests (see table below). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Adrien Estève’s research results.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2009 Grenelle I law Names the “fight against climate change” as its aim and states the necessity of 
financing research programs on “infectious diseases and sanitary risks linked 





The FDA launched the program in 2017 following COP21. Its aim is to ensure 
international adaptation to climate change and tackle climate risks (in relation 
to economic and human risks) through improved governance mechanisms, 
better environmental policymaking and innovative engineering projects. It 
applies to France’s partners in Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean 
(FDA 2017).
2018 High Council for 
Climate
In 2018, the president created the council as a new independent advisory 
authority that gathers thirteen experts from various scientific fields and 
publishes a critical annual report on France’s climate policies. The first report 
highlighted the insufficiency of France’s carbon reduction policies and also 
issued a general alert about the lack of resiliency of France’s forests against 
wildfire risks (HCC 2019).
2019 Ecological Defense 
Council (EDC)
Created in 2019 by President Macron, the EDC is a council of various 
Ministers that deals with environmental issues and makes recommendations 
to the government on both ecological transition and climate change policies 
(e.g. preventative flood risk policies). The council has met four times so far 
(Presidency 2020).
2019 citizens’ panel on 
climate politics
In 2019, the constitution of a citizens’ advisory panel (the Citizens’ convention 
for ecological transition) on climate policies became a dominant framework in 
domestic policy. Created in response to the gilets jaunes protests criticizing 
inequalities caused by ecological transition measures (though fuel taxes 
in particular), this initiative strives to prevent tensions and build a more 
“democratic” and “concrete” approach to climate governance (Government of 
France 2019).
2019 National Assembly 
mission on climate 
imbalances and 
conflicts
The National Assembly has begun to interview members of the French security 
community and experts from the governmental initiative OCCIDS in order to 
develop a report on the linkage between climate change and armed conflicts 
by the summer of 2020 (NA 2020).
Table 15: Findings on the climate-security nexus in France’s extended security sector
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The issue of nuclear energy constitutes an additional noteworthy security 
dimension of climate change. During the 2019 heatwaves, France halted 
three nuclear reactors after river temperatures rose too high to cool them. A 
2018 parliamentary inquiry committee on the safety of nuclear infrastructures 
had previously highlighted the Nuclear Safety Authority’s lack of prevention 
measures regarding droughts and heat waves and had recommended improving 
its preventive framework (NA 2018). 
France has also addressed the issue of food security in relation to climate 
change. In 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food launched the 4 per 1000: 
soils for food security and climate initiative, which aims to improve climate 
resilience through the development of new agricultural practices and carbon 
sequestration to reinforce “agricultural resilience” by sustainably protecting 
people from food shortages and land degradation in areas such as North Africa 
(MAAF 2016). In 2018, the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs issued the 
Strategy of Development, which includes and highlights the link between climate 
change and food security (MEFA 2018).
France has experienced a large variety of climate hazards in its overseas 
territories. Since the early 2010s, these territories have been considered the 
primary focus in the study of extreme weather event impacts due to their natural 
fragilities (e.g. MAF 2017). 2017’s hurricane Irma played an important role in 
changing how political and military leaders responded to extreme weather 
events provoked by climate change (President of France 2017). The destruction 
of numerous buildings on the islands of Saint Martin and Saint Barthelemy shed 
light on the French military’s lack of preparedness in terms of assisting civilian 
populations in remote overseas territories (NA 2019; Senate 2019). To help 
ameliorate the effects of climate change overseas, France became part of the 
international initiative Climate Risks and Early Warning Systems (CREWS), which 
aims to build resilience in Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) against climate-related natural events and reduce 
global disaster mortality. CREWS includes more than 40 countries and four 
international organizations (e.g. the World Bank) (CREWS 2018). 
In the course of the research, a conception of security from an existential 
perspective was detected in constitutional references to the necessary protection 
of future generations and with respect to the SIDS. 
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Generally speaking, a growing interest in the security implications of climate 
change can be detected in France’s domestic and foreign affairs, while new 
programs, initiatives and institutions focused on identifying emerging climate 
risks have been established. France’s military involvement in fragile regions 
such as the Sahel and the Pacific are also referenced in relation to the climate-
security nexus via its linkage to hard security issues (such as terrorism and 
violent conflict). Under the current presidency going forward, France may seek to 
develop this globally-focused narrative internationally with its strategic partners.




Since 2004, the constitution has included a special environmental chapter that 
describes the deterioration of the environment and lays out the right to a healthy 
environment, which includes the precautionary principle, the promotion of 
sustainable development and the obligation to protect the environment for the 
sake of future generations (Constitution 2015).
2011 Statement of the 
French representative at 
the UNSC
“The climate threat concerns us all. It is, in particular, a threat for our small 
island Pacific State partners, whose very existence is in peril, as is the survival 
of their territory, culture and identity [...]. The climate threat means that we 
must mobilize ourselves: first in the short term, to ensure the success of the 
Climate Conference in Durban and the Climate Change Conference in Rio; in 
the medium term, to prevent conflicts that could emerge; and in the long term 
to save the planet. My delegation is convinced that the Security Council must 
come back to this and in the future must express itself in a single voice. This 
is not over-ambitious; it is just taking account of the sad realities that we face” 
(UNSC 2011).
Table 16: Findings on the climate-security nexus in France from an existential 
security perspective
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FRANCE: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
Ever since the first debate in 2007, France has supported and become one of 
the biggest advocates of acknowledging the link between climate change and 
security within the UNSC (UNSC 2007). In 2011, for instance, France stated 
that climate change is a global threat with “destabilizing potential” due to its 
impact on food and water security, among other things. Climate change was 
said to threaten the “existence” and “survival” of small island states in the 
Pacific in particular (UNSC 2011). In 2016, France played an important role in 
the debate on climate security in the Sahel Region, noting that existing security 
challenges like migration, political instability and extremism could be especially 
aggravated by climate change. France pointed to the link between climate, 
security and development and argued that the international community needs 
a collective approach to counter these long-term challenges not only in the 
Sahel, but in other vulnerable areas of the world as well (Permanent Mission 
France 2016). France also emphasized the importance of considering climate 
change a security threat during the UNSC open debates in 2018 and 2019 
(Permanent Mission France 2018, 2019) and, in 2018, France joined the Group 
of Friends on Climate and Security, which was initiated by Germany and Nauru 
with the aim of getting the topic on the UN’s political agenda (German Federal 
Foreign Office 2018).
More recently, in April 2020, France hosted the Arria-Formula meeting on climate 
and security risks, in which the French representative demanded that climate 
change impacts immediately become a key element of conflict prevention given 
that the effects on security are already evident (de Rivière 2020). Accordingly, 
the entire UN system needs to be included and its capacities (e.g. the Climate 
Security Mechanism) strengthened. France requested a resolution would give 
the secretary-general a mandate to conduct regular reports for the UNSC on 
climate-related risk and prevention recommendations, for which access to 
solid data would need to be provided. France also supports the appointment 
of a special envoy responsible for climate security to coordinate actions with 
the UN system (de Rivière 2020).
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4.6. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN GERMANY
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Franziskus von Lucke 
Several acknowledgments of the climate-security nexus can be found in the 
traditional security sector (see table below). Whereas, in the 2000s and 2010s, 
the military only rarely participated in debates on the climate-security nexus and 
undertook few institutional responses, this has changed slightly in recent years. 
For instance, the 2016 white paper and the 2018 Sustainability Report mention 
climate security implications, and there has been an increase in forecast meetings 
and expert hearings on the matter. While climate change is still primarily seen as 
an issue to be tackled by civilian actors and (international) climate policy (BMVg 
2019b), the defense sector and the military increasingly see a role for themselves 
in networked approaches to security, preventive climate foreign policy and in 
supporting the development sector (BMVg 2016, 2017). Beyond that, defense 
actors acknowledge the strategic importance of the effects of climate change 
on the defense sector and the necessity of further greenhouse gas reductions. 
Finally, they see an increasing likelihood that the demand for military support 
in cases of domestic climate-induced disasters (e.g. heatwaves, droughts and 
wildfires) could grow (Bundeswehr Journal 2018).
Table 17: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Germany’s traditional  
security sector
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2016 White paper 
on security policy 
and the future of the 
Bundeswehr
Issued by the Ministry of Defense (BMVg), the paper is the main government 
document on security and defense policy and describes climate change as 
a global trend impacting the “livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people” 
with “significant and life-threatening consequences for numerous states and 
their populations” (BMVg 2016:42). Accordingly, climate change has gained 
relevance for security policy as it exacerbates destabilization and conflict 
processes in regions of fragile statehood and can thus lead to violent disputes 
and migration. “Germany is therefore committed to anchoring climate change 
as a security policy issue in international organisations and forums such as 
the UN, the EU and the G7.” The focus is mainly on resilience building, conflict 
prevention and stabilization in affected regions (BMVg 2016:42), the fear being 
that instability and conflicts could spill over into Europe and Germany through, 




The BMVg’s sustainability report (2018a) supports the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and, in line with the “greening the military” 
discourse, envisages a reduction of the armed forces’ GHG output through 
energy savings, renewables and sustainable mobility.
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The lens of the extended security sector reveals that climate security argumenta-
tion appears with particular frequency in German foreign and development poli-
cy. The dominant focus here is on the negative effects of climate change on poor 
and vulnerable populations in the Global South as well as their human security. 
The most prevalent perception is one of climate change as a physical threat that 
will have several negative effects including extreme weather events, droughts, 
heatwaves and sea level rise. This will lead to the loss of livelihoods and arable 
land as well as to resource scarcity, food insecurity and famines (BMZ 2017; AA 
2019d). 
Debates at the domestic level focus mostly on disaster risk reduction, adaptation 
and strengthening resilience through the Ministries of Environment and the 
Interior. Especially since summer 2018, when heatwaves caused damage to the 
agricultural sector (Federal German Government 2018), and not least due to the 
massive Fridays for Future demonstrations, climate change has again become 
increasingly important in domestic political debates. This renewed attention led 
to the adoption of a new “climate package” in 2019 (Federal German Government 
2019), which, however, has been widely criticized – even in internal reviews by 
the German ministries responsible (Traufetter 2020) – and has been challenged 
(so far unsuccessfully) in court cases by civil society organizations (Deutsche 
Welle 2020). 
Strategic forecast 
meetings in 2018, 2019
The BMVg has organized several meetings on climate change, such as the 
2018 Strategic Forecast: The Artic Dialogue meeting that addressed the 
impacts of climate change in the Arctic as well as questions related to security 
policy (BMVg 2018b). The 2019 meeting of the Strategy and Foresight network, 
composed of experts from politics, business, science and civil society, shows 
efforts to gather expertise on the climate-security nexus within the ministry 
and prepare for changed mission scenarios (BMVg 2019b). In the same year, 
a networking meeting on future scenarios concerned itself with the possibility 
of increased military deployments within NATO to manage migration flows 
and deliver humanitarian aid if global warming exceeds two degrees Celsius 
(BMVg 2019a). The connection between climate change and defense and its 
links to NATO cooperation was also the topic of a 2019 meeting of EU defense 
ministers in Helsinki (BMVg 2019c).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Franziskus von Lucke’s research results.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
Federal Foreign Office 
(AA) policy approach 
and practices 
The AA describes climate change as a potential “catalyst for conflicts” (AA 
2019c:2) and as “one of the main security threats of the 21st century” (AA 
2019a:1). It thus stresses the role of climate change in the erosion of state 
structures and in geopolitical as well as resource-based tensions (AA 2019d). 
However, in accordance with its broad understanding of security, the AA does 
not regard climate change as a single cause but rather as a risk multiplier 
which, in conjunction with other stressors, may increase the likelihood and 
intensity of conflicts, instability and migration (AA 2019a, c). 
In response, the emphasis is on holistic, networked and preventive approaches, 
and on climate-risk-management in particular (AA 2017). Thus, the goal is 
to combine climate, development and peacekeeping elements in order to 
prevent climate change from affecting the livelihoods and human security of 
people in the Global South. This could also contribute to preserving stability 
as well as global peace and security (AA 2019d, 2017). From 2011 onwards 
(AA 2011), climate foreign policy and climate diplomacy have become key 
approaches (AA and adelphi 2017). In this vein, the AA sees climate change 
as an opportunity to improve bilateral and multilateral relations, and it hopes 
to manage the negative consequences of climate change while simultaneously 
reaching international climate agreements. As part of this strategy, the AA also 
mainstreams climate security approaches into its embassies and diplomatic 
missions around the world (AA 2019d). 
In terms of concrete practices, the AA’s aim is to prevent or control climate 
risks. Examples of this include a climate security pilot project in the Horn 
of Africa that utilizes a crisis early detection tool, the Platform of Disaster 
Replacement (AA 2019d), and the ECC Platform that facilitates exchange on 
conflict, cooperation and the environment (AA and Adelphi 2017). In 2019, 
the AA also initiated the Berlin Conference on Climate Security and issued 
the Berlin Call for Action (AA 2019b). At the second Berlin climate security 
conference in 2020, the ministry launched a Global Climate Security Risk and 
Foresight Assessment (AA 2020).
Federal Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ), 
policy approach and 
practices 
The BMZ focuses on the human security implications of climate change 
and the mainstreaming of those implications into German and international 
development cooperation programs. The emphasis is on the most vulnerable 
people and on “comprehensive climate and disaster risk management” 
(BMZ 2019a:7-9). This includes a specific consideration of gender (e.g. the 
heightened vulnerability of women) as well as links to sustainability and the 
Agenda 2030 (BMZ 2017). A common concern is that climate change could 
lead to the reversal of development successes and increase global poverty 
(BMZ 2019b).
Concrete practices include preventive measures and early warning and climate 
insurance schemes (BMZ 2019c) to enhance the resilience of vulnerable 
groups and states (BMZ 2019b). The InsuResilience Global Partnership 
initiative, for example, establishes climate finance and insurance partnerships 
with the aim of strengthening resilience to disasters and moving from ex-post 
to ex-ante disaster support (BMZ 2019c).
Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, 
Nature Conservation, 
and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) and Federal 
Environment Agency 
(UBA)
In keeping with the discourse of ecological modernization, German climate 
policy, the BMU and the UBA are all motivated by a desire to modernize the 
economy through climate measures (BMU 2016). Moreover, they strive to 
avoid negative economic and societal consequences by taking early action 
(BMU 2018) and strengthening resilience as well as adaptation efforts in 
Germany (UBA 2019). In this context, the BMU and UBA established the 
German Adaptation Strategy and several adaptation action plans, set up an 
inter-ministerial working group on climate adaptation, and regularly issue 
monitoring reports on adaptation (UBA 2019).
Table 18: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Germany’s extended security sector
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Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Franziskus von Lucke’s research results.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
Germany’s constitution While environmental problems are mentioned only indirectly, future 
generations and natural livelihoods are considered. Article 20a [Protection 
of the natural foundations of life and animals] holds: “Mindful also of its 
responsibility towards future generations, the state shall protect the natural 
foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law 
and justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the 
constitutional order” (German Bundestag 1949:27).
White paper of the 
Federal Ministry of 
Defense (BMVg)
Holds that climate change has “significant and life-threatening consequences 
for numerous states and their populations” (BMVg 2016:42).
References to the 
exceeding of planetary 
boundaries, threatening 
of ecosystems and 
human survival
Several reports–in particular those from the BMU and the BMZ’s policy 
approach and practices–see climate change as a broad systemic threat that 
could overburden and exceed the planetary boundaries (BMZ 2017; BMU 
and Schulze 2019) and overwhelm the planet’s biological adaptation capacity. 
This could negatively affect or destabilize global or especially-vulnerable 
ecosystems (Federal German Government 2019b), lead to crucial losses of 
biodiversity (BMU 2018b), and ultimately render the earth uninhabitable (AA 
2019) and become a question of survival for humanity (BMZ 2019b).
2019 Statement at the 
UNSC open debate
Statement by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas at the open debate addressing the 
Impacts of Climate-related Disasters on International Peace and Security, in 
which he described the effects of climate-induced disasters such as “rising 
sea levels and hurricanes [that] threaten the very existence of a number of 
island states” (UNSC 2019).
Table 19: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Germany from an existential 
security perspective
Turning now to the conception of security as an existential issue, the constitution, 
descriptions of existential threats and references to the concept of planetary 
boundaries all constitute acknowledgements of the climate-security nexus from 
an existential perspective (see table below). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Franziskus von Lucke’s research results.
Federal Office of Civil 
Protection and Disaster 
Assistance (BBK) and 
Federal Ministry of the 
Interior (BMI)
The BBK increasingly issues reports and planning schemes that deal with 
the direct implications of climate change for civil protection and disaster 
management in Germany (BKK 2019a). The BMI occasionally considers the 
domestic implications of climate change in reports and policies concerning 
disaster and flood management (BMI 2018). Climate protection and adaptation 
measures are also considered in urban planning and housing promotion with 
the aim of ensuring healthy living conditions in cities (BMI et al. 2019).
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Looking back, it becomes clear that while climate change and climate security 
perceptions have played a central role in German political debates since the 
1980s, the 2007 report of the German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU 2007) on the security risks of climate change significantly intensified the 
climate security debate. 
Climate change has gone from being a purely environmental issue to a key foreign 
policy and (broad) security issue in Germany. Debates and discussions on how 
climate change causes or exacerbates conflicts and threatens international 
peace, security and stability have led to increased attention from the BMVg and 
the Bundeswehr in recent years. Despite this transformation, however, climate 
change has never penetrated the country’s narrow conception of national 
security and has instead mainly been linked to multilateral solutions and human 
security concepts. This is in line with both Germany’s reluctance toward self-
centered ideas of national security (Hellmann et al. 2006:187) and its emphasis 
on shared sovereignty and collective security that strives primarily to ensure 
international stability (Böckenförde 2014; Böckenförde and Gareis 2014). Thus, 
even in Germany’s defense and foreign policy, climate change has mainly been 
discussed as a threat to the human security of impoverished people in the Global 
South, and actors have largely avoided connecting in to hard security or national 
security. Germany will most likely continue on this path for the foreseeable future, 
although increased direct impacts of climate change in the country will probably 
lead to increased integration of (broad) climate security aspects in domestic 
disaster response and civil protection policies.
GERMANY: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
Germany aims to promote climate security issues in international fora – most 
importantly in the UNSC. In 2011, Germany had already raised the issue in 
the UNSC (2011a) and organized the second debate (the first having taken 
place in 2007) on climate change and security. In the accompanying concept 
note, Germany stressed that “the impacts of climate change on peace and 
security are already tangible” and that climate change was a “risk multiplier” 
with respect to armed conflict, especially in already-fragile countries in the 
Global South (UNSC 2011b:2). A subsequent presidential statement declared
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that climate change could add to existing peace and security threats in the 
long term (UNSC 2011c). During its current UNSC membership (2019-2020), 
Germany’s aim is to further anchor climate security in the structure of the UNSC 
and the UN (AA 2019d). Germany describes climate change as one of today’s 
main security threats and, in response, Germany wants to enable the UNSC to 
act in situations where climate change exacerbates conflicts and to strengthen 
the Council’s information management and early warning systems (AA 2019a). 
To further these goals, Germany, together with Nauru, founded the Group of 
Friends of Climate and Security in 2018. The group aims to raise awareness of 
climate security and seeks to integrate the topic into the UN system (AA 2018).
During the recent Arria-Formula meeting in 2020, the German representative 
emphasized that the UNSC cannot ignore climate change as a “main driver of 
conflict” (Heusgen 2020). In order to foster conflict prevention and preserve 
peace, he highlighted the need to provide the Council with appropriate and 
reliable information on the security implications of climate change though, 
e.g. sound scientific analysis and systematic reporting that would shorten 
timelines. Because many peacekeeping missions take place in vulnerable 
contexts, Germany has suggested that climate change be considered from 
a more comprehensive perspective that includes climate security risks. 
However, Germany also sees the need to include all UN entities in discussions 
of collective action and security risks. It thus supports the appointment of a 
special representative for the topic in the UN and the strengthening of the 
Climate Security Mechanism (Heusgen 2020). At the time of writing, a UNSC 
Council debate on climate security took place in July 2020. 
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4.7. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN INDONESIA
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana
Acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus within the traditional security 
sector has been detected in the Defense White Paper, which shows a broader 
understanding of security in its references to basic human needs such as 
insecurities, migration and conflict. 
Several references to threats and the use of security language and logics have 
been detected through the lens of the extended security sector at the domestic, 
environmental and climate politics levels, focusing on sea level rise and natural 
disasters in particular. 
Since 2004 and the democratic shift of the governmental system, Indonesia’s 
foreign policy has supported linkage and synergy between international and 
regional environmental regimes. The Bali COP13 in 2007 had an important 
impact on Indonesia, as it asserted the importance of an ongoing international 
climate regime. During the conference, tensions arose regarding how to 
approach climate change internationally. The disagreement was mainly caused 
by developing countries’ discontent with the approach to reducing emissions 
through afforestation and improving eco-efficiency in those countries. They 
called on industrialized nations to support less-developed nations in the 
realization of their mitigation and adaptation objectives. To mediate, then 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2015 Defense White 
Paper
The paper issued by the Ministry of Defense holds that: “Global climate 
change impacts on human life environment.” Environmental changes like 
rising temperatures and sea levels as well as extreme weather events “have 
a direct and indirect impact on the basic needs of human beings, especially 
food, water, health and energy. Climate change will affect the security 
issues indirectly. Non-fulfilment human life basic needs will cause disruption 
resilience and environment adaptability leading to insecurity. It also affects 
the dynamics of politics, economy, water and food crisis, the emergence of 
pandemic disease, the migration and conflict” (MoD 2015:16). Other direct 
causes of threats include border issues, internal conflict or civil war, weapons 
of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational crime. The major security 
focus is on power dynamics in the Asia Pacific region or South China Sea 
disputes. The highest priority of the Indonesian defense establishment is 
modernization of the Armed Forces (MoD 2015).
Table 20: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Indonesia’s traditional  
security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana’s research results.
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President Yudhoyono stressed the moral urgency of climate change solutions 
for subsequent generations (Wardoyo 2008). He was supported by the UN 
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon (2007), who underlined: “We gather because 
the time for equivocation is over. The science is clear. Climate change is 
happening. The impact is real. The time to act is now.” 
On the domestic level in 2008, Indonesia founded the National Council for 
Climate Change, which was tasked with providing policy guidance on mitigating 
and adapting to climate change. However, the council was dissolved in 2015 
by the Jokowi administration because of its failure to reduce GHG emissions 
caused by deforestation and forest degradation. Its mandate was handed over to 
the newly-formed Ministry of Ecology and Forestry (MEF), which is in charge of 
mitigation and adaptation policy guidance, and which points to the relationship 
between climate change and economic development as being most essential. 
It describes how the detrimental impacts of climate change such as a shift in 
biodiversity, explosion of plant and animal disease, and peat land forest fire will 
adversely affect the economic productivity of local communities. Therefore, its 
main focus is on reducing GHG emissions by undertaking programs to control 
deforestation and forest destruction. In response, programs known as social 
forestry have been established with the aim of benefitting people living in and 
around the forest (MEF 2018).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2015 ASEAN joint 
statement 
At the regional level, Indonesia engages with ASEAN’s intergovernmental 
initiative in order to shape and maintain its environmentally-oriented policy. 
ASEAN members released a joint statement on climate change in 2015 
confirming their willingness to enhance “cooperation to improve ASEAN’s 
collective capacity to address climate change; and […] strengthening 
rapid response capacity to be more efficient and effective in the event of 
natural disasters” (ASEAN 2015). The joint statement describes Indonesia 
(among others) as a “specific multi-Hazard hotspot” (ASEAN 2015). In 2019, 
Indonesia’s commitment to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement was 
reaffirmed. In addition, the general willingness for collaboration and dialogue 
within ASEAN and with external parties with the aim of “enhanc[ing] climate 
action in the ASEAN region” was highlighted (ASEAN 2019). 
Table 21: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Indonesia’s extended security sector
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Indonesia communicated an unconditional emission reduction target 
of 26% by 2030 in their NDC to the UNFCCC. With the support of the 
international community, Indonesia expressed willingness to increase its 
emissions reduction to 41% by 2030. The importance of poverty reduction 
and development is highlighted and “the national commitment towards a 
low-carbon and climate change-resilient development path, in which climate 
change adaptation and mitigation constitute an integrated and cross-cutting 
priority” is assured (NDC 2016:1). Accordingly, “[c]limate change presents 
significant risks for Indonesia’s natural resources that will, in turn, impact the 
production and distribution of food, water, and energy.” Climate mitigation and 
adaptation efforts are described “as an integrated concept that is essential for 
building resilience in safeguarding food, water and energy resources” (NDC 
2016:3). The goals are, among others, to improve certainty “in spatial planning 




The NDMD (2018) notes that, in the long run, climate change can elevate the 
risk of natural and social destruction because of weak disaster resilience in 
most of the country’s local communities. Therefore, the focus of the 2020-
2025 workplan is on environmental degradation, global warming and natural 
disasters in addition to the challenge of poverty (NDMD 2019).
Ministry of National 
Development Planning
According to the MNDP, 18,000 miles of Indonesia’s coastline have been 
impacted by climate change and “as a tropical country and the largest 
archipelago in the world, [it] is one of the countries most vulnerable to the 
negative impacts of climate change. The negative impacts of climate change 
can be felt both physically and environmentally, as well as socially and 
economically” (MNDP 2018). The MNDP anticipates more dramatic effects, 
particularly more frequent and intense hydro-meteorology hazards (e.g. 
flood, drought), due to increasing temperatures. Additionally, the impact of 
these warmer conditions on, for example, biodiversity through the whitening 
coral reefs referenced. The fishery sector is described as especially affected 
by global ocean warming accompanied by high ocean waves. The MNDP 
highlights the fact that all people in coastal areas (independent of the fishery 
sector) are particularly affected by climate change. The ministry report 
underscores that climate change will restrain Indonesia’s economic growth 
if the consequences are left unresolved and highlights the importance of low-
carbon development and achieving emission reduction targets, implying a 
neo-developmen-talist strategy (MNDP 2019).
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
At the 50th Pacific Islands Forum Summit (PIF) meeting in Tuvalu in 2019, 
Ambassador Desra Percaya, who led the Indonesian delegation, stated, “The 
impact of climate change has now become a real and dangerous threat faced 
by countries in the Pacific Ocean region, including Indonesia” and that future 
cooperation schemes at various levels need to be strengthened. “The 50th PIF 
Summit addresses issues of mutual concern in the Pacific, including regional 
security, climate change and maritime security. PIF endorsed the Kainaki II 
Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action and agreed to draft the 2050 
Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent” (MFA 2019).
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In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Research and Technology 
are involved in climate vulnerability control projects. The Ministry of Agriculture 
(2017) implemented a climate forecast system in cooperation with the Japanese 
government to anticipate climate change. The Ministry of Research and 
Technology advances the use of renewable energy sources in cooperation with 
the German government (Sulistyawati 2019).
The organization AMAN, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Alliance of 
Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago), focuses on empowerment of masyarakat 
adat (indigenous people) as important stakeholders in the process of climate 
policymaking and application with regard to the forest. In order to support the 
government’s programs on climate change mitigation, AMAN has argued that 
the government must acknowledge and protect the right of masyarakat adat to 
manage their own forest (Saturi 2015). The Ministry of Ecology and Forestry 
(MEF 2020) agreed with AMAN’s proposal, promising to proceed with legislation 
on the adat forest and to further the participation of indigenous people in dealing 
with climate change. 
Acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus from an existential security 
perspective has been detected in the Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC)’s reference to the constitution and in the project to move the capital, the 
latter being based on the supposition that the city is fundamentally threatened. 
It also includes the threat to island states. 
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It has been detected that climate change is generally described as affecting 
human security rather than state security, and no description of aggression by 
other states or the risk of interstate war related to climate change was found. 
Climate change impacts such as sea level rise, extreme weather, natural hazards, 
reduction in food products, and loss in territory represent increasingly serious 





The NDC cites the Indonesian Constitution, which stipulates “that ‘every 
person shall have the right to enjoy a good and healthy environment.’ As 
climate change becomes a reality, Indonesia continues to seek a balance 
between its current and future development and poverty reduction priorities” 
(NDC 2016:1).
2019 Statement at the 
UNSC
“When there is no capacity to adapt, potential security threats become real 
security threats– from the loss of livelihoods to irregular migration; from food 
scarcity to the loss of territory; and perhaps even the survival of a nation is 
jeopardized. Indonesia therefore truly shares the concerns of small islands 
developing States about the survival of our nations” (UNSC 2019).
Moving of the capital In 2019, President Jokowi announced the plan to move the nation’s capital 
from Jakarta to East Kalimantan. In addition to overpopulation and overloaded 
administration (Ihsannudin 2019), the reasons for the move are the negative 
impacts of climate change, especially rising sea levels and uncontrollable 
floods (MNDP 2019). This plan illustrates the governmental stance towards 
climate change, which is line with academic studies indicating Jakarta’s 
vulnerabilities brought on by climate change. Scientific studies anticipate that 
climate-related disasters in Jakarta will be more frequent and involve heavy, 
rainy floods (Firman et al. 2011) that are expected to paralyze economic activity, 
bring about significant infrastructure damage and result in human casualties, 
as occurred in 2002, 2007, 2013 and 2014 (Budiyono et al. 2016). The flood 
in early January 2020 submerged about 300 locations in the city, including 
trade and administrative centers (CNN Indonesia 2020). The plan has been 
questioned by environmentalists, who are concerned about the possible 
dangers to rainforests and wildlife in Kalimantan from various infrastructure 
projects and pollution (Poon 2019). In response, the government announced 
the planning of a green city concept as part of the environmental protection 
agenda (Liputan6 2020). 
At the time of writing, no authentic government document on the planning 
details for building a new capital has yet been published, though the president 
and his ministers have spoken of it on many occasions. Pending approval by 
parliament, the first phase of the new capital construction had been slated to 
begin in June 2020. Costs are estimated at around 466 trillion rupiah, or 32 
billion USD (Liputan6 2019). By July 2020, the government had decided to 
postpone construction of the new capital, and it has diverted the money to 
programs dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic (Putra 2020). 
Table 22: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Indonesia from an existential 
security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana’s research results.
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INDONESIA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
During its membership in the UNSC (2019-2020), Indonesia’s security priorities 
are the creation of international peace and stability and the promotion of global-
regional multilateral cooperation, which are also enduring components of the 
normative foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Gatra 2019). Climate change 
is not part of Indonesia’s main agenda; however, the Indonesian representative 
affirmed the importance of the topic and the security challenges arising from it 
(e.g. loss of livelihood, migration and loss of territory), especially for the small 
island developing states (SIDS). In the context of these security challenges, 
Indonesia suggested the UNSC develop a security approach to climate change 
consisting of three interrelated elements: First, the Council should respond to 
security implications of climate change, but not to climate change itself. Climate 
change should be considered in UN peacekeeping missions, for instance. 
Second, the link between security and sustainable development must be 
emphasized in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Third, the responsibility to 
counter climate-related security implications should fall to states, and regional 
organizations (e.g. ASEAN) must be taken into account to improve and promote 
cooperation. Accordingly, the Council needs to better understand the security 
dimension of climate change generally, and all UN agencies need to include 
climate change in their respective mandates. Indonesia argued that “while the 
Security Council can deal with the security dimension of climate change, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change remains the leading 
forum to address climate change. Upholding the Paris Agreement on climate 
change is absolutely vital” (UNSC 2019).
During the recent UNSC Arria-Formula meeting in 2020, the Indonesian 
representative again underscored the importance of coordination between all 
UN entities and avoiding a duplication of efforts. According to the Indonesian 
representative, a better understanding of the interconnected factors influencing 
vulnerability is crucial to finding solutions, as is the support of knowledge 
production within the UN system. Still, the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement is of central importance to Indonesia; the Representative therefore 
emphasized that “[p]revention is far more effective than the cure, collectively 
we need to enhance climate mitigation and adaptation capacities of national 
and local authorities in balance and equal manner” (Syihab 2020).
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4.8. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN NIGER
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Ousseyni Kalilou
Niger sees climate change as a major challenge for the Sahel region and as 
contributing to existing security issues. However, a sense of urgency as well 
as atrocities taking place in the region (e.g. the Lake Chad Basin and the tri 
border area in the Liptako Gourma) are steering policymakers’ attention toward 
immediate action and draining government funds (Issoufou et al. 2019) to the 
detriment of long-term climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. 
The climate-security nexus is accordingly acknowledged within the traditional 
security sector, especially in relation to the Sahel Region and the Lake Chad 
Basin (see table below). 
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The National Border Police is involved in national reforestation and provides 
health services and infrastructure for climate refugees and internally displaced 
persons (Ministry of the Interior 2018a). In the Lake Chad region, the 
military supports the restoring of basic public services, provides life-saving 
humanitarian assistance and facilitates the transition from humanitarian aid 
to sustainable development. The establishment of civil-military cooperation is 
envisaged as a means of strategizing regional stabilization in a way that can 
complement and strengthen military efforts (e.g. in the Diffa region) (LCBC 
2018). 
Sahel Region Niger’s 2016 Strategy of Development and Security for the Sahel-Sahara 
highlights the connection between droughts and displacement and economic 
issues as well as the worsening impact of terrorism and organized crime. 
Armed rebellions and inter-communal conflicts are seen as an additional 
complicating factor. Climate change and the nexus of governance, peace, 
development and security is described as a challenge for the overall region 
and a concern of the G5 Sahel leadership (Prime Minister 2016:18-26).
In 2019, during its presidency of the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region 
(CCSR), Niger called for awareness on the adverse impacts of climate change. 
President Issoufou (2019a) underlined the effects on water and food security 
and the connection to conflict and terrorism, concluding that the “link between 
climate change and terrorism has now been established.” In spite of his strong 
military focus, Issoufou (2019d) has outlined how advancing resilience is the 
most effective policy approach for Sahel countries in countering the security 
implications of climate change. 
Also in 2019, the CCSR decided to create a permanent secretariat with the 
mandate to coordinate the implementation of the Climate Investment Plan for 
the Sahel region (2018-2030). 400 billion USD was pledged for the plan, as 
was 1.32 billion USD for a priority program (Programme Regional Prioritaire, 
2018-2023) (CCSR 2019). 
Table 23: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Niger’s traditional  
security sector
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Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC)
Founded in 1964, the LCBC is responsible for the regional stabilization 
strategy in areas affected by humanitarian crises exacerbated by the Boko 
Haram uprising. Its mission includes the coordination of cross-border 
cooperation, prevention and management of acute crises and addressing their 
root causes. One approach is to mitigate the harmful effects of environmental 
change and enhance resilience by preserving the ecosystem. Accordingly, 
“[a]ll future investments in socio-economic development must be resilient to 
climate change […] to strengthen resilience to shocks, support adaptation 
and mitigation, and ensure long-term sustainability” (LCBC 2018:13). Climate 
change is thus connected to both conflict and the mitigation of tensions.
In order to strengthen the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Force in the 
Lake Chad Basin, President Issoufou (2018, 2019b, c) has expressed the need 
for increased military logistics and training from the international community.
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ousseyni Kalilou’s research results.
As illustrated in the table above, the traditional security sector also makes 
reference to the detrimental effects of climate change on human security due 
to the country’s geographic (Sahelian) position and increasing environmental 
stress. While climate change is a fundamental issue of domestic politics and 
security, in practice, the primary concern remains military operations and 
logistics due to the high level of conflict. Niger is, in fact, one of the most 
militarized states in Africa, hosting foreign troops from France, the USA, Germany, 
Canada, and Italy who provide military training and logistics. The Sahel Region 
in particular has attracted a lot of international attention that goes beyond the 
scope of military presence and can be categorized as belonging to the extended 
security approach. For example, the project titled Frexus: Improving security and 
climate resilience in a fragile context through the Water-Energy-Food Security 
Nexus, funded by the consulting office of the German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the European Commission, references the 
Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. The project focuses 
on climate resilience in Niger, Mali and Chad (2019-2021) and aims to turn the 
“vicious cycle of scarcity, competition, conflict and instability […] into a virtuous 
cycle of resilience, sustainable resources management, cooperation and 
security” (GIZ 2019).
In addition to Niger’s traditional security sector activities, in Resolution 2349 
(2017) on West Africa and the Sahel Region (Lake Chad Basin Region), the 
UNSC importantly recognized “the adverse effects of climate change and 
ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including 
through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food 
insecurity, and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessments and risk 
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management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these 
factors” (UNSC 2017:7).
At the domestic level, the lens of the extended security sector reveals an early 
awareness (since the early 1970s) of the adverse impacts of desertification and 
the establishment of several institutional measures (including ones taken in 
cooperation with neighboring states) in response to these concerns. It furthermore 
shows that, for the last decade, the Nigerien government has focused on human 
security in parallel with hard security aspects (see Prime Minister 2016; Ministry 
of the Interior 2017, 2018a; CNESS 2018; ANADIA 2014, 2018). However, over 
the last two years, additional concepts such as “the anthropogenic bill,” “food 
insecurity,” “the impact of climate change on our health” or “future generation” 
(Issoufou 2019a) have progressively emerged in debates, revealing the increasing 
influence and prominence of climate politics and the climate-security nexus on 
the conception of national security (GTC 2018).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
Early establishment of 
regional committees on 
environmental issues
Niger ratified the Algiers Convention (1970) on conservation and sustainable 
use of land, water, flora and fauna for the well-being of humanity; the Bamako 
Convention (1998) on hazardous waste produced in or imported to Africa; the 
Abidjan Convention (1981) on the pollution of the marine environment, coastal 
waters and river waters of West and Central Africa (NECSD 2015a, 2016b, 
2017c) (GTC 2018a, b).
Following the severe drought of 1973, Niger joined Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad to create the Inter-State Committee to 
Combat Drought in the Sahel in 1976 (NECSD 2016a). 
National Environment 
Council for Sustainable 
Development (NECSD)
Established in 1995 after the Rio de Janeiro summit, NECSD is responsible 
for communicating with the UNFCCC and outlining climate change adaptation 
and resilience strategies such as the National Adaptation Program of Action 
on the adverse effects of climate change, which promotes livestock markets, 
urban gardening, development of shared water resources and the creation of 
grain banks (NECSD 2006).
The NECSD’s executive secretariat is directly attached to the prime minister‘s 
office, illustrating how important the issue is for the government (NECSD 2012, 
2014). Themes such as “agriculture climate insurance,” “green jobs,” “smart 
climate agriculture,” and “green wall” have gradually been included in Niger’s 




The NDCs contain a strong focus on the link between climate adaptation and 
mitigation and include assuring food security, combating poverty, strengthening 
social cohesion and resilience. One example of Niger’s adaptation initiatives 
is “the Food Security Support Project in the Maradi region (PASADEM) for a 
cost of $ US 31.7 million, which is dealing with aspects of resilience in the rural 
environment” (NDC 2015:12).
Table 24: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Niger’s extended security sector
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2018 Draft Action Plan 
for National Border 
Policy
National Border Policy focuses mainly on managing issues of inse-curity, 
border and migration management and alleviating poverty. The need to 
“strengthen people‘s resilience to the effects of climate change and actions” 
and “build capacity” is included in its national security strategy plans 
(Ministry of the Interior 2018b: 29). Climate change is taken into account in 
the regulation of migration, particularly in the context of movements due to 
the frontier permeability and cross-border family ties (Ministry of the Interior 
2018a). Accordingly, difficult circumstances and limited state capacities 
challenge stability along borders (Ministry of the Interior 2018b).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ousseyni Kalilou’s research results.
In addition, the president has gradually raised concerns about the impacts of 
climate change on national security (Issoufou 2019b; Ministry of Interior, 2018b: 
Policy paper), focusing mainly on changing policy approaches and an increase 
in resilience, adaptation and mitigation. At the COP21 forum, President Issoufou, 
reaffirming the aim of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees, said that 
the main polluters need to support Africa monetarily (e.g. through investment in 
Niger’s energy transition) as the African states contribute much less pollution and 
are rather focused on socioeconomic development and food security (Issoufou 
2015) in the fight against hunger and poverty. The president also stated in a 
speech to the nation that the strengthening of resilience to climate change is 
inseparable from ensuring “the stability and security of our peoples and states” 
(Issoufou 2017).
Several other presidential statements highlight the importance of the climate-
security nexus for Niger in a foreign policy context by outlining, for example, 
how climate change aggravates the existing humanitarian situation by worsening 
food security, how water and economic insecurity can lead to competition for 
depleting resources, and how climate change affects migration and internal 
displacement (Issoufou 2019a,b). The consequences for women, who are 
among the most vulnerable to climate and environmental changes, have been 
described: “We are witnessing the trivialization of violence and the reign of terror 
daily. In this dramatic situation, women and children pay the heaviest price” 
(Issoufou 2019b).
From an agricultural standpoint, the Ministry of the Interior (2018b) describes 
Niger’s vulnerability to climate change by noting that it is losing 100,000 hectares 
of land per year, and that pastures and water are rapidly being depleted. While 
the region experienced exceptional droughts in the early 1970s and 80s, lately, 
those droughts have since become recurrent (NECSD 2016). Lake Chad has lost 
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90% of its waters since the 1960s, and desertification is advancing toward the 
south (NECSD 2015).
Over the last decade, the government has established restoration and protection 
practices in line with climate change mitigation, adaptation and resilience 
(Ministry of Planning 2018:38). The 2012 3N Initiative (Nigeriens Nourishing 
Nigeriens), with a budget of approximately 22 million euros (aims to strengthen 
the agro-sylvo-pastoral and fishery sectors, reduce food insecurity and improve 
the resilience against climate change and disasters (The Presidency n.d.). In 
the same vein, the government announced the goals of “zero hunger by 2021” 
(December 21, 2018) and “zero rice imports by 2023” (July 18, 2019) (Issoufou 
2017), both of which illustrate the government’s willingness to implement the 
Sustainable Development Goals.
Niger has since become more active in promoting the climate-security nexus 
agenda in international forums. It has taken on the roles of presidency of the 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), permanent secretariat 
of the G5 Sahel, command of the Joint Force G5 Sahel and presidency of the 
CCSR (Climate Commission for the Sahel Region), and it is part of the Peace 
Agreement Monitoring Committee.
While the traditional and extended sectors are the most prevalent in Niger’s 
security approaches, an awareness of security from an existential perspective 





While climate change is not mentioned specifically, desertification and 
environmental protection are connected to human rights and justice. Article 
35 stipulates: “Any person has the right to a healthy environment. The State 
has the obligation to protect the environment in the interest of present and 
future generations. Each one is required to contribute to the safeguarding and 
to the improvement of the environment in which he lives.” Article 36 obligates 
the state and the collectivities to combat desertification, while Article 37 sets 
out corporate environmental responsibilities (Constitution 2010).
Table 25: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Niger from an existential  
security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ousseyni Kalilou’s research results.
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Overall, it can be said that, while domestic policymakers have increasingly 
acknowledged climate change as an impact factor for national security strategy 
on the international scene, domestic policies are more focused on food security, 
combating poverty, strengthening resilience and on the socioeconomic effects 
of climate change (NECSD 2015a, 2016b; Ministry of Planning 2017; Ministry 
of the Interior 2018a,b). While there is a high likelihood that Niger may strive 
for more robust involvement in climate security, this is subject to the upcoming 
Nigerien national elections in December 2020. However, the UNSC (2017) 
resolution recognizing the adverse impacts of climate change on the stability of 
the region nevertheless constitutes a very important landmark. 
NIGER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC 
In context of the UNSC, Niger regards climate change as an issue of importance 
to both its national security and all other countries as well, and it has made 
the security implications of climate change a priority for its membership in the 
Council (2020-2021) (Africa News 2020). Niger has emphasized the need for 
an international response and a solution to climate deregulation and its related 
insecurities (Abarry 2020a).
As part of its advocacy on the issue, Niger co-organized the April 2020 
UNSC Arria-Formula meeting on climate security. During the meeting, Niger’s 
representative underlined the need to consider climate change a threat to 
peace and security and pointed to the Sahel region as a clear example of 
“climate driven conflicts” (Abarry 2020b), the link between climate change 
and violence having already been established in the 2018 UNSC statement 
concerning the Lake Chad Basin. Niger’s representative also highlighted the 
importance of implementing the Paris Agreement and stressed that climate 
change is especially devastating for African nations despite their being minor 
emitters of CO2, and the representative called for a stronger information basis 
and better cooperation between UN entities (e.g. through a report of the 
secretary-general to the UNSC on climate-related risks and the appointment 
of a special representative). The representative also noted the “need for cross-
disciplinary work in research and policy” and said that efforts “should include 
local knowledge of communities that have already shown resilience. We should 
emphasize the need for cross-organisation capacity training” (Abarry 2020b).
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Acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus can be detected through the 
lens of the extended security sector in several state programs and broader 
security strategies (see table below). In addition to the research results listed 
in the table, climate change is mentioned in descriptions of challenges, risks 
and threats in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (Russian President 2016a), 
Fundamentals of the State Policy in the Field of Civil Defense for the Period until 
2030 (Russian President 2016b), Fundamentals of Protection of the Population 
and Territories from the Emergency Situations up to 2030 (Russian President 
2017b), Fundamentals of Chemical and Biological Safety up to 2025 and beyond 
(Russian President 2019c), and in Energy and Food Security Doctrines (Russian 
President 2019a and 2020, respectively). The focus thereby rests mostly on 
domestic issues and in protecting the vital interests of individuals, society and 
the state, and in reference to domestic energy and reducing, for example, air 
pollution. 
4.9. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN RUSSIA
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Ilya Stepanov
The climate-security nexus is acknowledged within Russia’s traditional security 
sector, as illustrated in the table below. The evolution of national security policy 
papers shows that climate change is gradually gaining more and more room in 
the national security strategy, whereby climate change is described mostly as a 
cause of other threats to Russian security rather than as a threat in itself. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2009, 2015 National 
Security Strategy 
The 2009 strategy includes broader frameworks of environmental problems 
and disaster security (Russian President 2009a).
In 2015, climate change was listed after eight other threats (e.g. foreign 
espionage, terrorism and corruption). It was not depicted as main threat, 
but “natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes, including those driven 
by climate change” are singled out as a threat to Russian “state and social 
security” (Russian President 2015a:7).
Military activity in 
domestic and foreign 
contexts
Frequent deployment of the military to mitigate environmental and climate 
change damage through cleaning and garbage collection in the Arctic, 
firefighting or flood management, and social assistance to people suffering 
from natural disasters and extreme weather events (RIA 2019).
Table 26: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Russia’s traditional  
security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ilya Stepanov’s research results.
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Table 27: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Russia’s extended security sector
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2009 Climate Doctrine The doctrine represents the first framework climate policy paper to call for the 
need to consider climate change as one of the “key long-term security factors” 
of the Russian Federation and to incorporate the issue of climate change 
into both national and international dimensions of Russian policy. Climate 
change is depicted as a phenomenon that will “inevitably affect people‘s lives, 
the state of the animal and plant world in all regions of the planet, and will 
become a tangible threat to the well-being of the population and sustainable 
development in some of them” (Russian President 2009b).
2012 State Program 
on Environmental 
Protection 
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and several other 
ministries adopted this state program for the period until 2020 with the 
purpose of “improv[ing] environmental safety and [preserving] natural 
systems.” It was motivated by, among other aspects, the aim of reducing “the 
overall anthropogenic impact on the environment by improving the economy’s 
environmental efficiency” and improving “the environmental situation for the 
36.1 million Russians currently residing in urban areas with high or extremely 
high air pollution levels.” The overall objective is to protect “the vital interests 
of individuals, society and the state against the effects of natural hazards 
and climate change” (providing “hydrometeorological safety”) (Russian 
Government 2012).
Ministry for Civil 
Defense, Emergencies 




As can be seen in this statement from the Russian Minister of Emergency, 
EMERCOM addresses climate change: “[N]ew threats are appearing due 
to global climate change. Permafrost is going away, earthquakes are hitting 
the regions, that have never experienced any earthquakes before, landslides, 
mud flows, emission of gas condensate and others. New requirements for 
infrastructure protection are already being worked out” (EMERCOM 2015).
2017 Russian Economic 
Security Strategy
The strategy highlights the fact that climate-induced factors could impact 
national economic security through increased shortages in food and fresh 
water supply and intensified competition for access to renewable resources, 
including the resources of the Arctic and Antarctic zones and the Arctic Ocean 
(Russian Government 2017).
2019 Energy Security 
Doctrine
The doctrine is a strategic planning document in the field of national security 
reflecting the official view on ensuring Russia‘s energy security. The legal 
framework for the doctrine includes the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and normative legal acts of the 
President and the government. It outlines “the discrimination of Russian 
enterprises of fuel and energy complex in world energy markets by the means 
of changing international legal regulation in the energy sector, including under 
the pretext of implementing climate and environmental policies or diversifying 
sources of energy imports” (Russian President 2019a).
2020 Adopted Strategy 
from the Ministry of 
Energy
2020 Draft Strategy 
of the Ministry of 
Economic Development 
A new Energy Strategy for the period until 2035 includes references to 
increased environmental impact, and the need for adaptation of the Russian 
energy sector to climate change is highlighted as a “breakthrough” towards 
“more efficient, flexible and sustainable energy that is able to adequately 
respond to challenges and threats in its field and overcome existing problems” 
(ME 2020).
The draft of the Russian strategy for long-term, low-emission development 
until the year 2050 includes the threatening impacts of climate change that are 
associated “with severe, widespread and irreversible consequences for man-
made and natural systems, [that contain] high risks for global and regional 
food safety, life safety and sustainable development” (MED 2020). 
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Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ilya Stepanov’s research results.
2020 National Climate 
Change Adaptation Plan
The plan for 2020–2022 has been laid out by the Ministry of Economic 
Development and mainstreamed through the involvement of many ministries, 
state agencies and executive bodies (e.g. the Ministries of Emergency 
Situations; Energy, Education and Science, Health; Development of the 
Russian Far East and Arctic, Economic Development, Foreign Affairs) in its 
implementation. The plan stresses “the wide socio-economic consequences 
of temperature and pressure contrasts, extreme precipitation and floods 
noted in recent years prove the growing vulnerability of the population and the 
economy to extreme weather and climate impacts.” Measures for adaptation 
have gained strategic importance and are needed to improve “the level of 
security (protection of the vital interests of the individual, society and the 
state) from the effects of climate change on the population and the economy, 
including natural hazards and natural emergencies.” This is to be achieved 
with the aid of science, among other things (Russian Government 2020). The 
plan also mentions some advantageous effects of climate change, such as 
reduction in energy consumption during the heating period and improved 
transport conditions in the Artic.
In addition to the main domestic focus, an additional important interrelation of 
national security and climate change can be detected in the area of Russian 
Arctic Policy. First, the Artic is considered one of the regions most affected 
by climate change due to melting permafrost, desertification, fires and floods 
(Russian President 2019b). Important infrastructure (like pipelines or strategic 
military facilities) is also affected, which means funds for maintenance and 
security measures are increasingly required (Sukhankin 2020). Second, the 
Arctic region plays a role in reference to the extended security approach, 
mainly through its crucial role in economic development: The northern regions 
contribute one-fifth of Russia’s gross national product and a quarter of the 
country’s exports. The impacts of climate change on the Artic are therefore also 
described as new economic opportunities (Sukhankin 2020). Hence, possible 
advantageous effects of a warming climate are also considered, especially in 
the northern regions where oil and gas companies could gain better access 
(Russian Government 2020). Additionally, the reaction of the global economy 
to climate change–in other words, the global low-carbon transition–is regarded 
as a security threat to Russia (Russian President 2019a) as decreasing demand 
for Russian energy-intense goods could potentially undermine the security 
of Russian fossil fuel and energy companies (Makarov et al. 2020; Russian 
President 2019a), which play a significant role in Russian economic prosperity. 
Third, the role of the region in connection to environmental and climate change 
security issues is connected to Arctic diplomacy in a national security context 
in order to ensure environmental safety and preserve peace and cooperation 
(Arctic Council n.d.). While the new 2020 Arctic Strategy of development and 
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national security until 2035 is still being drafted, the Fundamentals of Russian 
Policy in the Arctic until 2035, adopted in March 2020 (Russian President 2020), 
highlights that further research “on dangerous natural and natural-technological 
phenomena in the Arctic […] under conditions of climate change” is needed. It 
also points out that new technologies and engineering solutions “for reducing 
threats to human life” due to climate change need to be investigated (Russian 
President 2020) and contains “development and application of effective 
engineering solutions in order to prevent damage to infrastructure elements 
due to global climate change” and the “development on a scientific basis of 
a network of specially protected natural territories and water areas in order to 
preserve ecological systems and their adaptation to climate change” as two of 
its aims. It goes on to describe “the building up by foreign states of a military 
presence in the Arctic and an increase in the conflict potential in the region” as 
one of the threats to national security in the Arctic. One of the desired outcomes 
of the Arctic Policy is “achieving a high level of cooperation with the Arctic states, 
contributing to the preservation of the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability and 
mutually beneficial partnership”.
Another acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus can be detected in 
the context of the ASEAN Partnership for Sustainability, adopted at the East 
Asian Summit in 2019, which highlights the important role of the Sustainable 
Development Goals in order to foster cooperation, stability and peace, 
“sustainable security,” promotion of food and water security, and enhancement 
of regional energy security (Russian Government 2019; ASEAN 2019).
During COP 21, President Vladimir Putin stated that “[c]limate change is one 
of the most serious challenges humanity faces today. Hurricanes, floods, 
droughts and other extreme weather phenomena caused by global warming are 
causing ever-greater economic losses and destroying our familiar and traditional 
environment. The quality of life of everyone on this planet, economic growth and 
sustainable social development of entire regions depend on our ability to resolve 
the climate problem” (Russian President 2015b). Statements such as these may 
indicate an awareness of security from an existential perspective; other findings 
in this vein include references from the constitution and the Environmental 
Security Strategy. 
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Generally, security is understood in broader terms, as can be seen in several 
security strategies on environment, economy and food. The assessment of the 
climate-security nexus shows that while the attention paid to climate change is 
relatively minor compared to other topics and concerns on the national political/
security agenda, it is gradually gaining more room. The responses focus on 
climate change adaptation such as planned development and on scientifically-
substantiated risk assessments for the country. Within the main approaches to 
the climate-security nexus, the focus rests on economic and energy security, 
such as in the positive connotations of how climate change strengthens national 
security, e.g. through resource extraction and transportation in the warming 
Arctic, or though climate diplomacy strengthening international cooperation 
and peace. Furthermore, references to indirect risks related to the global energy 
transition, which may threaten national security, can be found. This focus on 
economic and energy security and disaster risk management shows change 
and a broadening of the actors and policies with respect to climate change and 
new security approaches. The mainstream vision of the government shows that, 
even though the man-made origins of climate change are partly in doubt, the 
existence of climate change itself is not questioned. Environmental degradation 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
1993, 2020 Constitution 
of the Russian 
Federation 
The preamble notes: “We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, 
united by a common fate on our land, establishing human rights and freedoms, 
civic peace and accord, preserving the historically established state unity, 
proceeding from the universally recognized principles of equality and self-
determination of peoples, revering the memory of ancestors who have 
conveyed to us the love for the Fatherland, belief in the good and justice, 
reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the firmness of its 
democratic basic, striving to ensure the well-being and prosperity of Russia, 
proceeding from the responsibility for our Fatherland before the present and 
future generations, recognizing ourselves as part of the world community.”
Article 42 holds: “Everyone shall have the right to favourable environment, 
reliable information about its state and for a restitution of damage inflicted on 
his health and property by ecological transgressions.”
Article 58 states: “Everyone shall be obliged to preserve nature and the 
environment, carefully treat the natural wealth” (Constitution 1993).
2017 Environmental 
Security Strategy
The strategy focuses on domestic affairs in particular. It states that the effects 
of climate change are considered a global threat to environmental security 
through the inevitable effects on the lives and health of people and condition 
of the animal and plant world, while, in some regions of the world, climate 
change presents a tangible threat to the well-being of the population and 
sustainable development (Russian President 2017a).
Table 28: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Russia from an existential 
security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Ilya Stepanov’s research results.
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and disasters as well as global warming are recognized as existing phenomena 
with adverse security effects and severe consequences for the state, individuals 
and the environment. The creation of several institutions and the mainstreaming 
of the topic into several ministries and security strategies shows a growing 
concern and focus on non-traditional security responses. 
RUSSIA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
Since the start of the discussion on climate change in the UNSC (2007), Russia has 
been skeptical toward the inclusion of climate change in the Council’s mandate. 
This skepticism has been explained with the argument that inclusion would 
stretch the mandate of the Council, and that the responsibility to act on this topic 
falls to other UN agencies like the UNFCCC. Additionally, it has been argued that 
inclusion would cause counterproductive consequences, as it could result in the 
generalization of the linkage between climate change and security and create 
the “false assumption that the problems of the environment are unavoidable 
and always lead to conflict,” as stated by the Russian Representative in 2019 
(UNSC 2019). In spite of its reserved position on the matter, Russia agreed to 
several UNSC activities and resolutions that recognize the adverse effects of 
climate change in certain regions, mostly in Africa. For instance, Russia voted for 
Resolution 2349 on Lake Chad, which recognizes the adverse effects of climate 
change on the stability of the region and emphasizes the need for further risk 
assessment and management (UNSC 2017).
These changes in relation to specific cases and a less skeptical position 
also became clear in the recent Arria-Formula meeting in 2020. The Russian 
representative noted that climate change has adverse effects, but that these 
represent only one among many factors that have an impact on the “vulnerability 
of countries that may result in instability.” Accordingly, the linkage between 
security and climate change needs to be established through country-
specific, scientific analysis in order to avoid overstatement, generalization or 
simplification of the link, which might otherwise result in a blurred picture of 
the other causes of conflicts and problems. However, the representative also 
emphasized the need to avoid duplication of efforts within the UN system or 
stretching the UNSC mandate, and pointed to the considerable costs resulting 
from new risk assessment and management strategies (Chumakov 2020).
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4.10. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS  
IN SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Rose-Ann Smith
An archipelagic state in the Eastern Caribbean comprised of a chain of 32 island 
cays, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) has a population (as of 2019) 
of 110,608 (Statistical Office 2020). The island, on account of its geography, 
geology and socioeconomic characteristics, is highly vulnerable to climate 
change and climate-related hazards. It lies within the Atlantic hurricane belt 
and has experienced significant hurricane impacts in the past, including from 
Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and Hurricane Tomas in 2010 (CANARI 2018). Most of 
the island’s population (85%) and a majority of its critical infrastructure (over 
90%) such as utilities, airports, hotels and roads are located within the coastal 
zone (John 2015). This makes it very vulnerable to sea level rise, storm surges 
and coastal erosion, while steep terrain adds to the risk of landslides and flash 
flooding. The importance of climate change in SVG is reflected throughout the 
results of this case study.
This case study analysis has not provided findings concerning the traditional 
security sector. SVG has no army or defense force but instead relies on a special 
military arm of the Royal SVG Police Force (Police Force n.d.). Furthermore, 
the interrelations between climate change and human conflict or civil unrest 
were not found in any of the analyzed documents. Instead, viewing the climate-
security nexus through the lens of the extended security sector reveals that, 
nationally, one of the greatest impacts that has been stressed in several reports 
is the impact of climate change on livelihoods. This threat has been witnessed 
both on a national scale and in terms of sectoral impacts, such as the impact 
of climate change on agriculture, fisheries and tourism, which are key sectors 
for SVG. Agriculture, including fishing, is threatened by increased erosion, new 
pests and diseases, migratory species and low fish stocks. As illustrated in the 
table below, the country has developed a number of plans and strategies that 
address climate resilience. 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
Early advocacy for 
climate protection
In SVG’s first national communication to the UNFCCC, the importance of 
climate protection was underlined: “Being a tiny island state with most of our 
infrastructural development on the coast, sea-level rise will have a devastating 
impact on our ability to remain a proud independent nation. […] Recognizing 
our ecological fragility and our dependence on agriculture and tourism, we 
cannot afford to be spectators on issues as important as Climate Change” 
(NEAB and MHWE 2000:iii). The communication was prepared in conjunction 
with the joint regional project Caribbean: Planning for Adaptation to Global 
Climate Change. As part of this, the country established a climate-monitoring 
station to record environmental change. It also participated in several regional 
efforts to establish databases and information systems, inventory coastal 
resources and uses, and formulate policy frameworks for integrated coastal 
and marine management (UNDP CCA n.d.).
2013 Third International 
Conference on Small 
Island Developing States 
- National Report
Issued by the Ministry of Health, Wellness and the Environment, the report 
stated that the island had submitted only one national communication to the 
UNFCCC because the technology needed for the assessment was incomplete. 
It continued: “On the ground there is no real indication that the country is 
able to handle the vagaries of climate change. Adaptation efforts seen are the 
natural response of the Vincentian people with little infusion of the lessons 
learnt from the global community” (MHWE 2013:10).
National Economic and 
Social Development 
Plan 2013-2025
Issued by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, Sustainable 
Development and Information Technology, the plan aims to, among other 
things, improve physical infrastructure, protect the environment, advance 
climate resilience-building and effectively prepare to mitigate disasters. 
Efficient use and management of natural resources is envisaged to “ensure 
a clean, safe and healthy environment,” and the importation of fuels should 
be reduced. Climate change is described as causing unprecedented and 
fundamental change in SVG due to “[its] negative impacts […] and the country’s 
increased vulnerability to natural disasters” (MFESI 2013:16). Responses 
to these challenges focus on awareness-raising and resilience-building to 
minimize impacts on settlement, infrastructure, agriculture and human health. 
The development of an “appropriate legislative and regulatory framework, for 
proper environmental management, and institutional systems for responding 




SVG recognized the need for an “integrated approach to adaptation by 
linking local activities with national policies and sector specific experiences.” 
Therefore, resilience-building and “climate change adaptation activities have 
been mainstreamed into national development planning (through the National 
Economic and Social Development Plan).” Various areas were considered: 
“culture, identity and national pride; economic; social capital; governance; 
national security; energy, disaster management and the environment; physical 
infrastructure and education, telecommunications, science and technology” 
(NDC 2015: 9). Examples of concrete steps taken include “support for small 
scale farmers from the government, in production technologies, agri-business 
management, good agricultural practices […] policy initiatives to address 
climate change issues, environmental protection, risk mitigation and fisheries 
development; and a national plan for dealing with food security” (NDC 2015:10).
Table 29: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines’ extended security sector
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Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Rose-Ann Smith’s research results.
National Climate 
Change Policy
The 2018 Strategy and Implementation Plan on Climate Change Policy (2020-
2030), which was issued by the Organization for Eastern Caribbean States’ 
(OECS) Regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project and funded by the 
World Bank and the Climate Investment Fund’s Pilot Program for Climate 
Resilience Technical Assistance and implemented by the Caribbean Natural 
Resources Institute (CANARI), provides the basis for developing the climate 
change policy plan, which was drafted in 2019. 
The 2019 National Climate Change Policy provides guidance on adaptation 
and mitigation measures to reduce climate vulnerability and build resilience 
over the long term (2020–2030). The importance of an integrated approach 
to climate change, disaster risk management and national security as a cross-
cutting theme with the objective of ensuring the health, safety and security of 
residents and visitors is highlighted. The text describes impacts on climate-
sensitive livelihoods such as agriculture and tourism as well as on national 
security issues such as “migration, resettlement and threats to law and order 
triggered by climate related disasters and related issues of food, water and 
energy security” (CANARI 2019:36).
2019 National 
Adaptation Plan
The plan was developed with the “support of the Japan-Caribbean Climate 
Change Partnership (J-CCCP), with the aim of guiding Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines towards a green, low-emission and climate resilient development 
pathway” (Government SVG 2019:3). It describes how the consequences 
of climate change like increasing temperature or changing precipitation 
could cause coastal erosion, landslides, droughts, storms and hurricanes, 
floods, heat waves, fires and diseases, all of which threatens lives, animals, 
housing, agriculture, economic and physical infrastructure and increases the 
vulnerability of people below the poverty line, single parents, the elderly, the 
disabled and homeless persons (Government SVG 2019).
In the regional context, it should be emphasized that SVG belongs to organiza-
tions that have developed responsive actions and institutional frameworks for 
confronting the threats of climate change. Some examples include the Carib-
bean Community’s (CARICOM) Liliendaal Declaration on Climate Change and 
Development, the Regional Framework for Achieving Development Resilient to a 
Changing Climate and its Implementation Plan (2011-2021) as well as the Com-
prehensive Disaster Management Strategy 2014-2024. Furthermore, in 1991, 
the CARICOM established the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management 
Agency, which embraces “an integrated and proactive approach to disaster 
management and seeks to reduce the risk and loss associated with natural and 
technological hazards and the effects of climate change to enhance regional 
sustainable development” (CDEMA n.d.). 
A member of the Organization for Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), SVG 
has been working alongside other member states on the development of a 
comprehensive resilience framework which supports the OECS Environmental 
Management Strategy and addresses climate change causes and impacts, 
energy efficiency, renewable energy and disaster risk reduction. In addition, 
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members are in the process of developing the Eastern Caribbean Regional 
Climate Change Implementation Plan, which aims to reduce large-scale 
emissions, increase green growth in the region, deliver development co-benefits 
and improve resilience to climate change impacts (CANARI 2019).
In addition to these domestic- and regional-centered policies and attempts to 
deal with adverse impacts, the prime minister has, on several occasions at the 
UN, pointed out SVG’s particular vulnerability while underlining that climate 
change is a threat caused by foreign countries and larger emitters who–unlike 
SVG–are not committed to the task of mitigating climate change (UNGA 2011, 
2015). It is also within the UN context that most of the pertinent references 
to climate change as an existential threat–in this case to island states – were 
detected (see table below).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2009 Statement 
by the permanent 
representative
“As a small island archipelagic state, we, more than most, are affected and 
threatened by the ravages of climate change. We, more than most, recognize 
the critical importance of a meaningful, measurable and enforceable global 
compact on climate change. However, we do not simply want to ‘seal the deal’ 
at Copenhagen, as posited by the sloganeers in the UN. We want to seal the 
right deal, the just deal, and the deal that ensures our continued survival. We 
most emphatically will not seal a suicide pact that will assure the elimination 
of small island states and our way of life. The Alliance of Small Island States 
has recently issued a declaration that contains what we consider to be the 
essential contours of any meaningful agreement on climate change. We trust 
that our blameless position on the front lines of climate change fallout will be 
considered and respected in the global effort to ‘seal the deal.’ We cannot, as 
in the case of the world economy, be excluded in any way from the solutions to 
a problem that so fundamentally affects us” (UNGA 2009).
2019 Statement by the 
prime minister
“Marginalized nations and peoples had ‘thirsted too long at the dry spigot of 
promised trickle-down prosperity,’ and the long-foretold ‘rising tide that lifts 
all boats’ had come in the form of rising seas which threatened to inundate 
small island developing States. […] As big emitters continued to dither, more 
frequent and intense hurricanes washed away large swaths of his country’s 
GDP in a matter of hours” (UNGA 2016). 
2017 Statements by the 
deputy prime minister 
and foreign minister
“Saint Vincent and the Grenadines views any attempt to disavow the freshly-
minted commitments of the Paris Accord as an act of hostility, and we draw a 
direct, causal connection between any such abdication and the future death 
and destruction that island states face as the result of increasingly frequent 
and intense weather events” (UNGA 2017).
Table 30: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines from an existential security perspective
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The Commonwealth of Nations (2020, n.d), of which SVG is part, also acknowledges 
the existential threat and supports the vulnerable island states in the face of climate 
change by strengthening “the voice of small states and unit[ing] its members to 
address this existential threat,” and it aims to secure the “historic Paris Accord.” 
The 2011 CARIBSAVE Climate Change Risk Atlas also describes climate change 
as a “serious and substantial threat to the economies of Caribbean nations, the 
livelihoods of communities and the environments and infrastructure across the 
region” and recommends a strong disaster and emergency management system 
for SVG in order to ensure “safety and security but also to the socio-economic 
performance of the country” (Simpson et al. 2012).
Generally speaking, it must be emphasized that SVG displays considerable 
recognition and awareness of the threats posed by climate change and its 
consequences. Nevertheless, the general emphasis on adaptation rather 
than mitigation signifies an implicit understanding that, in spite of the island’s 
commitment to mitigating climate change, SVG must identify the best means 
of living with it until the main emitters have accepted that the true responsibility 
lies with them. The response to climate change can therefore be understood 
as a global effort of various international frameworks calling for adaptation and 
mitigation that has trickled down to the regional and national level. While there 
were no findings on the traditional security sector or on the interrelations between 
climate change and conflict, there is a recognition of climate change’s potential to 
cause even broader security issues in terms of an existential threat. SVG’s prime 
minister has made statements to this effect in his addresses at the general debates 
2018 Statement by the 
prime minister 
During the 2018 general debate of United Nations General Assembly, the 
prime minister stated: “Beyond the headlines, the story of climate change 
is grimly told in daily experiences of floods, droughts, landslides, coastal 
erosions, lost lives and livelihoods across our region.” Major emitters who “fail 
to set – and honour – ambitious mitigation pledges are committing a direct act 
of hostility, and we ought to resist the recklessness of those emitters acting 
against our interests” because climate change represents an “multifaceted 
existential problem,” especially in the Caribbean (UNGA 2018).
2020 Statement marking 
the assumption of the 
UNSC seat
The permanent representative to the UN stated that “in a world in which climate 
change is an existential threat to the Small Island Developing State (SIDS), in 
a world where climate change threatens to make the independent citizens of a 
Small Island Developing State stateless in the not-too-distant future, the Small 
Island Developing State has the responsibility to its citizens to be bold and 
advocate vociferously in the international arena for climate justice now… The 
Small Island Developing State must fight for its protection, it must fight to hold 
carbon emitters accountable, it must fight for behaviour change, it must do so 
even as it grapples with its own homegrown challenge” (King 2020a).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Rose-Ann Smith research results.
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of the United Nations General Assembly over the years. Furthermore, the election 
of the country as a non-permanent member of the Group of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and a non-permanent member of the UNSC was motivated by SVG’s 
role in representing the interests of all SIDS in addressing climate change.
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES:  
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is the smallest nation ever to secure a non-
permanent seat in the UNSC (2020-2021). In addition to supporting principles 
like equality, sovereignty and independency, the country advocates sustainable 
development and is committed to addressing the security implications of climate 
change, especially for the SIDS. SVG has expressed willingness to cooperate with 
other members on the matter (UN News 2019). As an elected, non-permanent 
member of the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean, the country is 
expected to represent the group’s interest in the UNSC (King 2020a). During 
the UNSC’s open debate in 2019, the representative from Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines noted that the UNFCCC is the main UN body for addressing climate 
change; however, a “multi-pronged” approach in which the UNSC recognizes 
climate change’s implications for international peace and security is needed. 
The representative highlighted that unless major emitters take responsibility for 
climate change and reduce their emissions, this inaction could be seen as a 
“direct act of hostility” (UNSC 2019).
During the recent 2020 Arria-Formula meeting, which was co-organized by 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the country emphasized the need for the 
UNSC to address climate-related security risks but also to include the whole 
UN system, as climate change is present across all spectrums. The tenets of 
the UNFCCC “should undergird coherent action throughout the UN system as 
fundamental components of all policies, programs and operations.” According 
to Representative King, it is also necessary to support adaptation and mitigation 
efforts in climate-vulnerable countries through funding. She underlined that 
a key prevention measure to avoid “climate induced or exacerbated conflict” 
is mitigating emissions. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines currently endorses 
initiatives to improve the information base for UN activities on the issue, and it 
supports the Climate Security Mechanism (King 2020b).
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The table below shows multiple acknowledgements of the climate-security 
nexus in the extended security sector. Generally, several development plans and 
national frameworks mainstream climate change and disaster risk management 
4.11. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Nicholas Simpson and 
Birgitt Ouweneel
As illustrated in the table below, the climate-security nexus is acknowledged 
within the traditional security sector, and it can be said that security apparatuses 
such as the military and the Department of Defence (DoD) have been influenced 
conceptually and operationally by climate change. The underlying security 
concept is relatively broad and characterized by the interplay of soft and hard 
security aspects. Several consequences attributed to climate change are stated 
in relation to conflict, human insecurity, underdevelopment and migration. 
In response to perceived insecurity, the DoD (2015:14) underscores the 
importance of the integration and combination of all government domains in 
possible interventions. The military is also included in disaster risk management 
at the domestic and foreign level. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2014 and 2015 Defence 
Strategies
The Defence Strategy 2014 of the Department of Defence holds that “advancing 
climate change, poverty and disease continue to exacerbate the social 
and economic vulnerability of many communities” (DoD 2014:6, 2015:10) 
and act as global and regional stress factors alongside, e.g. international 
terrorism (DoD 2014:10). Climate change is linked to conflict due to resource 
competition and migration across borders (DoD 2015:14) and is described as 
being one of the “most serious threats to humanity” through, e.g. hurricanes, 
floods and wildfires (DoD 2014:13, 2015:2). Response objectives are the 
promotion of well-being and development, protection of the environment and 
climate for future generations, assurance of prosperity of the country, region 
and continent, and sustainable economic growth (DoD 2015:4).
South African National 
Defence Force
Increasing role of the South African National Defence Force in the context 
of disaster risk management. The mandate includes flood and disaster relief 
(Hlahla 2006). The defense sector is part of a major framework of natural 
disaster response (2015 Disaster Management Act, see below); it supports 
other government departments with humanitarian assistance in response to 
environmental threats, and it also acts abroad (The Presidency 2015; DoD 
2014:13, 2015:28), e.g. in the military operation in Mozambique after the 2019 
Cyclone Idai (Maclean 2019).
Table 31: Findings on the climate-security nexus in South Africa’s traditional 
security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Nicholas Simpson’s and Birgitt Ouweneel’s 
research results.
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into broader policies based on the argument that climate change and security 
are interrelated. An important focus is on poverty, underdevelopment, and food 
and water security in connection to climate change. As such, climate change is 
described as posing a considerable risk to the country’s economy and a threat 
to the lives and livelihoods of all South Africans (DoD 2015; DEA 2017a) and 
as disproportionately impacting the poor, especially women and children (NPC 
2012). As the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic 
of South Africa stated during the Security Council briefing on peace and security 
in Africa, “Historically, some of the contributing factors for instability and 
insecurity on the African Continent include poverty, marginalisation, inequality, 
unemployment, failure to manage diversity, governance, the scramble for natural 
resources, external interference, and recently the impact of climate change” 
(Pandor 2019). President Ramaphosa (2019a) stated that “the devastating 
effects of global warming on our climate are already being felt, with extreme 
weather conditions damaging livelihoods, communities and economies.” 
Acknowledgement of the historical responsibility in causing climate change 
can be detected, for example, in another statement from President Ramaphosa 
(2019b) in which he expressed that South Africa shares a sense of urgency in 
addressing the climate emergency and highlighted that, although developing 
countries “have historically contributed the least to global emissions, they are 
and will continue to be the most affected by climate change and its impacts.” A 
fair contribution to the global climate change response dependent on respective 
national capabilities and differentiated responsibilities is also emphasized. 
Similarly, the Department of Environmental Affairs states that “developed 
countries [need] to step up and do their fair share,” indicating that they see it 
as their obligation to support “developing countries to enhance their climate 
actions through technology and skills transfer, financing and others” (DEA 2018). 





Climate change is entrenched and mainstreamed in the country’s development 
directory. The National Planning Commission’s development plan highlights 
consequences of climate change on conflicts, migration and food security 
through its impact on food production and access to water. The general 
message is that climate change disproportionately impacts the poor, especially 
women and children (NPC 2012).
2015 Disaster 
Management Act 
The act envisages the consideration of climate change in disaster risk 
assessments throughout all spheres of government. It mandates measures 
to reduce the risk of disaster through adaptation to climate change and the 
development of early warning mechanisms (Presidency 2015).
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In addition, cooperation between local government and private actors is evi-
denced in references to climate change, water and energy security. Provincial 
and local governments seeking to provide enhanced water and energy security 
are increasingly using these terms, recognizing the need for the involvement of 
private actors in response to climate induced disruptions, the limited reach of 
state response, and the importance of coordination between all security actors. 
The whole-of-society-approach emphasizes overlapping security roles and the 
need for cooperation between state and non-state actors, e.g. in the water strat-
egy of Cape Town Municipality (CoCT 2019; Simpson et al. 2019).
Generally, the responses address vulnerability reduction, strengthening of 
resilience and the cooperation of different actors throughout several sectors 
and governance levels. The country’s climate change engagements represent 
a complex system influenced by national, continental and global actors. On 
the African continent, South Africa has become the main driver of climate 
negotiations (Nhamo 2011) and plays a vital role in ensuring the implementation 
of the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
President Ramaphosa (2019b) emphasized that “the climate crisis cannot be 
solved outside of a development context. We see the crisis as an opportunity 
to strengthen global governance and that in addressing the crisis, we can meet 
the aspirations of the UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the 
Sustainable Development Goals. South Africa’s National Development Plan 2030 
identifies poverty, inequality and unemployment as our most serious national 
development challenges. Overcoming these triple challenges fundamentally 
informs our approach to addressing climate change.” 




The department is mainstreaming climate change and response measures 
into relevant sectors to ensure coordinated and integrated responses by all 
spheres of government. It seeks to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen 
resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change and ensure an adequate 
national adaptation response in the context of the global response (DEA 2011, 
2018). Accordingly, water is the primary medium through which the impacts of 
climate change are being felt in South Africa (DEA 2017b).
2016 Nationally 
Determined Contribution
The NDCs include a strong focus on water and food security in relation 
to climate change: “The nature of the climate change challenge is one 
characterized by the overuse of a global commons in an unequal world. Along 
with other developing countries, South Africa is especially vulnerable to its 
impacts, particularly in respect of water and food security, as well as impacts 
on health, human settlements, and infrastructure and ecosystem services” 
(NDC 2016:1).
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The existential security perspective is found in the constitution, the Department 
of Defence and in UNSC statements.
As an overall insight, it can be concluded that South Africa sees an important 
correlation between addressing the causes and consequences of insecurity 
and promoting an environment conducive to human development. This people-
centered approach to national security thus places a legitimate, credible and 
cohesive developmental state at the center of driving the overarching agenda 
to build a better South Africa, a better and safer Africa, and a better world for 
all peoples. 
To date, more substantive effort has been focused on notions of security that 
have extended to water, food, energy and other “second-generation” rights. 
This derives in part from the recognition that climate change presents a range 
of risks to essential goods, which have a potentially greater and immediate 
impact on domestic insecurities, as well as the co-benefit of addressing broader 
societal goals. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
1996 Constitution The constitution states, “Everyone has the right – (a) to an environment that 
is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and (b) to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures that (i) prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development” (Constitution 1996).
2014, 2015 Department 
of Defence
Relatively exceptional is the fact that defense strategies include references to 
an existential understanding of security, with climate change being described 
as part of the “most serious threats to humanity” through, e.g. hurricanes, 
floods and wildfires (DoD 2014:13, 2015:2) and that, in alignment with the 
environmental right, the strategies highlight the protection of the environment 
and future generations through the promotion of wellbeing, for example. 
Department of 
Environmental Affairs
The South African representative stated: “The true nature of the threat posed 
by climate change is existential and global in nature” (UNSC 2019).
Table 33: Findings on the climate-security nexus in South Africa from an 
existential security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Nicholas Simpson and Birgitt Ouweneel’s 
research results.
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SOUTH AFRICA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC 
Through its membership in the UNSC (2019-2020), South Africa aims to champion 
the positioning of Africa as a strong, resilient and influential global player by 
bolstering the African Union’s relationship with the United Nations (Ramaphosa 
2020). The main priority of South Africa’s membership is advocating preventative 
diplomacy, mainstreaming gender perspectives into all of the Council’s 
resolutions (DIRCO 2018), and promoting greater equitability for countries 
of the Global South within the UN system (Landers 2019). During its previous 
memberships in 2007 and 2011, South Africa argued that inclusion went beyond 
the Council’s mandate and needed to be addressed in other UN forums (UNSC 
2007, 2011). Again in 2019, South Africa questioned the appropriateness of the 
Council dealing with climate change, arguing that the high level of uncertainty 
makes it difficult to determine a direct causal nexus between climate change 
and natural disasters as well as threats to international peace and security. A 
possible duplication of efforts with other UN entities who are better suited to deal 
with this matter was also pointed out (UNSC 2019). Additionally, the possibility of 
undermining states’ sovereignty and a fracturing of the international system were 
expressed as main concerns (Murphy 2018).
The recent UNSC Arria-Formula meeting in 2020 showed that the position 
rejecting inclusion has changed. The South African representative stated that, 
while it is still important to question the exact role of the Council, it has become 
clear that climate change is a matter of security that acts as a “conflict multiplier” 
and is contributing to conflicts, e.g. in the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn of 
Africa (Mogashoa 2020). She highlighted the importance of unpacking the 
linkages between climate change and security and considering possible ways in 
which the UNSC can address these challenges, which are regarded as especially 
important in context of COVID-19. South Africa recommends considering the 
scientific consensus on this topic and strengthening multilateral solutions in which 
the UNFCCC plays an important role. It is therefore highlighted as “absolutely 
critical” that the UN coordinate collective responses to this “existential threat of 
this nature” as well as cooperate with regional organizations like the African Union 
and partners on the ground (Mogashoa 2020). The country encourages greater 
research and analyses not only on this topic, but other environmental challenges 
that affect security as well in order to plan timely and appropriate interventions.
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In this context, it is regarded as crucial to consider as many voices as possible 
and to promote resilient livelihoods to create social cohesion. Accordingly, the 
UNSC needs to address these challenges “holistically” and integrate aspects of 
(sustainable) development (Mogashoa 2020).
4.12. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN TUNISIA
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Hatem Jammeli
No references to the climate-security nexus with respect to traditional security 
considerations have been detected among the Tunisian government documents 
analyzed during the available research period. While the traditional security 
sector is thus not an aspect of this case study, it can nevertheless be highlighted 
that the Tunisian army is actively involved in disaster risk management and civil 
security missions to rescue people from devastated regions. Recently, in 2019, 
the army assisted in the evacuation of people from the flood-affected area of the 
Ariana Governorate and participated in water pumping efforts (Dejoul 2019). 
Military forces are also involved in fighting desertification and harvesting crops. 
In 2019, for instance, the military secured about 600 thousand quintals of 
freshly-harvested cereals from the northwestern governorate of Siliana (Realities 
2019). Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has contributed considerably to 
agriculture development projects concerning date palm production in particular 
(Marsad 2017).
The extended security sector does show acknowledgement of the climate-
security nexus on the domestic level in relation to energy and food security and 
extreme events, as the state has already experienced several flood disasters 
primarily affecting the North (Medjerda River basin), Midwest, and Northeast in 
2007, 2009 and 2018, respectively (Fehri 2014; France 24 2018). In the findings 
that focus on foreign affairs, reference is made to aims to strengthen dialogue 
and cooperation in reducing and managing disasters, the fight against ecological 
degradation, and to descriptions of the African States as being particularly 
exposed and vulnerable to climate change.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2007 National Strategy 
for Adaptation to 
Climate Change
2012 National Strategy 
on Climate Change
The 2007 strategy was first developed for the agricultural sector and also 
included several sectors directly or indirectly related to agriculture. However, 
it subsequently moved beyond those sectors and became a cross-cutting 
strategy, attracting great interest in the country and raising awareness of the 
challenges of climate change (MAWRF and GIZ 2007).
In 2012, a new national strategy was adopted. It provided a multi-sectoral 
response to climate change and created a roadmap for the enhancement of the 
country’s adaptive capacity. It describes possible pathways forward following 
the revolution, but it places future Tunisian development on insecure ground 
and highlights the needs of the Tunisian people, namely socioeconomic 
development and protection of the poor. These aims can be achieved with 
the help of robust climate politics that includes, e.g. spatial equilibrium and 
adaptation to sea level rise. The strategy also includes the possibility of 
conflicts resulting from resource competition (MESD and GIZ 2012). Both 





Tunisia “supports international efforts to combat climate change” (NDC 2015: 
4) and the commitments of the UNFCCC. The nexus of energy and security is 
prominent as the “policy of fighting climate change is particularly emphasized 
in the energy sector.” Security issues are thereby said to arise from the 
“growing energy balance deficit and the heavy reliance on conventional energy” 
(NDC 2015:4). Additionally, economic sustainability issues are associated 
with fluctuations of global energy prices and their implications in terms of the 
balance of payments and public finances. In addition, the expected impact on 
the agricultural sector is highlighted. Extreme droughts could decrease the 
available land area for rain-fed cereal production by 30%, which could lead 
to a decline of 5-10% of the GDP by 2030 compared to 2010. To meet these 
challenges, an energy transition process that strengthens energy efficiency 
and renewable energies is envisaged. The government aims to lower its 
carbon intensity by 41% by 2030 compared to 2010 (NDC 2015).
Foreign policy principles The principles and objectives of Tunisian diplomacy in foreign policy are 
formulated “[o]n the basis of a global and comprehensive approach to 
international relations based on a close correlation between the notions of 
peace, security, stability, development and democracy” and include three 
overall goals. In addition to enhancing cooperation, reducing “tension and 
crises in international relations and fostering a favorable climate for the 
promotion of peace, security and stability in the world,” a third goal is “[r]
ectifying the disequilibria characterizing international economic relations and 
enhancing complementarity and solidarity partnership between States,” which 
includes the aim of “[e]nhancing international cooperation in the field of fight 
against the phenomenon of ecological degradation and cleanliness of global 
environment” (MFA n.d.).
Table 34: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Tunisia’s extended  
security sector
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2018 Declaration on 
Disaster Risk Reduction
The Tunis Declaration on accelerating the implementation of the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 recognizes “the ever-
increasing risk of disasters and their devastating effects, including loss of life, 
livelihoods and infrastructure, and forced displacement. The differentiated 
impact on men and women across the continent is exacerbated mostly 
by climate change and variability, environmental degradation, unplanned 
urbanisation, inequality, as well as conflicts. This trend undermines the 
efforts aimed at achieving the global targets of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable 
Development and the aspirations of Agenda 2063.” Furthermore, it recognizes 
“the increasing vulnerability of island states of Africa, as well African states 
emerging from conflicts and disasters to climate change, and the impact 
of natural hazards on their economies and development” (UNDRR and 
AU 2018:2). In response, “the integration of climate change, disaster risk 
reduction and sustainable development strategies, policies, programmes and 
plans of action at all levels to ensure disaster risk informed, inclusive, resilient 
and sustainable development in Africa” is envisaged (UNDRR and AU 2018:4f). 
This aim employs the whole-of-society approach, which addresses disaster 
risk reduction in cooperation with civil society and the disadvantaged and 
vulnerable in a mainstreaming approach.
During a 2012 meeting, Tunisia highlighted the need for better disaster risk 
and management and increasing resiliency due to extreme events like heavy 
floods. Tunisia announced the establishment of a risk information system and 
risk-sensitive policies in response (UNDRR 2012).
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Hatem Jammeli’s research results.
When it comes to viewing climate change’s impact on security from an 
existential perspective, the focus rests primarily on the Tunisian constitution 
(see table below). Drafted after the 2011 uprising known as the Arab Spring, 
the new constitution was adopted in 2014 and emphasizes the importance of 
environmental issues in a specially-designated section. Constitutionalizing the 
right to a “healthy” environment shows that Tunisian legislators are aware of the 
implications of climate change and that environmental and climate protection 
are part of the political agenda. The constitution specifically references climate 
change: “[I]n the wake of the political changes triggered in December 2010, 
Tunisia adopted a new constitution on 26 January 2014, which incorporated 
the fight against climate change as a permanent feature. Under Article 44 of 
the new constitution, the state shall ‘provide the means necessary to guarantee 
a healthy and balanced environment and contribute to the climate’s integrity’” 
(NDC 2015:4). The USAID (2018) factsheet Climate Risk Profile Tunisia also 
states that the “Government of Tunisia recognizes the threat that climate change 
poses, with climate change explicitly discussed in the country’s constitution.”
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Some external actors have illustrated the climate-security nexus by specifically 
connecting climate change to water security in the “water scarce low-lying 
islands off Tunisia’s coast,” to coastal erosion (USAID 2018:1; UNDP 2017), 
or by focusing on environmental degradation, environmentally-dependent 
socioeconomic systems and population displacement (Gsir and Bounouh 2017). 
According to a study carried out by the World Bank, IPCC projections indicate 
that Tunisia and neighboring countries are projected to experience strongly 
reduced hydrological cycles and, therefore, drier conditions with increased risks 
of droughts throughout the 21st century under high greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission scenarios (Verner et al. 2018). The potential socioeconomic impacts 
of soil erosion and desertification may include reduced income for farmers 
and agribusinesses, increased prices for food and other primary products, 
rural unemployment, lower tax revenues, increased crime and insecurity, and 
increased migration to urban areas and elsewhere (Verner 2018).
The findings to date indicate that, in spite of several acknowledgements included 
in this case study, the climate-security nexus is not a key concern at the domestic 
level. As indicated below, however, Tunisia’s position during its membership in 
the UNSC shows an increasing concern with the issue. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
Tunisia’s constitution The preamble highlights the “necessity of contributing to the preservation of a 
healthy environment that guarantees the sustainability of our natural resources 
and bequeathing a secure life to future generations.” Article 45 holds that the 
“state guarantees the right to a healthy and balanced environment and the 
right to participate in the protection of the climate. The state shall provide 
the necessary means to eradicate pollution of the environment” (Tunisian 
Constitution 2014). 
Table 35: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Tunisia from an existential 
perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Hatem Jammeli’s research results.
TUNISIA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
During its membership in the UNSC (2020-2021), Tunisia’s focus is mainly on 
conflict prevention and settlement, with particular attention paid to both the 
role of women and younger generations in this context and to the importance
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4.13. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Cameron Harrington
As illustrated in the table below, the climate-security nexus is acknowledged 
within the UK’s traditional security sector, and climate change concerns are 
included in domestic and foreign affairs. It also shows that climate change is 
framed in relation to the activity of the military itself and unstable regions. Climate 
change as a root cause of conflict is absent in most of the security documents 
reviewed. Most strategic outlooks and assessments from the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) are focused on building military preparedness rather than emphasizing 
of enhancing developmental cooperation. Combatting terrorism is another 
security priority. Following Tunisia’s election to the Council in 2019, climate 
change was not mentioned as a main priority, but the global challenges “facing 
human beings and international community” were referenced by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (Jhinaoui 2019).
However, in April 2020, Tunisia co-organized the Arria-Formula on climate 
and security risks, during which the Tunisian representative advocated for 
the topic’s inclusion in the UNSC. He pointed out that the impacts of climate 
change on livelihoods (e.g. food security) can “exacerbate existing conflicts,” 
and that the UN does not have the appropriate tools to deal with the situation. 
Tunisia therefore sees the need to strengthen the UN’s data- and knowledge 
base on the topic and integrate risk assessment of this threat in all levels of 
security, especially preventative strategies. Tunisia supports periodic reporting 
from the secretary-general to the UNSC that includes in-depth analysis of the 
current and future risks posed by climate change. The Council could then take 
these aspects into consideration in peacekeeping missions and preventive 
measures. To improve coordination within the UN, Tunisia also favors the 
appointment of a special envoy for climate security. The representative 
emphasized that a “holistic” security approach that includes all UN entities 
is needed and, lastly, underlined the key role of the Paris Agreement and the 
Agenda 2030 in collectively tackling climate change (Ladeb 2020).
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mitigation or climate conflict prevention. Certainly, the militarization of the topic 
is possible, but the UK has not, as yet, designated climate change as a problem 
to be solved militarily. Instead, the MoD and UK Forces see themselves as being 
positioned to provide assistance and expertise to developing countries bearing 
the brunt of deleterious climate effects and do not have the resources necessary 
for mitigation (MoD 2015). Therefore, the Ministry demonstrates the prevailing 
view that climate security is better handled politically than militarily.
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National Security 
Strategy of the Cabinet 
includes climate change 
(2009) as “threat 
multiplier” (2015) and 
“national security priority” 
(2019) 
Climate change is referred to as “potentially the greatest challenge to global 
stability and security, and therefore to national security” (Cabinet Office 
2009:18) and as a “threat multiplier” (Cabinet Office 2010:17), the impacts 
of which are exacerbating instability, conflict and migration in many countries, 
particularly in North Africa and the Middle East (Cabinet Office 2015:17). 
The UK’s security has been described as more complex, intertwined and 
dangerous since 2015, and new security priorities affecting the UK, like 
diseases and natural hazards that exist peripherally to climate change, are 
considered (Cabinet Office 2015). In this context, civil emergency risks and 
their direct effects on the UK and are also seemingly of growing importance 
to national security. Finally, in 2019 in the third Annual Report, it is noted that 
“climate change is rightly treated as a national security priority” (Cabinet Office 
2019:3).
Ministry of Defence In 2010, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (2010:12) released climate change 
strategies and highlighted the effect of climate change on the UK’s interests 
“both at home through increased migration, and abroad as climate change 
acts as a threat multiplier, destabilising areas of the world that are of strategic 
importance to the UK.”
On a strategic level, future scenarios of climate change impacts are emphasized 
as climate and related risks are listed among the highest impact and certainty 
threats to defense (MoD 2018). 
Climate change is framed as an institutional challenge that threatens 
the “defence’s ability to meet its strategic objectives.” It affects the type, 
frequency and location of military operations and the “availability and cost 
of energy, products and services.” The identification and understanding of 
the worldwide and local consequences of climate change is seen as crucial 
(MoD 2017). Reducing military GHG emissions if envisaged (MoD 2020) and 
the importance of an eco-friendly image to bolster recruitment amongst the 
younger generation is also highlighted (Makin-Isherwood 2019).
In 2020, a new climate change strategy and strategic outlook was announced. 
It will highlight “the need to be prepared to operate more often in the Arctic 
region as ice sheets recede and Russian submarine activity increases; our 
forces are increasingly called upon to assist with natural disasters across the 
globe; and they need to be able to operate in environments that will and are 
experiencing more extreme weather patterns” (MoD 2020).
Table 36: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the UK’s traditional  
security sector
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The UK has been at the forefront of linking climate and security for decades. 
Even as far back as 1989, then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher framed climate 
change as a global existential risk, using a speech in the UN General Assembly 
to proclaim that “it is life itself that we must battle to preserve” (Thatcher 1989). 
Since at least 2007, climate change has been acknowledged as an important 
security issue in and for the UK and is gaining more room in the UK’s security 
policy. It is now utilized in multiple ways across departments and in different 
ways across time and place.
The table below shows the multiple acknowledgments of the climate-security 
nexus within the extended security sector. The focus is mostly on foreign affairs 
as the UK champions climate diplomacy, aid, and the building of resilient and 
adaptive societies. Climate change is thereby used to further a vision of global 
security that is advanced through international cooperation and multilateral aid. 
Accordingly, the “UK has taken a proactive approach to mainstream climate talks 
through other channels including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (with 
its highly-regarded network of climate attachés) [...] the G7 and G20, the UN 
Security Council and other ‘soft diplomacy’ routes” (CCC 2019:119). However, 
domestic vulnerability is also taken into account. Climate impacts on the UK 
itself are said to be significant, diverse, and increasing (CCC 2017b; DEFRA 
2018; DBEIS 2017). The Meteorology Office (Met Office 2018) projects that all 
areas of the UK will become warmer, with wetter winters and drier summers by 
the end of the 21st century and a consistently rising sea level (under all emission 
scenarios) as well. 
Another important aspect that is not highlighted in the following table but has 
already had an important influence on UK politics is the fact that the country 
will host the upcoming UN Conference of Parties (COP26), which has been 
postponed until 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in Glasgow. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Cameron Harrington’s research results.
Role of the military in 
disaster management 
(domestic and abroad)
The Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force have played key roles in 
responding to disasters such as the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia, the 
2015 earthquake in Nepal, Hurricane Dorian in the Bahamas, Hurricane Irma 
in 2017, and the 2018 earthquake in Indonesia. Domestically, forces were also 
used during the flooding caused by Storm Desmond in 2015 (Forces Network 
2019), for example.






In the context of the FCO, strong concerns about climate change exist, and 
several diplomats and officials are advocating for the acknowledgement 
of climate-security links. Minister Mark Field, for example, highlighted the 
importance of factoring the risks of climate change into all governmental 
decision-making and states, “climate security must be at the heart of foreign 
policy work at a global level” (FCO 2019a).
A particular concern lies on the impacts of climate change for the Island 
Developing States and Least Developed Countries, including almost 60% of 
the Commonwealth members, which accordingly face an existential threat 




The DFID states: “We face a climate cataclysm that could undermine all our 
efforts. We are helping to make countries and populations more resilient in 
the face of the climate crisis and better able to anticipate and manage risks 
and shocks. We are mitigating the impact of climate change including through 
low carbon growth supported by innovation and technology; and providing 
stronger protection of biodiversity and the environment” (DFID 2019).
International Climate 
Finance as primary 
mechanism of 
development and aid 
policy
The “UK International Climate Finance (ICF) plays a crucial role in addressing 
this global challenge […]. Our ICF delivers in the national interest, delivering 
all 4 aims of the UK aid strategy: strengthening global peace, security and 
governance; strengthening resilience and response to crises; promoting 
global prosperity; tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most 
vulnerable” (UK Government 2020).
Climate Change Risk 
Assessment of the 
Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC)
The CCC includes security in relation to domestic and international dimensions. 
Climate security is not seen as a direct cause of global instability but rather one 
important piece in a larger suite of factors. It poses a risk to the UK because of 
its potential impacts on the following:
1. State failure in a given area may require greater proportions of UK aid to be 
channeled to humanitarian assistance, thereby reducing the funds available 
for longer-term economic development and adaptation actions and thus failing 
to address some of the root causes.
2. Second, the breakdown of state structures can lead to greater insecurity 
in trade and transportation through the area. This also acknowledges that 
conflicts can lead to migration or, conversely, that populations might also be 
rendered less mobile and effectively trapped in conflict zones.
3. Finally, in extreme cases, state failure may require military presence by 
international forces (including from the UK) to control non-state elements 
including terrorist organizations (CCC 2017b).
Domestically, flooding and costal changes are presented as a high risk to 
communities, businesses and infrastructure in the UK. Also, heatwaves and 
rising temperatures are an increasing risk for people’s health and will possibly 
lead to droughts and water supply shortages (water security) with devastating 
effects for agriculture (food security) and the public (CCC 2017a).
The latest CCC report (2020:101) states that the UK has a reputation “as 
one of the largest development aid donors and is respected for its efforts 
to help support vulnerable countries dealing with the impacts of climate 
change. This has helped the UK play an important role in the international 
climate negotiations (including through the EU) that resulted in the global Paris 
Agreement on climate change.”
Table 37: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the UK’s extended  
security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Cameron Harrington’s research results.
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An existential security perspective can be detected in the 2019 declaration 
of climate emergency by the UK Parliament, which makes references to future 
generations and irreversible destruction, as well as in references to other countries.
While the declaration of climate emergency demonstrates the will of Parliament, it 
does not legally compel any specific actions. Discursively, declaring an emergency 
captures the mood of the general population, which views climate change to be 
one of– perhaps the most – pressing global issue (Taylor 2019). The last years 
have seen a marked increase in UK acknowledgement of climate change threats 
and risks. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that climate politics has long 
been considered a fundamental principle in the UK, given that the 2008 Climate 
Change Act is law. The law sets out carbon budgets (e.g. 80% GHG reductions by 
2050) that the government is legally required to meet (CCC 2014).
The findings to date indicate that no sustained emphasis connecting climate 
change to UK state security is prevalent, though the country frequently connects 
its global interests to climate action. The Earth System was not detected in 
government discourse, but the importance of climate change is repeatedly 
highlighted, generally in connection to a variety of “knock-on” security effects 
(e.g. fueling instability, impacting food and water security, impacting growth 
and development, flood risk and other extreme weather events). What this all 
suggests is that climate change has been framed as a broad-based security risk, 
no matter what type of security one employs. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2019 UK Parliament 
climate emergency 
declaration
States that: “Today the House must declare an environment and climate 
emergency. We have no time to waste. We are living in a climate crisis that 
will spiral dangerously out of control unless we take rapid and dramatic action 
now. This is no longer about a distant future; we are talking about nothing 
less than the irreversible destruction of the environment within the lifetimes 
of Members. Young people know this. They have the most to lose” (House of 
Commons 2019).
2019 Statement at the 
UNSC 
“This is also an extremely important issue for the United Kingdom. Indeed, we 
were the first country to raise the issue in the Security Council, in 2007 (see 
S/PV.5663). We are particularly concerned about small island developing 
States and least developed countries, including almost 60 per cent of our 
fellow Commonwealth members, which face an existential threat from climate 
change and associated natural disasters” (UNSC 2019).
Table 38: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the UK from an existential 
security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Cameron Harrington’s research results.
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That said, if one takes traditional security as state security, it is rare to find any 
mention of climate change as an existential threat to the United Kingdom itself. 
While it views with concern and alarm the potential and real effects of climate 
change on areas around the world (particularly already-vulnerable regions), there 
is little mention of existential domestic threats from climate change. However, 
state security and national self-interest (in the form of state preservation) is found 
in the UK’s climate security discourse and practices. Indeed, the dominant frame 
of climate security in the UK today seems to emphasize the managing of risk and 
building resilience.
Looking ahead, one could expect climate change to increase in visibility in national 
strategic documents and climate security to become increasingly prevalent. 
In light of the 2017 Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCC 2017a), the next 
National Security Strategy (due in 2020 or 2021) is likely to emphasize the role of 
climate change in exacerbating existing conflict dynamics and the need for UK 
armed forces to better prepare to respond both at home and abroad. However, 
the Conservative government, in power until at least 2024, has not yet produced 
a compelling suite of action plans to combat climate change despite its net-
zero by 2050 pledge. Looking further ahead to the next decade–as the effects 
of climate change grow larger, more consistent and more easily connected to 
social effects–a number of security logics will inevitably be employed by the UK 
to justify its responses. How specifically these logics will manifest themselves, 
and what type of governance is produced in their image, remains to be seen.
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UNITED KINGDOM: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
The UK is a strong advocate for having climate change on the UNSC’s agenda 
and initiated the first-ever debate on climate security in the Council in 2007. 
The UK’s stated rationale was that climate change poses a potential threat to 
international peace because it would trigger border disputes, migration, and 
humanitarian crises (UNSC 2007a), representing an implication for “collective 
security” (UNSC 2007b) worldwide. Again, in 2011, the UK along with countries 
like the US and the Small Island Developing States (SIDs) argued the UNSC 
had the responsibility to act because climate change is a “threat multiplier” 
and part of a wave of new crosscutting security challenges (UNSC 2011). Since 
then, the UK has been a key actor alongside European allies like Germany,  
France, Sweden, and the European Council in continuing the discussion within 
the UNSC (Harris 2012). In 2018, it joined the Group of Friends on Climate 
and Security with the aim of enhancing action on climate-related security risks 
within the United Nations system (German Federal Foreign Office 2018). During 
the UNSC open debate in 2019, the UK emphasized that climate change is 
a contemporary security risk that threatens the whole world and therefore 
requires shared solutions (FCO 2019b).
Recently, during the Arria-Formula meeting co-organized by the UK, the 
British representative stressed the importance of considering climate change 
as a security threat to lives and livelihoods even though the world’s attention 
is currently focused on the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK representative 
underscored the importance of an evidence-based approach that takes 
regional factors (e.g. the resolutions on Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel, Somalia 
and Darfur) into account. Therefore, a better understanding by the UN and 
UNSC of conflict drivers and impacts on stability–as well as ways to mitigate 
them–is seen as a necessity. The UK supports reporting from the secretary-
general to the UNSC and including risk assessment (e.g. forecasting and risk 
data) in conflict prevention efforts. The representative stated, “addressing 
climate risks and resilience should be an integral part of the Council’s work 
and factored into UN operations, conflict preventions and solution strategies 
and peacebuilding plans” (Allan 2020).
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4.14. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS  
IN THE UNITED STATES
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Daniel Abrahams
In the assessment of the US’s approach to climate change, significant differences 
can be detected in the respective administrations of Barack Obama (2009-2017) 
and President Donald Trump (2017-to date). The shift in approach from one 
that strongly emphasized climate change policy (Obama administration) to one 
that has actively deemphasized the importance of climate change carries with 
it significant implications. This can be seen most clearly in the agreement and 
ratification of the Paris Agreement under Obama in 2016 and the stated intent 
to withdraw by President Trump in 2017 (Hermwille and Sanderink 2019). This 
change is of considerable importance when considering the role of the executive 
branch and its direction of federal agencies with a direct role in addressing climate 
security (e.g. the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of 
Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency and United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)). 
The table below shows the different acknowledgements of the climate-security 
nexus within the traditional security sector during both administrations. In spite 
of the differences and changes over time, there are policy efforts and discursive 
formations that have stayed consistent. Some efforts concerning the climate-
security nexus continue within key agencies and other branches of the Federal 
Government under the Trump administration (Abrahams 2019). For example, a 
cross-cutting issue is that the impacts of climate change on military infrastructure, 
basing, training and logistics are consistently depicted as “a national security 
issue” (e.g. DoD 2014, 2019a). This concern is also described in several hearings 
before the US legislature (see US Senate 2017; Conger 2019). 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CONTENT
Obama Administration Trump Administration
National Security 
Strategy
The 2015 National Security Strategy 
notes: “Climate change is an urgent 
and growing threat to our national se-
curity, contributing to increased natural 
disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts 
over basic resources like food and wa-
ter. The present-day effects of climate 
change are being felt from the Arctic to 
the Midwest. Increased sea levels and 
storm surges threaten coastal regions, 
infrastructure, and property” (Obama 
2015a:12).
Climate policy is included in relation to 
the energy sector in the 2017 National 
Security Strategy. The aim is to secure 
the US’s dominant and leading position 
and energy dominance. Therefore, the 
energy sector must be diversified and 
the “importance of environmental stew-
ardship” recognized. To “safeguard the 
environment,” initiatives and investment 
in clean energy sources are envisaged: 
“[C]limate policies will continue to sha-
pe the global energy system.” Energy 
security and environmental protection 
need to be balanced and “the United 
States will remain a global leader in 
reducing traditional pollution, as well 
as greenhouse gases, while expanding 
our economy” (Trump 2017b:22).
Department of 
Defense
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Re-
view’s focus is on climate change as 
a threat to military infrastructure: “The 
impacts of climate change may increa-
se the frequency, scale, and complexity 
of future missions, including defense 
support to civil authorities, while at the 
same time undermining the capacity of 
our domestic installations to support 
training activities and other forms of 
violence” (DoD 2014:8).
Climate change is also connected to 
water, food and economic security, and 
is said to act as a “threat multiplier” that 
can lead to violence and terrorism.
The 2019 Report on Effects of a Chan-
ging Climate assesses the “significant 
vulnerabilities from climate-related 
events in order to identify high risks to 
mission effectiveness on installations 
and to operations” and “the Efforts to 
Increase Installation Resiliency & Ope-
rational Viability” (DoD 2019a:2). It also 
holds that “the effects of a changing 
climate are a national security issue” as 
they are potentially impacting the DoD 
and its infrastructure, operations and 
plans (DoD 2019a:2).
US Military The Navy’s Roadmap on Climate Change (DoN 2010) set up a special envoy on 
climate change (active until 2019) (Simkins 2019). 
US Army Corps of Engineers Engineering examine the changing climate effects 
in the Artic (DoD 2019b:17).
Table 39: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the US’s traditional 
security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Daniel Abrahams’s research results.
Another continuity in both administrations is detected in references to the Arctic. 
During the Obama administration, the Arctic was a clear concern for the DoD with 
an emphasis on risk mitigation, strategic and future planning, and opportunities, 
as can be seen in the following quote: “Climate change also creates both a 
need and an opportunity for nations to work together” (DoD 2014:25). The 2019 
Arctic strategy under Trump points out that the changing physical environment 
(receding sea ice, concerns over oil and gas exploration, the opening of new 
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shipping lanes and access to resources) is of growing concern to national 
security (DoD 2019b). Similarly, the 2019 Report on Effects of a Changing 
Climate to the Department of Defense highlights that “[c]limate-related effects 
impact accessibility and activity in the Arctic,” which will increase the “demand 
for Arctic-specific search and rescue (SAR) resources” and requires “further 
military support to civil authorities to enable the peaceful opening of the Arctic” 
(DoD 2019a:8).
The lens of the extended security sector reveals several acknowledgements of the 
climate-security nexus by other agencies including, for example, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS). Created in 2002 in response to the September 11 
attacks and coordinated by the White House, its broad mandate is “to secure 
the nation from the many threats we face,” including border security, cyber 
security and disaster response (DHS 2019). The administrations refer differently 
to this mandate, but it becomes apparent that while climate change has been de-
emphasized under the Trump administration, topics such as climatic hazards, 
shocks and resilience persist. Similarly, the USAID sees its mission as “support 
of America‘s foreign policyleading,” and “the U.S. Government‘s international 
development and disaster assistance through partnerships and investments that 
save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance, and help people 
emerge from humanitarian crises and progress beyond assistance” (USAID 
n.d.). In addition, it sees its work in the advancement of “U.S. national security 
and economic prosperity,” the demonstration of “American generosity” and the 
promotion of “a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience” (USAID n.d.), and 
it partly includes or indirectly mentions the climate-security nexus. As shown 
in several other sections of this research report, the USAID carries out several 
projects in other states with reference to the climate-security nexus (e.g. the 
Dominican Republic). 
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Table 40: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the US’s extended security sector
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CONTENT
Obama Administration Trump Administration
Department of 
Homeland Security
The 2012 Climate Change Adaptation 
Roadmap “presents the Department’s 
long-range  planning  effort  to  frame, 
analyze, and adapt to the potential im-
pacts of climate change across its home-
land security missions” (DHS 2012:IV). 
The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Secu-
rity Review describes climate change 
as a “threat multiplier” in relation to 
terrorism, violence, poverty, migration, 
environmental degradation, natural di-
sasters and pandemics. Extremes as 
hurricanes are described as a particu-
lar threat to the life of populations and 
the economy (DHS 2014a:21f).
The 2015 Climate Action Plan examined 
issues of climate resilience and the sup-
port of state, local and non-governmen-
tal actors in preparing for local risks of 
climate change (DHS 2014b).
The 2016 DHS budget earmarked $616 
million to support President Obama’s 
Climate Resiliency Initia-tive (DHS 2015).
In 2017, more than $130 billion had 
been appropriated for disaster spen-
ding in response to hurricanes and 
wildfires (estimated total damage: $300 
billion) (Wharton Risk Center 2018). 
The DHS’s Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency does not mention cli-
mate change in its 2018 Disaster Reco-
very Reform Act, however, the report’s 
preamble references an unpreceden-
ted year in terms of climatic hazards like 
hurricanes and wildfires (FEMA 2018).
Several hearings with experts on cli-
mate change as a threat to national se-
curity (e.g. the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs’ 2019 hearing on How Climate 
Change Threatens U.S. National Secu-
rity) were carried out.
Presidential 
frameworks and 
orders related to 
climate change
Executive Order 13514, Federal Lea-
dership in Environmental, Energy, and 
Economic Performance (Obama 2009); 
Executive Order 13653, Preparing the 
United States for the Impacts of Clima-
te Change (Obama 2013a); Executive 
Order 13693, Planning for Federal Sus-
tainability in the Next Decade (Obama 
2015b).
The President’s 2013 Climate Action 
Plan holds that “[w]hile no single step 
can reverse the effects of climate 
change, we have a moral obligation to 
future generations to leave them a pla-
net that is not polluted and damaged. 
Through steady, responsible action to 
cut carbon pollution, we can protect 
our children’s health and begin to slow 
the effects of climate change so that we 
leave behind a cleaner, more stable en-
vironment” (Obama 2013b:4).
The Presidential Memorandum on Cli-
mate Change and National Security 
acts as a “framework and directs Fede-
ral departments and agencies to per-
form certain functions to ensure that 
climate change-related impacts are 
fully considered in the development of 
national security doctrine, policies, and 
plans” (Obama 2016:sec. 1).
Executive Order 13783, Promoting 
Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth (Trump 2017a) formally disban-
ded and nullified the former administra-
tion’s main frameworks on these issues.
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Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Daniel Abrahams’s research results.
USAID The 2015 Policy document Climate 
Change and Conflict holds that clima-
te change affects security and stability, 
but also that conflict and fragility limit 
the ability to deal with a changing cli-
mate whereas peace can support the 
effort. The need to analyze the climate 
change-conflict nexus and address the 
overlap of socioeconomic vulnerability, 
fragi-lity, and security through conflict-
sensitive programming with the goal of 
“strengthen[ing] efforts to promote both 
peace and climate resilience” is empha-
sized (USAID 2015:X).
The 2019 USAID Policy Framework 
states its mission as “ending the need 
for foreign assistance” through the pro-
motion of self-reliance and reform of de-
velopment assistance. While, notably, 
climate change is not mentioned, it de-
scribes how complex crises as well as 
natural disasters hinder progress and 
points out underlying fragilities world-
wide. “Even in more stable countries, 
many communities lack resilience to 
shocks and stresses, particularly in the 
face of rising environmental pressures” 
(USAID 2019:8).
Several cases illustrated in the table below and express concern for the SIDS 
and future generations, indicating the US’ acknowledgement of the climate-
security nexus from an existential perspective 
The focus on climate security among US policy actors varies between the need 
to secure the state, the people of the US, or the US military. In addition to the 
domestic focus, the foreign focus connects climate change mainly with conflict, 
terrorism, instability and socioeconomic vulnerability. It is notable that, despite 
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Obama’s State of the 
Union speech in 2015
States that “no challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than 
climate change” (Obama 2015c). 
US-China joint 
statement on climate 
change in 2014, 2016
A prominent instance of climate diplomacy and an example of the existential 
security approach is the US-China joint presidential statement on climate 
change, in which both states “have a critical role to play in combating global 
climate change, one of the greatest threats facing humanity” (Office of the Press 
Secretary 2014) and the united support of the UNFCC and the implementation 
of the Paris Agreement was announced “to win the fight against the climate 
threat” (Office of the Press Secretary 2016).
2018 Statement at the 
UNSC
The US representative Johnathan Cohen stated that “the United States 
acknowledges the special challenges that small island developing States 
face in achieving sustainable development, challenges related to their size, 
geographic isolation from markets and limited infrastructure and institutional 
capacity. We have heard from our friends in the Pacific that they consider 
climate change to be an existential threat to their populations, and we 
understand the priority they place on the United Nations system and the 
international community supporting their unique needs” (UNSC 2018).
Table 41: Findings on the climate-security nexus in the US from an existential 
security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Daniel Abrahams’s research results.
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the clear shift from the explicit attention paid to climate change during the 
Obama administration to, in turn, climate security in the Trump administration, 
the discursive positioning of climate change as a threat multiplier continues. The 
Department of Defense is considered a particularly important voice due to its 
perceived appeal to right-leaning political communities (Abrahams 2019). 
UNITED STATES: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
In the first debate on climate change in 2007, the US was relatively reluctant during 
the discussion of the topic (UNSC 2007). However, in 2009, climate change was 
declared as one of the highest priorities of the Obama administration, and the 
need for intensified efforts by the UN System was highlighted (UNGA 2009). In 
2011, the US representative stressed that climate change impacts international 
peace and security through its effects on “vulnerable communities and greater 
instability.” Accordingly, the Council has a responsibility to address these 
security implications (UNSC 2011). Furthermore, in 2015, the urgent need to 
address both climate change and energy security was highlighted (UN 2015).
In comparison, under the Trump administration, US representatives 
deemphasized the importance of climate change in the context of the UNSC. 
In 2019, the US representative highlighted the devastating domestic effects 
of disasters (e.g. fires and hurricanes) for the country and their exacerbating 
effect on existing vulnerabilities, and he described the relationship between 
natural disasters and violence as well as instability. The US representative did 
not use the term climate change in open debates before the UNSC, but did 
refer to climate disasters or extreme climate events; however, he noted the 
importance of considering natural phenomena and disasters as a threat to 
international peace and security. Accordingly, it was emphasized that “post-
disaster recovery” and “post-disaster resilience” should play greater role in the 
UN and the UNSC (UNSC 2019).
During the recent Arria-Formula meeting in 2020, the US shared the concerns of 
the attendees that climate change acts as a contributing factor, among others, 
to instability and conflict. The US representative noted that natural disasters 
and climate change “can increase poverty, food scarcity, and displacement, 
especially in vulnerable states” (Barkin 2020). Accordingly, cooperation with 
global partners on the topic remains part of US foreign policy in order to  
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increase resilience through economic growth and the establishment of clean 
energy technologies in particular. The US sees a need for risk assessment 
and (voluntary and mutually agreed-upon) management and highlights the 
intersection of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and disaster response. A 
recent partnership between USAID and SERVIR of NASA, which “provides 
state-of-the-art, satellite-based Earth monitoring data, geospatial information 
and tools to help improve environmental decision-making among developing 
nations” (NASA n.d.) was presented as an example of successful assessment 
of global climate-related risk. Nonetheless, the explicit role of the UNSC in this 
was not mentioned, and funding for additional initiatives would be based on 
voluntary donations (Barkin 2020).
4.15. FINDINGS ON THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS IN VIETNAM
Based on the analysis and substantial contribution by Vo Dao Chi
Vietnam, a disaster-prone country with 3,260 kilometers of coastline and many 
islands, recognized early on that climate change constitutes a threat affecting not 
only vulnerable groups whose livelihoods are largely dependent on agriculture, 
but national security as well. In the traditional security sector (see table below), 
the military and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) are involved in various activities 
and cooperation formats in order to respond to climate-induced disasters. A 2004 
law on national security, defined as the “sustainable development of the socialist 
regime and the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the inviolability of 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the whole country,” 
(National Assembly 2004) contains a security definition that includes military 
and defense protection but also broader aspects such as political, social and 
economic instabilities in development processes. The National Defense White 
Paper (MoD 2019), adopted in 2019, highlights the importance of climate 
change as a non-traditional security issue with respect to national security and 
emphasizes cooperative response at the global level and in the context of the 
Mekong Delta (see below). Vietnam’s diplomatic focus emphasizes peace to 
address conflict and enhance international cooperation on climate change. 
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Ministry of Defense and 
the military
The MoD takes a leading role in the National (steering) Committee for Disaster, 
Incident Response, Search and Rescue, ensures the sovereignty of the sea, 
islands, territory and border sovereignty, and supports rescues and damage 
containment (Prime Minister 2017b). 
Military forces at the border cooperate with local authorities and fishery 
agencies to manage and monitor vessels and assist fishermen in response to 
storms and tropical low pressures, mitigating damage to people and vessels. 
This ensures social stability and the livelihoods of the fishing community and 
strengthens individuals’ involvement in protecting Vietnam‘s sovereignty over 
the sea and islands. The MoD also cooperates with other ministries to perform 
rescue operations and minimize damage from, e.g. natural disasters and 
epidemics. It assists the Ministry of Health – which also deals with natural 
disasters and epidemics – in developing health information systems and 
carrying out training and communication related to climate change and health. 
2019 National Defense 
White Paper
The white paper states: “Global security issues, ranging from finance, energy, 
water and food to climate change, natural calamities, and epidemics are 
unfolding with complicated developments” (MoD 2019:9ff). And: “Non-
traditional security issues, as seen in cyberspace, terrorism, energy, food, 
climate change, natural disasters, epidemics, drug trafficking, people 
smuggling, illegal migration, transnational crime, and maritime piracy, are 
posing acute challenges to peace, security, stability, and cooperation for 
development in the region” (MoD 2019:12). The same non-traditional security 
issues “also pose perpetual challenges to the national defence and security of 
Viet Nam” (MoD 2019:19). In response to these issues, “Viet Nam promotes 
cooperation with countries inside and outside the region to address common 
security challenges. Prevention and response to global climate change is one 
of Viet Nam‘s national strategic goals. Viet Nam prioritises the use of clean 
energy, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and mitigation of sea-level rise 
impacts. Additionally, it endorses efforts of the Mekong River Commission and 
effective management and use of Mekong‘s water resources according to the 
rules of international law that govern interstate relations over transboundary 
rivers” (MoD 2019:32).
Table 42: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Vietnam’s traditional  
security sector
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Vo Dao Chi’s research results.
At the ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy Conference 2020, hosted by 
Vietnam, the deputy defense minister highlighted the effects of non-traditional 
threats such as COVID-19 and environmental challenges in the need for 
ASEAN to further “strengthen their cooperation to solve these problems on 
the basis of international laws and by peaceful means, for the benefits of all 
nations” (MoD 2020).
Viewing acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus through the lens of 
the extended security sector (see table below) places a focus on the fact that 
Vietnam has established and developed legal frameworks, institutions and 
resolutions (e.g. the Communist Party 2013 and the 2013 law on natural disaster 
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prevention and control) to improve its national capacity to address and respond 
to challenges related to climate change. These measures emphasize disaster 
risk management, early warning and rapid response actions to rescue people 
and mitigate the negative impacts of climate extremes and disasters. Several 
national committees also aim to enhance the integration and cooperation of 
various ministries, whereby an important focus rests on the fact that climate 
change, along with disease, has been recognized as a direct threat. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  CONTENT
2007 National Strategy 
on Natural Disaster 
Prevention, Response 
and Mitigation
Envisages prevention and the minimization of damage caused by natural 
disasters and aims to ensure national security with regard to social stability, 
security and national defense. The strategy also emphasizes the role of the 
People‘s Army in rapid response and in dealing with serious environmental 
issues such as disasters, climate extremes and epidemics (Prime Minster 
2007). Established the Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control as the 
main body in charge of national disaster preparedness and mitigation.
2008 National Target 
Program to Respond to 
Climate Change (NTP-
RCC)
Describes climate change as a global challenge that greatly affects and 
alters social life on a global scale. Its related consequences include threating 
“national strength”, “national [competition]” and “social living” in Vietnam. 
Responses to these phenomena are therefore considered a “matter of living”, 
and sustainable development of a low-carbon economy is a main strategic aim 
(Prime Minister 2008).
2011 National Climate 
Change Strategy
Identifies strategic tasks and priorities such as food, energy and water 
security in the national response to climate change. The strategy envisages 
the protection of quality of life, security and sustainable development of the 
nation. The strategy also aims to increase the ability of the population and 
the economy to adapt to climate variabilities. It also highlights international 
cooperation in protecting the global climate system (Prime Minister 2011a).
2013 Resolution in 
response to climate 
change
The resolution on the active response to climate change, increasing natural 
resources management and environmental protection, issued by the 
Communist Party and the Party Central Executive Committee, shows that 
responding to climate change is a crucial task for the entire political system 
(Communist Party 2013).
2013 Law on disaster 
prevention and control
Issued by the National Assembly, the law specifies the role and responsibilities 
of the central government, government agencies, the armed forces and 
communities in protecting human safety against storms and sea level rise and 
ensuring national defense and security in the context of sovereignty disputes 
in the East Sea (National Assembly 2013).
Congress, 2011 and 
2016
Congress categorized climate change as a non-traditional security issue 
alongside population explosion, diseases, international and transnational 
crime, inequality, migration, scarcity of energy and natural resources. It 
identified climate change as threat due to its specific impact on food, water, 
climate disaster, disease, and energy (Communist Party 2011, 2016; Doan 
2017).
Table 43: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Vietnam’s extended  
security sector
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Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Vo Dao Chi’s research results.
National Action Plan on 
Climate Change for the 
period 2012-2020
Aims to enhance climate monitoring and early warning systems for disasters, 
ensure food and water security, create initiatives to respond to disasters, prevent 
flooding in large cities, protect the dike system and reservoirs, minimize GHGs 
and promote a low-carbon economy, enhance management capacity, further 
develop the climate change mechanism, enable the participation of economic 
sectors in response to climate change, raise awareness of climate change and 
develop human resources, enhance international cooperation and Vietnam‘s 
position and role in international activities on climate change, and mobilize 
resources and funds to cope with climate change (Prime Minister 2012a).
National strategy on 
environment protection
Aims to control and minimize increases in environmental pollution, resource 
degradation and biodiversity decline, to continuously improve the quality of 
the living environment, to improve the ability to proactively respond to climate 





The NDCs contain several references to security, as illustrated in the following 
quotes. Vietnam aims to “[a]ssure national energy security by developing 
and exploiting different energy sources, while simultaneously using energy 
sources effectively” (NDC 2015:5). “The National Climate Change Strategy 
has identified that priorities are food security, energy security, water security, 
poverty reduction, gender equality, social security, public health, livelihood 
improvements and the protection of natural resources. These goals can only 
be achieved through enhancing the adaptive capacity of human and socio-
economic systems as well as natural systems. Through its NDC, Viet Nam 
can communicate its current and future climate change response efforts 
implemented with national resources, and what can be done better with 
additional international support” (NDC 2015:8). The NDCs also state that 
the implementation of “disaster prevention plans and measures […] protect 
peoples’ lives, and ensure national defence and security” (NDC 2015:10).
Social security is connected to water and food security: “Implement integrated 
water resources management in river basin systems; ensure reservoir safety; 
strengthen international cooperation in addressing transboundary water 
issues; ensure water security […] Ensure food security through protecting, 
sustainably maintaining and managing agricultural land; restructuring of 
crops and livestock; create new climate change resilient varieties; complete 
the disease control and prevention system” (NDC 2015:10).
2017 National Green 
Growth Strategy
As shown in the 2017 National Green Growth Strategy, the concept of “green 
growth” has become a main political approach. Climate change is considered 
not only a threat, but also a potential opportunity for Vietnam to motivate 
innovative development thinking and enhance its competitiveness and national 
strength (Prime Minister 2017a).
2018 National Action 
Strategy on health 
includes climate change
The general aim of this strategy is to enhance the ability of the health sector to 
respond to climate change; the central focus is on prevention and minimization 
of the environmental and climate change risks affecting the health system 
(Ministry of Health 2018).
Moving beyond these domestic approaches, the Mekong Delta, which covers 
3.9 million hectares at one meter above sea level (Smajgl 2018) and is home 
to 17.3 million people living in 13 provinces, 74.9% of which are rural (GSO 
2018), plays an important role in Vietnam’s consideration of climate security. 
As one of Vietnam’s most productive agricultural zones, the Mekong Delta has 
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received considerable attention due to the adverse impacts of climate change 
(such as storm surges, saline water intrusion and sea level rise) on the local 
agriculture-based economy (Vu et al. 2018) and the livelihoods of the population 
(Smajgl 2018). In addition, the Mekong River passes through six countries that 
share water resources with Vietnam. Investment in agriculture and hydrology 
plants in upstream countries, particularly China, Cambodia and Laos, have 
exposed Vietnam to high risk in terms of food and water security. In this conflict-
laden context, the inter-governmental organization Mekong River Commission, 
established in 1995, aims to enhance international cooperation and sustainable 
water management among the countries, support its members in coping with 
extreme floods, drought and sea level rise, and facilitate dialogue among 
governments, the private sector and civil society (Mekong River Commission 
2014). The commission has called for cooperation in addressing climate 
change and has included adaptation to climate change as a priority area in its 
development strategy (Mekong River Commission n.d.). Vietnam participated 
alongside commission members in the Climate Change Adaption Initiative 
(2011-2015), which concluded: “Climate change is no longer just a threat in the 
Lower Mekong Basin. Its impact is present and is affecting the livelihoods of 
millions that rely on the river’s natural resources.” The commission thus “works 
to determine, with greater certainty, the impacts of climate change, and how the 
organisation can help Mekong countries better adapt to these changes” and 
highlights that a basin-wide approach “ensures that climate change adaptation 
is harmonized with effective strategies, plans at various levels and is applied 
at priority locations throughout the basin” (Mekong River Commission 2015). 
Vietnam cooperates on several other Mekong Delta frameworks with Japan, the 
US, China, European countries, the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank, among others, and has received attention–varying from research to 
practical actions to funding of community development projects at the local 
level–from international agencies.
The research found that the issue of climate change is anchored in the constitu-
tion and that the threat to the existence of island states is of particular concern. 
These aspects indicate an awareness of an existential security perspective on 
climate change.  
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2013 Constitution of 
Vietnam
Article 63 holds that the “State has a policy to protect the environment; to 
manage and effectively and stably use natural resources; to protect nature and 
biodiversity; to take initiative in prevention, control and response to climate 
change” (Constitution 2013).
2019 Statement at the 
UNSC open debate
The permanent representative to the UN emphasized that the “most threatening 
impact of climate change is sea level rise. Studies showed that, in the most 
optimistic scenario, by 2050, without concrete climate and development 
actions from the international community, hundreds of countries and territories 
will be affected. The very survival of small islands states is at risk. Climate 
change[’s] direct impact to international peace and security has become more 
evident. The threat is already here and now. The way we [respond] to it will 
define our future” (UNSC 2019). 
Table 44: Findings on the climate-security nexus in Vietnam from an existential 
security perspective
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Vo Dao Chi’s research results.
Overall, it must be emphasized that Vietnam is one of the countries most 
vulnerable to climate change, which is why the Vietnamese government considers 
it a “matter of living” (Primer Minister 2008). However, climate change has been 
viewed primarily as a non-traditional security issue, and the security implications 
of climate change are mostly seen as being linked with food, water and energy 
security as well as natural disasters and epidemics. Vietnam has gradually 
established and developed legal frameworks and institutions to enhance its 
ability to address and respond to these issues, and climate change has been 
integrated in most of its national plans, strategies, programs and international 
policies as well.
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VIETNAM: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC
In context of the UNSC, Vietnam has made the impacts of climate change on 
peace and security a main priority of its membership (2020-2021). Climate 
change is included among seven priorities, following issues such as conflict 
prevention and preventive diplomacy as well as the strengthening of regional 
organizations and the protection of children in military conflicts (Foreign 
Ministry 2019). During the UNSC open debate in 2019, Vietnam stressed that 
climate change poses major security risks through increasingly frequent and 
intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts) that have already 
“caused untold suffering to hundreds of millions of people” and can lead to 
displacement, food and water insecurities and potentially cause conflict. 
Vietnam highlighted that sea level rise has the biggest security impact because 
“hundreds of countries and territories will be affected” if no action is taken 
by the international community. Accordingly, the UN needs a comprehensive 
response plan that includes the security implications of climate change and 
involves all UN entities in all regions and levels, and which integrates national 
governments and regional organizations such as ASEAN (UNSC 2019).
Vietnam was a co-organizer of the recent Arria-Formula meeting on climate 
security in April 2020. The Vietnamese representative stated that Vietnam 
itself is heavily affected by climate change, and that it especially shares in the 
concerns related to the Sahel Region and the SIDS. Climate change is thus 
“undeniably” a security threat–one that must be recognized and considered 
by the UNSC. Vietnam therefore emphasized the need for a better information 
basis and analysis of climate-related security risk in order for the UNSC to 
prepare for complex situations by, e.g. monitoring the impacts of climate 
change on peace operations and peacebuilding efforts (Dang 2020).
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The comparative analysis shows that the climate-security nexus is acknowledged 
by all UNSC member states throughout the traditional security sector as well as 
by a number of other state actors, ranging from heads of state to ministries. An 
overview of how climate change is related to security can be seen in the table 
below and illustrates the broad array of understandings that apply throughout 
the different sectors. These conceptions primarily refer to climate change as 
a threat, challenge, risk and vulnerability, or they address the need to respond 
with certain policies or actions. In addition to the entities, fields and processes 
broadly outlined below, the climate-security nexus often appears in references 
to specific geographical locations such as the Sahel, the Artic, the Mekong River, 
and the Small Island states.  
As this research was limited to a mapping approach, a qualitative evaluation 
of the responses and activities described in the case studies – an evaluation 
that measures certain assertions against what is documented or communicated 
in official sources – remains a task for future elaborations. In the meantime, 
however, a sense of change in the treatment of climate security as a topic can 
be detected. While the US in particular has displayed a strong inverse trend 
since the beginning of the Trump administration, inclusion and integration 
5. Cross-cutting research  
 findings, recommendations  
 and outlook
CLIMATE CHANGE is
- interrelated with / - impacts on
CLIMATE CHANGE is
- interrelated with / - impacts on / - a challenge to  
- linked with multiple threats to/- a threat to
• conflict, terrorism, war  
and peace 
• national security, international 
peace and stability
• poor and vulnerable 
populations
• military forces, infrastructure, 
military activity
• vulnerability of sovereignty, 
statehood and regions
• future generations  
and humanity
• social vulnerability, instability 
and migration
• livelihood and health of 
people via socioeconomic 
and socioecological impact  
of extreme weather events
• wildlife, nature and  
the planet
Table 45: Overview of the climate-security nexus in the comparative analysis of 
the UNSC member states
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
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of the climate-security nexus and other adverse effects of climate change 
outlined above is generally increasing in several policy fields at the domestic 
level (for example, by including climate change in the constitution – see section 
on existential security below) as well as in other international organizations 
and within the UNSC itself. In contrast to these tendencies and as a general 
observation of mainstreaming, in most of the case studies the issue receives 
releatively little attion in comparison to other policy fields. This furthermore 
calls attention to the fact that the responses and actions are mostly limited to 
climate politics despite widespread acknowledgement of the broad topics and 
processes involved (see table above) and also in reference to the scope and 
dramatic implications of existential security threats. Particularly striking, too, are 
the occasional discrepancies between national state policies and the state’s 
UNSC position on the matter. 
Also striking is the general absence of references to the scientific descriptions 
and assessments of the world concerning, e.g. fundamental research from the 
Earth System Science and/or the broader Environmental Humanities. References 
to the importance of scientific advice is surprisingly low as well. 
In the following, the main research findings and recommendations of the compar-
ative analysis will be described in reference to the four analytical research foci.  
5.1. CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS FINDINGS IN THE  
TRADITIONAL SECURITY SECTOR 
The comparative analysis shows that climate change is addressed or integrated 
in the traditional security sector in 12 member states (Belgium, Estonia, China, 
Germany, France, Indonesia, Niger, Russia, South Africa, the US, the UK and 
Vietnam). In three member states (the Dominican Republic, Tunisia and SVG), 
no acknowledgement of the climate-security nexus was found in the traditional 
sector. Eleven member states (Estonia, Vietnam, Russia, China, South Africa, 
Niger, the UK, the US, Indonesia, Germany and France) include climate 
change in their security strategy, and some states (Russia, the UK) even have 
a specifically environment- or climate change-focused security strategy while 
others (e.g. China, South Africa) reference a holistic security concept that 
explicitly includes the broader security dimensions of an evolving world. The 
different acknowledgements of climate change and security in the traditional 
security sector include it’s impacts on violent conflict, migration and statehood 
loss (e.g. in Germany); on dialogue, cooperation and peace (e.g. in France); 
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and especially on military forces, infrastructure and activity (e.g. in the US). The 
existential threat to future generations is also acknowledged by the traditional 
security sector (e.g. in South Africa and Germany). 
The suggested responses in the documents mostly involve mitigation and 
greenhouse gas reduction (e.g. in Vietnam), international cooperation (e.g. 
in Estonia), environmental protection (e.g. in Estonia and South Africa) and 
development assistance (e.g. in Estonia and Belgium). In addition to the 
descriptions by different actors, the research detected activity on the subject, 
ranging from personnel and institutional divisions (e.g. in the US, China and 
France) to research, monitoring and reporting on the topic (e.g. in Belgium, 
Germany, France, Estonia and the US). In many member states, the military is 
included in disaster risk management and in responses to weather extremes 
and the corresponding humanitarian issues on a domestic level (e.g. in China, 
the Dominican Republic, Niger, Tunisia and Vietnam) as well as the international 
level (e.g. in Belgium, South Africa, Russia and the UK). 
Generally, it needs to be emphasized that the traditional security sector and its 
conceptions of the world and realpolitik are changing with respect to climate 
change. The case studies show that, while the multiple implications and effects 
of climate change are acknowledged in member states’ traditional security 
sectors and may result in corresponding activities, a militarization of the topic 
through increased war preparation measures was not detected. Instead, the 
traditional security sector engages mostly in activities of establishing expertise 
in fostering cooperation on the issue. On the basis of these findings, scholars as 
well as practitioners will need to engage further with the re-assessment and new 
definitions of state and human security concepts, such as the classical division 
between traditional, hard and soft security. The approaches described in the 
case studies thereby provide a research basis for scholars and can also serve 
as models for initiating processes of learning and adaptation for other security 
institutions and actors. It is also important to evaluate the acknowledgments and 
approaches of the tradiational security sector in terms of the seriousness of the 
threat. The acknowledgments of climate change and the inclusion of expertise 
and scientific advice on the matter shows a growing concern with the issues. 
Questions of how the traditional security sector is and will be further engaged 
in socioecological phenomena remain subject to further research and policy 
development.   
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5.2. CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS FINDINGS IN THE  
EXTENDED SECURITY SECTOR 
The climate-security nexus is also acknowledged in a broad sense by other 
state actors, ranging from heads of governments to parliaments and various 
ministries. It is notable that the importance attributed to the climate-security 
nexus varies widely among the member states. While a qualitative analysis is 
still needed, the research shows that especially vulnerable or affected countries 
such as the Dominican Republic have included climate change adaptation in 
their constitution as a state priority. In addition, Niger, whose vulnerability has 
already been recognized in the UNSC resolution on the Sahel (UNSC 2017), 
suffers from desertification and climate change as well as from the instability 
and governmental fragility associated with these phenomena and deserves a 
special mention among the case studies. It was furthermore detected that some 
member states (e.g. France, Germany, the UK) approach the issue primarily in 
the foreign policy domain while others (e.g. China, the Dominican Republic, 
Niger, Russia and South Africa) include and/or address the issue on the level of 
domestic affairs and policies.
Climate change is treated as a cross-cutting issue in most states (Belgium, 
Estonia, China, the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Niger, Russia, SVG, 
Tunisia, the UK and Vietnam) through a National Adaptation Plan for Climate 
Change. Furthermore, the climate-security nexus is included in several climate 
policies (e.g. those of Belgium and Estonia) by describing, for example, physical 
threats to the state itself such as sea level rise and weather extremes and their 
impacts on not only the security of the population (e.g. in Russia) but also 
on food security (e.g. in SVG, Niger and South Africa), water security (e.g. in 
Indonesia and South Africa) and energy security (e.g. in Tunisia). Some national 
environmental and climate policies (e.g. those of Belgium, Estonia and the UK) 
describe, as a means of justification, the relationship between climate change 
and violent conflicts in other parts of the world, or they stress the need for 
implementation based on the policies’ potential effect on domestic tensions 
(e.g. in France’s reference to the gilet jaunes protests). The National Determined 
Contributions communications to the UNFCCC (from the Dominican Republic, 
China Niger, Indonesia, South Africa, SVG, Tunisia and Vietnam) also contain 
different references to the term security.
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It is also worth noting that the particular focus of some member states’ (e.g. 
SVG and the Dominican Republic) on extreme weather events and disaster risk 
management reflects these issues’ fundamental importance to the protection 
of the state. This focus cross-cuts through all other sectors and is included in 
several regional cooperation frameworks on disaster risk management. 
Extended security sector responses can be described as including largely 
preventive and protective approaches such as climate change mainstreaming, 
institutionalization, scientific assessment, strategic or presidential policy plans 
and frameworks, disaster risk management, humanitarian and development aid, 
and climate politics and diplomacy. Some institutionalization can be detected 
(e.g. France’s Ecological Defense Council).
Generally speaking, security thinking is included in several other policies ranging 
from development aid to domestic security and to environmental and climate 
politics. It is also notable that most of the broad incorporations of climate change 
into politics are often underpinned by a threat-response approach. Sometimes 
the very creation of the climate policy itself is justified using references to security 
implications.  
An important conclusion in terms of the general picture is that, while the majority 
of the literature and practitioners associate the climate-security nexus with 
traditional security actors and topics, the actual actors and policies involved, 
implicated and (indirectly) affected are much broader. This also applies to the 
general geographic focus on vulnerable or conflict- and violence-prone areas 
such as the Sahel or on resource-rich and geopolitically relevant regions such 
as the Artic. Recognition of these broad, cross-cutting acknowledgements in all 
the case studies provides an important basis for further research as well as more 
coherent policymaking and an alignment of strategies at several levels, ranging 
from the domestic and foreign levels up to the UNSC level. 
5.3. CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS FINDINGS AND EXISTENTIAL SECURITY 
Climate change has been acknowledged by 13 member states (see table below) 
as an existential security threat to future generations and the SIDS, among 
others. These acknowledgements have mostly been detected in statements 
at events such as COP21 or in institutional contexts such as the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC itself. The following table illustrates the topics 
detected in several statements and documents.
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One unique feature among the case studies is that SVG has, over the years, 
repeatedly emphasized the existential threat to SVG itself as well as other 
island states in several statements within the UN context. Also notable is the 
fact that, as described in the case study, the UK parliament has declared a 
state of climate emergency and therefore seems to be particularly concerned 
about the issue. The German case study stands out because it carries the only 
detected reference to planetary boundaries and the Earth System, which points 
to an acknowledgement of scientific research results on the global threat of 
climate change. In the Chinese case study, it is interesting to note that the aims 
of protecting the planet and achieving ecological security were detected even 
though these aspirations are not to be directly related to the especially party-
centered Chinese national security concept.  
It is particularly striking that the responses articulated in relation to the existential 
security perspective also comply with the ones outlined in the other two sector 
approaches. The only exceptions are several statements (from, e.g. SVG, the 
Dominican Republic, South Africa and Niger) that highlight responsibilities of 
member states in the Global North and stress that the survival of more-vulnerable 
countries depends on multilateral action.
In addition to the classical threat description, this research focused on the central 
value to secure and placed a special focus on member state constitutions. The results 
of this research shows that, despite being relatively old, most of the constitutions 
made reference to the protection of the environment (in Belgium, Estonia, China, 
the Dominican Republic, Niger, France, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Tunisia 
CLIMATE CHANGE itself  
challenges/is a threat to/is interrelated with/ 
is linked with multiple threats to
DETECTED in
• the existence of the SIDS or small islands  
in general through sea level rise
Belgium, Estonia, the Dominican Republic, France, 
Germany, Indonesia, SVG, the UK, Vietnam
• the very survival of the nation itself SVG
• nations, states and populations Estonia, Germany, Indonesia
• humankind and future generations China, Germany, South Africa, the UK, the US
• life and the planet France, Germany, Russia, the UK
Table 46: Comparative research findings on UNSC member states’ existential 
security descriptions of the climate-security nexus
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
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and Vietnam) and future generations (in Belgium, Estonia, the Dominican Republic, 
Niger, France, Germany, Russia, South Africa and Tunisia). In SVG, the Dominican 
Republic, Vietnam and (according to several references) Tunisia, the constitutions 
include the need to address and/or to adapt to climate change. 
Given the number of acknowledgements, it is striking that this existential security 
perspective neither plays a major role nor seems to merit particular response 
in comparison to other areas of politics, whether domestic or international. 
Currently, no UN institution provides a mandate on these fundamental questions 
of climate change threat or on the impacts on insecurity linked to broader 
socioecological phenomena that measures up to the scientific descriptions of 
massive, disruptive consequences such as, for example, biodiversity loss and 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the UN itself has not included the fundamental 
principles of protecting the future generations and life in general in the UN 
Charter. This research thus renders especially visible the missing theoretical gap 
and policy gap that youth protests and scientists point to (see Thunberg 2018; 
Hagedorn et al. 2019; Ripple et al. 2019). Immediate steps to address this would 
inlcude several crucial fundamental starting points. These include protecting of 
fundamental values (human life and future generations) in the UN Charter (Fopp 
2019), including the sciences and strengthening the science-policy interface 
(especially engaging with research on existential security through joint efforts in 
the natural and social sciences), and including different research communities 
such as Earth System Sciences, Peace and Conflict and Security Studies, 
among others, and providing a voice to children, future generations and those 
especially threatened, such as the SIDS and other groups or populations. 
5.4. POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNSC 
The comparative analysis of the member states’ different positions in the 
context of the UNSC and, particularly, during the April 2020 Arria-Formula 
meeting (Permanent Mission France 2020), shows that most of the member 
states are in agreement on proposed systematic and periodic reporting by the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on climate and security issues as well 
as preventive measures. Some member states suggested additional support 
for the Climate Security Mechanism and the appointment of a special envoy 
to better coordinate UN responses. While sometimes expressed in a hesitant 
manner and with skepticism toward addressing climate change within the 
UNSC, all 15 Council members acknowledged during this meeting that climate 
change has an impact on international security, even if some states described 
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it as representing one factor among several (Permanent Mission France 2020). 
All member states also emphasized the necessity of engaging in multilateral 
actions and strengthening the UN. The analysis of their statements detected 
the need for an improved information basis supported by further scientific and 
case-specific assessment of the linkages between security and climate change. 
Furthermore, most of the states expressed the need for responses to include 
the whole UN system and to support better coordination and synergy while 
avoiding the duplication of efforts. On the basis of these findings, a next step in 
strengthening the science-policy interface on the matter would be to establish a 
science network and research body that would explicitly address and tackle the 
multiple topics associated within the climate-security nexus. 
The comparison between the UNSC positions on integrating climate change 
into national policy agendas reveals several discrepancies. While, some states 
(e.g. Russia, China, the US) have mostly been skeptical or have even refrained 
from addressing climate change in the UNSC, these same states include 
and mainstream (to an extent) climate change in the traditional and extended 
security sectors on the domestic level. Furthermore, it is notable that while 
some states are willing to acknowledge the climate-security nexus in the UNSC 
context in reference to a certain geographical focus (see the UNSC resolutions 
with climate-security references limited to the African continent), they refrain 
from recognizing the link generally and as a cross-cutting issue. While these 
discrepancies require further research, it is suggested here that establishing a 
regular dialogue between member states on national and local experiences with 
and approaches to the issue, and supporting state dialogue might improve the 
information basis for action and increase awareness of the states’ own domestic 
matters well, given that most of the states already engage in these activities at 
domestic level. An understanding of the state of the Earth System and of the 
dramatic socioecological processes and consequences, of the impossibility to 
sovereign delimitable action and securing of national security, and of the need to 
develop decisive and concrete policies that place a special focus on existential 
security is fundamentally important and a responsibility of the international 
community. 
5.5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNSC CONTEXT
An important goal of this research project was to formulate policy recommen-
dations that reflect the widespread acknowlegdment by the member states of 
the climate-security nexus. 
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Based on the key research results, the IFSH Policy Brief (Hardt 2020) formulated 
the following main recommendations for the UNSC context:
 ❚ “That the UNSC formally recognize the complex interrelations of climate 
change and security and their effects as a cross-cutting issue, and adapt 
institutional working methods in order to comprehend the challenges
 ❚ Improving dialogue within the UN by strengthening work capacity and knowl-
edge provision in the Climate Security Mechanism and establishing a system-
atic forum for sharing lessons learned and responses to the climate-security 
nexus between countries
 ❚ Establishing an international, interdisciplinary science hub/network” that 
“deals explicitly with questions in this ample research field and provides 
knowledge to the UNSC, CSM, UN and the broader international community. 
The network’s assessments could provide the UNSC with a scientific basis 
for future decision-making, dialogue and bargaining concerning: 
• The building of case-by-case analyses of complex, dynamic, context-de-
pendent connections between the forms and sociopolitical roots of the 
climate-security nexus in possible responses at the local level. The accom-
panying scientific analysis should include local experts and be informed 
by the disciplines of Peace and Conflict, Security Studies and Earth Sys-
tem Sciences, among others. 
• The development of proposals for specific institutional adaptation and im-
proved working methods. A central goal should be developing preventive 
and multilateral responses to protect essential conditions for life and the 
most vulnerable, thereby protecting other core aspects of global security–
the environment and future generations–as already addressed in multiple 
member states’ constitutions”.  
5.6. LIMITATIONS AND OUTLOOK
This research has not engaged with the multiple power structures and relations 
that importantly influence political dynamics, nor with the fact that the UNSC 
largely concentrates on the basic five permanent members versus the elected 
members. Also, the scope of this project did not include other (not as easily 
visible) political bargaining processes related to geopolitical interests influenced 
by other political dimensions, nor could it address the tension between state- and 
nationally-focused action and the fear of loss of sovereignty that stands partly in 
contrast to the collective and multilateral cooperation necessary to face these 
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massive threats. Furthermore, a qualitative evaluation of the member states’ 
actions in contrast to their discourse as well as a discussion of the normative 
and political implications of the different approaches will need to be addressed 
in future research. This research outline was based on a relatively classical 
approach and on the assumption of a clear delineation of actors and different 
policy levels. Furthermore, the research on civil society and on the respective 
research communities will need to be tackled in a future approach. 
Additional central topics that have not been alluded to within this research include 
multiple risks and political implications on securitization and climatization (e.g. 
Chaturvedi and Doyle 2016; Ide 2020; Maertens 2019; Maertens and Hardt 
forthcoming in 2021) and a renewed discussion of the limits or broadness of 
the field. 
Finally, it is important to highlight the fact that, even though a broad acknowl-
edgement of the link between climate change and security was detected in the 
case studies, the importance placed on effective responses to climate change 
does not adequately correspond to the severity of the threats nor to the complex 
and partly unknown yet profound impact these threats have had and will have. 
The seriousness of existential threats and of what is at stake as these irreversible 
and partly unforeseeable consequences cross-cut livelihoods, nations, peoples, 
the vulnerable and future generations is obviously not sufficiently understood by 
decision-makers. 
Generally, it should be highlighted that a sound body of knowledge already 
exists on the matter and that many of the above outlined future research 
questions are already partly tackled by some research communities and/or 
individual scholars, mostly those with a Security, Peace and Conflict research 
background. However, the scholarship that engages with the nexus of broader 
socioecological phenomenon and security requires further support, elaboration 
and integration of different sciences. Connecting existing scholarship on the 
climate-security nexus to the broader fields of Security, Peace and Conflict 
Studies and the Earth System Sciences, as well as improving the science-
policy interface in order to fully comprehend and begin to engage with the 
development of policies on and approaches to the existential security threats, 
remain central challenges that lie ahead. 
This research hopes to provide a basis that will encourage future research, 
policy responses and action on the topic. 
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